We note that the record is silent as to whether this witness' information was based solely upon a discussion of the instant offense, or upon other information Sergeant Beck may have received. Clark v. State, 500 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973). In Mitchell v. State, 524 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975) the Court was presented with a similar situation and wrote:
The court's instruction was sufficient to cure any error in the question. Clark v. State, 500 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973); White v. State, 444 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Crim.App. 1969). Finally, appellant contends that the court erred in submitting the two enhancement convictions to the jury because the State waived the use of those prior convictions.
evidence of personal opinion or specific acts. Houghton v. State, 171 Tex.Crim. R., 345 S.W.2d 535; Lutz v. State, 146 Tex.Crim. 503, 176 S.W.2d 317; Brown v. State, 92 Tex.Crim. 147, 242 S.W. 218; Brownlee v. State, 13 Tex. App. 255[ 13 Tex.Crim. 255]; McCormick Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, Sec. 1432. Yet, when such improper evidence is admitted, the State may not under the guise of rebuttal present additional improper evidence. Johnson v. State, 91 Tex.Crim. R., 241 S.W. 484 (on motion for rehearing). Apart from these limitations on how character may be proven, evidence similar in appearance to improper proof of character may be admissible for other purposes, such as to show the defendant's conduct, appearance or condition of mind at a particular time, or the relationship between the accused and the deceased, without subjecting the witness to have you heard questions on cross-examination. See, Odum v. State, 533 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Cr.App.); Els v. State, 525 S.W.2d 11 (Tex.Cr.App.); Clark v. State, 500 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Cr.App.); Hurt v. State, 480 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.Cr.App.); V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 19.06. In this case, although some of the testimony of appellant's wife had the appearance of improper opinion testimony of appellant's character, it was apparently offered to show the effects and changes in his behavior associated with his relationship with the deceased, and in any event was not offered as testimony of his reputation in the community.
It is of necessity hearsay evidence. Clark v. State, 500 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Sanchez v. State, 398 S.W.2d 117 (Tex.Cr.App. 1965); Weatherall v. State, supra, and the cases there cited. And see generally McCormick on Evidence, 2d ed., Secs. 191, 193.
However, that broad language was expressly overruled in Carey v. State, 537 S.W.2d 757 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976). In Carey we held that the asking of such a question could be cured by an instruction to the jury to disregard the question, citing Clark v. State, 500 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Ortiz v. State, 490 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Longoria v. State, 507 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974), and White v. State, 444 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Cr.App. 1969), as examples of prior cases wherein the harmfulness of asking an improper question was cured by an instruction. In Carey we quoted from White:
The appellant relies upon cases which he interprets as holding that a question's harmfulness cannot be cured by an instruction. In Clark v. State, 500 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973), this Court held that while it was improper for the prosecutor to ask a witness at the punishment stage, 'Are you saying that you are completely aware of this Defendant's police record?' It was not so harmful as to require reversal because it did not amount to a positive assertion of another offense. In Ortiz v. State, 490 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973), this Court held the following question to be improper but curable, 'Do you know Robert has been in trouble with the law before?' Likewise, in Longoria v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 507 S.W.2d 753, this Court held that the reference to an extraneous offense by a witness in response to a question was curable by an instruction to the jury, citing Bolden v. State, 504 S.W.2d 418 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974), and White v. State, 444 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Cr.App. 1969).
A juvenile officer after being qualified is as competent as any other witness to testify concerning an appellant's reputation. See and compare Broadway v. State, 418 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Cr.App. 1967); Frison v. State, 473 S.W.2d 479 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971); Pogue v. State, 474 S.W.2d 492 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971); Clark v. State, 500 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Proctor v. State, 503 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974). Moreover, Maxwell, the other juvenile probation officer, had testified without objection that the appellant's reputation was bad.
Ordinarily, an error in asking an improper question or admitting improper testimony may be cured or rendered harmless by an instruction to disregard same. Bolden v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 504 S.W.2d 418; Clark v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 469; Cazares v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 488 S.W.2d 110. Harm, if any, was cured by the court's instruction to disregard. The next contention in this series is directed to the following question asked Sewell by the prosecutor:
The first requirement of Stephens — that bad reputation testimony not be based solely on the offense for which appellant is on trial — has been reiterated many times by this Court. Clark v. State, 500 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Nichols v. State, 494 S.W.2d 830 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Twine v. State, 475 S.W.2d 774 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); Frison v. State, 473 S.W.2d 479 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971); Martin v. State, 449 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.Cr.App. 1970). Although appellant strenuously urges this ground, the record clearly indicates that Chief Waits' knowledge of appellant's bad reputation was based on his 'rap sheet' as well as on the facts of the offense for which he was on trial.
No reversible error is shown. Clark v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 469. Appellant's sixth ground of error is overruled.