Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Inasmuch as the gravamen of the plaintiff's first cause of action is that the defendant's conduct interfered with prospective appraisal contracts, and inasmuch as the injury alleged is essentially to its economic interests rather than its reputation (see, Guard-Life Corp. v Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183; Jemison v Crichlow, 139 A.D.2d 332, affd 74 N.Y.2d 726; cf., Morrison v National Broadcasting Co., 19 N.Y.2d 453), the Supreme Court properly determined that the three-year Statute of Limitations applied (see, CPLR 214). Moreover, the second, third and fourth causes of action concern specific contracts with which the defendant allegedly successfully interfered, albeit by words. We agree with the Supreme Court that these causes of action are also governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations. Finally, although the request for punitive damages was erroneously set forth in a separate cause of action, it was not improper for the Supreme Court to deem that cause of action a demand for damages in the first cause of action (see, Laufer v Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin, 143 A.D.2d 732). Kooper, J.P., Harwood, Balletta and Miller, JJ., concur.