Opinion
SC-07-3149.
Decided May 12, 2008.
Robert Clary, Plaintiff pro se, Chicopee, MA.
Edward L. Freer, Esq., Attorney for the Defendant, Poughkeepsie, NY.
On March 6, 2008, a trial was held in this matter, the plaintiff proceeded pro se and the defendant, represented by Edward L. Freer, Esq. moved to dismiss the action, claiming, in part, that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the matter and that the Family Court maintains exclusive jurisdiction over these proceedings. The defendant submitted a Memorandum of Law, dated March 27, 2008 signed by Edward L. Freer, Esq. in support of a motion to dismiss plaintiff's small claim action. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, submitted a response to defendant's memorandum of law, dated April 5, 2008, from Robert Clary. The Court having duly deliberated on the motion, finds and determines as follows:
Facts and Determination
Plaintiff has brought the instant small claim seeking to recover medical premiums in the amount of $2,128.34 paid to the defendant, his wife, as reimbursement paid to her for health insurance that she was to maintain in accordance with a separation agreement. The parties are currently married and entered into a separation agreement on August 28, 2002, wherein they agreed not to divorce until the plaintiff, husband, reached the age of sixty-five (65) years. As part of the separation agreement, the defendant agreed to maintain medical insurance for her husband until he reaches the age of 65 or dies, whichever occurs first. On or about February 1, 2006, the plaintiff began receiving Medicare Part B because he was on Social Security Disability (SSDI) for more than twenty-four (24) months. In turn, Medicare credited the defendant's health insurance policy co-pay premium by the amount of Medicare Part B ($88.00/month), and deducted the Medicare Part B premium from the plaintiff's SSDI payments. In effect, the plaintiff claims that he was paying for his own health insurance premiums because the defendant failed to reimburse him for the Medicare Part B premium that she was credited (and was deducted from his check), and she also failed to forward to him Medicare payments she received in his behalf. Plaintiff claims that this violates the terms of the separation agreement in that the defendant was to maintain the insurance for the plaintiff at her sole expense, and instead he paid, in part, for the medical insurance. In light of the terms of the separation agreement, plaintiff claims he is entitled to be reimbursed for all monies credited to defendant from Medicare.
Generally, the jurisdiction for matrimonial actions, including enforcement of a separation agreement is maintained by Supreme Court or Family Court. F.C.A. § 411, et seq.; Barone v. Stern, N.Y.L.J., p. 30, col. 5 (Jan. 8, 1999). Where a divorce has been granted, the judgment of divorce often reserves the power to resolve disputes in Supreme or Family Court. Barone, supra.
This is because Family Court is usually more knowledgeable of each case because it has handled all prior proceedings with the family before it. As such, there is a strong preference for having one judge decide all matters concerning the family before it. George A. v. Ivett A. , 14 Misc 3d 622 (Bronx Cty 2006). Here, though, there is no judgment of divorce, but only a separation agreement. Indeed, the parties are still married. Moreover, there is no evidence that the parties have ever appeared in Family Court to litigate any of their marital issues before.
On the other hand, the Uniform City Court Act (UCCA) § 1801 provides that a small claim may be brought for any cause of action for money not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5000) provided that the defendant either resides, or has an office for the transaction of business or a regular employment within the county. U.C.C.A. § 1801. And, civil court and small claims court are not precluded from hearing claims arising out of matrimonial issues. Barone, supra; Moss v. Davis, 11 Misc 3d 1060A (Rochester City Ct. 2006). However, the "Small Claims Part has no equitable powers and cannot grant equitable relief." Cucinotta v. Hanulak, 231 AD2d 904 (4th Dept. 1996); Moss v. Davis, 11 Misc 3d 1060A (Rochester City Ct. 2006). It is a court of limited jurisdiction, and anything outside the purview of the statute, is outside the court's jurisdiction. The defendant argues that the true nature of the relief sought by the plaintiff is equitable in nature (not monetary), and therefore the small claims court does not have jurisdiction to hear the matter. In particular, the defendant argues that the plaintiff is seeking reformation of the separation agreement to make it conform to what the parties understood, therefore only supreme court can adjudicate the claim. Defendant argues that although on the face of the action money is sought, the claim is equitable in nature because it seeks to impeach the meaning of the separation agreement. Yet, there is no evidence to support this. Plaintiff's opposition papers request that the Court, "uphold the exact words and [to] carry out the Agreement exactly as written and signed." Moreover, plaintiff has already presented his evidence at a hearing held on March 6, 2008. At this hearing, no allegation of fraud or mistake was alleged by plaintiff, nor did the plaintiff argue that the agreement should conform to something other than what is written.
A defendant can always argue that a condition precedent to a contract was not satisfied or that an exception applied and therefore a simple breach of contract claim is equitable in nature and needs to be brought in Supreme Court, accompanied by its attendant delays, complexity, and expenses. Whitfield v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. , 12 Misc 3d 428 , 429 (NY Cty. 2006). However, this would vitiate subject matter jurisdiction over innumerable breach of contract actions. Id. at 429. That was not the Legislature's intent when it limited the jurisdiction of small claims parts.
Small Claims Court remains a court of law where cases are be adjudged "according to the rules and principles of substantive law" and courts ensure that "substantial justice" is met between the parties. U.C.C.A. § 1804; 1807. Questions of construction of a contract are cognizable in a court of law. Celestin v. American Transit Ins. Co., 193 Misc 2d 72, 74 (Queens Cty. 2002). Here, the plaintiff is not suing for declaratory relief, but for reimbursement of money he claims he is owed. In ruling on this issue, the fact that the court, out of necessity, interprets
a contract or lease, is simply incidental to the relief sought, and does not compel the conclusion that the relief sought is equitable. Celestin v. American Transit Ins. Co., 193 Misc 2d 72, 74 (Queens Cty. 2002); see D. SIEGEL, NY PRACTICE. § 581, at 1007 (4th ed. 2005); Hampton v. Dist. Council 37 Health Sec. Plan, 97 Misc 2d 324 (Kings Cty Civ. Ct. 1978); cf. Vidal Corp. v. Langley Aviation Corp. 48 N.Y.S.2d 824 (NY Cty. 1944).
Since, the plaintiff's claim seeks monetary relief and construction of the terms in the written contract (separation agreement) are incidental to the relief sought, this Court has jurisdiction to preside over this claim.
THEREFORE, for all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's small claim's action is denied.
SO ORDERED.
All parties are directed to appear on ___________, 2008 for a continuation of the small claims hearing.