Opinion
CLAIM NO. E912584
ORDER FILED DECEMBER 1, 2000
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE DAVID H. McCORMICK, Attorney at Law, Russellville, Arkansas.
Respondent represented by the HONORABLE TERRY D. LUCY, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge: Modified.
OPINION AND ORDER
The respondents appeal an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on June 8, 2000. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found that the respondents should be responsible for all of the claimant's medical treatment to date following her work-related back injury on June 20, 1999. The respondents assert on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate a causal connection between the claimant's alleged injury and her current back problems, complaints, and need for treatment. We agree. We find that the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the claimant's work-related back injury resolved prior to September 28, 1999, and that the claimant has therefore failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any medical treatment she has received since that time has been causally related to her work-related back injury.
The claimant was employed by the respondent as a waitress. There is no dispute that the claimant slipped on a wet floor at work on June 20, 1999 and fell to her knees. The evidence which persuades us that the claimant sustained a relatively minor injury which resolved prior to September 28, 1999 includes the following: (1) evidence that the claimant made persistent back complaints to at least one co-worker both before andafter the June 20, 1999 incident (2) evidence that one co-worker, at the claimant's request, felt a knot on the claimant's back shortly before June 20, 1999 (3) evidence that the claimant continued to engage in her pre-injury weekend dancing activities after the June 20, 1999 injury (4) evidence that, after initially treating with an emergency room physician, her family physician and a chiropractor, the claimant did not seek any additional back treatment for her back from approximately July 12, 1999 until September 28, 1999 (5) evidence that the claimant did seek medical attention for another medical problem (TMJ) between July 12, 1999 and September 28, 1999 (6) evidence that the claimant sought treatment on September 28, 1999 when she experienced "instant pain" in her back tending to her child and (7) evidence that the claimant was only taken off work for a couple of days after June 20, 1999, then continued to work until approximately September 28, 1999.
In reaching our conclusion that the claimant sustained a minor injury which resolved prior to September 28, 1999, we note that Dr. Terry Green opined on February 2, 2000 that the claimant's back pain at that time was caused by her slip and fall injury on June 20, 1999. However, in assessing the weight to be accorded by Dr. Green's opinion, we note that Dr. Green's opinion makes no reference to the claimant's persistent pre-injury back complaints or to the pre-existing knot in the claimant's back. In fact, Dr. Green's report indicates that Dr. Green was under the mistaken impression that the claimant actually had no history of back pain prior to the June 20, 1999 incident except for one instance in 1994. Dr. Green was also under the impression that the claimant had not seen anyone for her back between 1994 until after June 20, 1999. The claimant provided a similar history to the respondents in her deposition. In fact, however, the claimant's medical records indicate that the claimant sustained a sufficient back injury hanging a picture on August 16, 1996 to require a trip to the emergency room, and the claimant returned to the emergency room on September 8, 1997, purportedly because she had bent over and couldn't straighten up. In summary, both co-worker testimony and medical records indicate that Dr. Green was provided a sufficiently inaccurate history so that we accord Dr. Green's opinion very little weight. In light of the seven factors cited above, we likewise accord little weight to the claimant's assertion that she experienced symptoms from her June 20, 1999 fall that persisted to and beyond September 28, 1999.
Therefore, after conducting a de novo review of the entire record, and for the reasons discussed herein, we find that the administrative law judge's award of additional benefits must be, and hereby is, modified. The respondents are only liable for the claimant's medical treatment between June 20, 1999, and July 12, 1999.
All accrued benefits shall be paid in a lump sum without discount and with interest thereon at the lawful rate from the date of the administrative law judge's decision in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-809 (Repl. 1996). For prevailing in part on this appeal before the Full Commission, claimant's attorney is hereby awarded an additional attorney's fee in the amount of $250.00 in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 (Repl. 1996).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________ ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman
Commissioner Humphrey concurs in part and dissents in part.
I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part from the principal opinion in this case.
In S S Construction, Inc. v. Coplin, 65 Ark. App. 251, 986 S.W.2d 132 (1999), the Court of Appeals held that we lack the authority to issue an opinion without a majority vote. In view of the Coplin case, I am compelled to concur with the finding that respondents are liable for claimant's medical treatment from at least June 20, 1999, through July 12, 1999, so that claimant's award of medical benefits may be preserved. However, I dissent from the finding that claimant failed to prove entitlement to medical benefits after July 12, 1999. In my view, claimant established the requisite causal connection between the compensable injury and her current symptoms. Accordingly, I would award the medical treatment recommended by Dr. Moore.
Based on the foregoing, I concur in part and dissent in part.
_________________________________ PAT WEST HUMPHREY, Commissioner
Commissioner Wilson concurs in part and dissents in part.
I concur in the majority's opinion that claimant is not entitled to any medical benefits after July 12, 1999. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion finding that the respondent should pay for the medical treatment rendered to the claimant after June 20, 1999. In my opinion, claimant has only proven that she fell while working for respondent in 1999. However, she failed to prove that her medical treatment after June 20, 1999, is related to the work-place fall. The medical evidence indicates that claimant suffered similar back problems in 1995, 1996 and 1997, and claimant complained of low back pain consistently throughout her employment with respondent, before and after the incident, according to witnesses. The fact that claimant appeared to be in more pain in her actions after the accident according to witnesses does not demonstrate that she suffered any injury from that fall, especially since this behavior occurred after she had voiced her intention to sue respondent if her bills were not paid.
In addition, claimant failed to report significant parts of her medical history regarding her previous incidents of back pain, brought on by falling, putting a bowl on a table and hanging pictures, prior to the work-place fall, when she saw the emergency room doctor and her treating physician, Dr. Green. Not only do these omissions invalidate Dr. Green's opinion that her need for treatment was causally related to her fall, they are also consistent with the proposition that claimant is determined to force respondent to pay her benefits regardless of whether she is entitled to them, and further that she is aware that her back problems predated her fall.
I also note that witnesses also testified that claimant reported weekends of dancing all night before and after the incident, including the weekend immediately after the fall.
After my de novo review of the entire record, I find that claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her fall and her need for treatment (other than the emergency room visit on the date of the fall which respondent directed) are causally connected.
_________________________ MIKE WILSON, Commissioner