Opinion
20-3887
05-14-2021
Sean A. Clark, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark J.F. Schroeder, NYS Commissioner of DMV, Defendant.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Sean A. Clark, pro se, New York, NY. FOR DEFENDANT: No Appearance.
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 14th day of May, two thousand twenty-one. PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, REENA RAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
Sean A. Clark, pro se, New York, NY.
FOR DEFENDANT:
No Appearance.
Appeal from a November 5, 2020 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Broderick, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Sean A. Clark, pro se, sued Mark J.F. Schroeder, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV"), asserting violations of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), the Fifth Amendment (through 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and Section 1611 of the Social Security Act ("SSA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1382(a)(6). He sought damages in connection with the alleged disclosure of his driver's license number by either the New York County Clerk's Office or the New York City Human Resources Administration ("NYCHRA") during his 2014 lawsuit against NYCHRA over its termination of certain disability benefits. Acting sua sponte (that is, on its own motion), the district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous, ruling that Schroeder is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. It further denied leave to amend as futile. Clark now appeals. We assume Clark's familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision affirming the district court's judgment.
District courts have the inherent power to dismiss a complaint as frivolous, even when, as here, the plaintiff has paid the filing fee. Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Although we have not determined whether to review de novo or for abuse of discretion a district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint as frivolous, the district court's determination here "easily passes muster under the more rigorous de novo review." Id. at 364 n.2.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), district courts must dismiss complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief against a defendant immune from suit regardless of whether the plaintiff has paid the filing fee. --------
As an initial matter, in his brief on appeal, Clark does not mention his Fifth Amendment claim or argue that the district court erred in denying him leave to amend his complaint. Accordingly, he has abandoned any challenge to these rulings. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995). Clark also argues for the first time on appeal that NYCHRA, as Schroeder's designee, violated his substantive due process rights. Because this argument was not raised in the district court, we decline to address it on appeal. See Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[I]t is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.")
A complaint is frivolous when (1) "the factual contentions are clearly baseless"; or (2) "the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). One example of a claim "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" is a claim brought against a defendant who is "clear[ly] . . . immune from suit." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
The district court correctly held that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes Schroeder, a state official, from this suit. Absent the State's express waiver or a congressional abrogation of immunity, the Eleventh Amendment renders a state immune from federal lawsuits brought either by its own citizens or by citizens of another state. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. N.Y. State Off. of Real Prop. Servs., 306 F.3d 87, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2002); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1890). This immunity extends to "state agents and state instrumentalities." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1997). State instrumentalities include the DMV. Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, Clark seeks damages from Schroeder solely in Schroeder's official capacity as the Commissioner of the DMV. Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment bars Clark's claims against Schroeder. See id.
A "well-known exception" to Eleventh Amendment immunity was established by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and its progeny. See Vega v. Semple, 963 F.3d 259, 281 (2d Cir. 2020). Ex parte Young allows suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officers sued in their official capacity. See id.; Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The Eleventh Amendment . . . does not preclude suits against state officers in their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law."). Clark argues that the Ex parte Young exception applies here. He is mistaken. As he sought damages against Schroeder for past violations of federal law, Ex parte Young is not relevant to his claim.
Of course, the Eleventh Amendment does not shield defendants sued for money damages in their individual capacities. State Emp. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 718 F.3d 126, 137 (2d Cir. 2013). But Clark's complaint did not allege claims against Schroeder in his individual capacity. Indeed, Clark confirmed that he was suing Schroeder in his official capacity when he argued in the district court that "the Commissioner or [his] representative for DMV should not have any problem with answering the summons & complaint." App'x 29. In light of Schroeder's immunity from suit, the district court did not err in sua sponte dismissing Clark's complaint as frivolous. See CSX Transp., Inc., 306 F.3d at 94-95.
We have considered Clark's remaining arguments and find in them no basis for reversal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court