Opinion
Decided April 5, 1927.
Where a general purpose is manifested to establish a charitable trust the gift is not void for uncertainty though the trustees are empowered to select the beneficiaries.
Where the language as a whole evinces an intention to create a charitable trust such design will not be frustrated merely because some of the organizations to which the trustees may allot funds for disbursement are not described by words completely synonymous with the word charitable; but allotments to such institutions must be devoted to their charitable activities.
Where in creating such a trust the gift is made to such "institutions . . . public and private . . . as they [the trustees] in their discretion shall select," the selection of organizations to carry the gift into effect is not limited to those which are owned or controlled by the state, and the trustees may transfer property for charitable uses directly to any institutions they properly select.
The words of a document are to be interpreted with reference to their context.
PETITION, for advice as to the construction of clause eleven of the will of Charles H. Cummings. Other clauses of the same will are construed in Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281. Transferred by Scammon, J., without a ruling.
Under the clause in question the testator disposes of the residue of his estate by directing his trustees to "give, expend, dispose of and distribute the principal thereof and income therefrom to, for, in and among such charitable, fraternal, benevolent and educational uses, purposes, societies, institutions, associations and corporations public or private within the State of New Hampshire as they in their discretion shall select and designate, and in such proportions and sums and at such time or times and in such manner and ways and with such limitations as to use as they . . . shall deem proper, beneficial and expedient."
Advice is asked as to whether the clause creates a charitable trust, and if so, whether the trustees may transfer personal property or real estate directly to any of the institutions deemed to be beneficiaries under the trust.
George G. Clark (of Massachusetts) and Owen Veazey (Mr. Owen orally), for the petitioners.
Frank N. Parsons, orally, for the New Hampshire Orphans' Home.
The testator's language as a whole clearly evinces an intention to create a charitable trust. Glover v. Baker, 76 N.H. 393, 414; Carter v. Whitcomb, 74 N.H. 482, 487; Goodale v. Mooney, 60 N.H. 528. Since his general purpose can be effectuated by judicial decree and his trustees are empowered to select beneficiaries, the gift is not void for uncertainty. French v. Lawrence, 76 N.H. 234, 236; Haynes v. Carr, 70 N.H. 463, 479; Snow v. Durgin, 70 N.H. 121, 123, 124; Towle v. Nesmith, 69 N.H. 212; Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N.H. 354, 356. The distinction in this respect between a bequest for charity and one for a private purpose is made plain in Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281.
The testator's design is not to be frustrated merely because some of the adjectives used are not completely synonymous with the word "charitable." It is a cardinal principle of construction that words are to be interpreted with reference to their context. Nor does it matter that the word "fraternal," as thus construed, may be given a restricted meaning. Lodges or other associations formed for mutual aid, in order to come within the class of institutions designated, must be engaged in charitable activities, and the money or property which the trustees in their discretion see fit to bestow on societies of this kind must be devoted to such activity. See Roberts v. Corson, 79 N.H. 215, and cases cited.
The words "public or private" should be similarly construed. They indicate "the mode of distribution only." Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen 446, 471. Although the bequest is for a public purpose, the selection of organizations to carry out that purpose is not limited to those which are owned or controlled by the state.
The trustees are vested with a wide discretion. They are advised that they may transfer for charitable uses personal property or real estate directly to any of the institutions properly chosen by them as beneficiaries.
Case discharged.
All concurred.