Opinion
6:23-cv-00289-HMH-JDA
07-06-2023
Susan Clark, Plaintiff, v. Tommy Christopher d/b/a Tommy's Heating and Air; Thirteenth Circuit Solicitor's Office; Paula Carpenter, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Thirteenth Circuit Solicitor's Office (the “Solicitor's Office”) and Paula Carpenter (collectively, the “Moving Defendants”). [Doc. 6.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff, through counsel, filed this action in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas on December 16, 2022 [Doc. 1-1], and Defendants removed the case to this Court on January 20, 2023 [Doc. 1]. Also on January 20, 2023, the Moving Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. [Doc. 6.] Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion on February 3, 2023 [Doc. 17], and the Moving Defendants filed a reply on February 10, 2023 [Doc. 18]. Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from the Complaint. [Doc. 1-1.]
In February 2021, Plaintiff entered into a contract with Defendant Tommy Christopher to have Christopher work on HVAC systems at her residence. [Doc. 1-1 ¶ 10.] Under the contract, Plaintiff was required to make an initial payment of $5,000, with the balance due upon completion of the work. [Id. ¶ 11.] Plaintiff paid the final balance by check. [Id. ¶ 13.]
After she paid the final balance, Plaintiff discovered problems with the work that had been completed, including “failure to provide warranty paperwork, failure to install the correct air conditioning unit, and failure to properly complete the job.” [Id. ¶¶ 12-13.] While Plaintiff was attempting to resolve these problems with Christopher, she discovered that he “was not licensed in South Carolina to handle the work” she had contracted him to perform. [Id. ¶¶ 14-15.] Plaintiff asserts that this lack of licensure was a misdemeanor violation of South Carolina law and precluded Christopher from taking legal action to enforce the provisions of his contract with Plaintiff. [Id. ¶ 16.]
On March 16, 2021, Plaintiff informed Christopher “that she had placed a stop payment on the check for the final balance and would not pay in full until the job was done as required by the contract, proper paperwork related to the job was presented, and proof of licensure was provided.” [Id. ¶ 17.] Christopher emailed Plaintiff on March 20, 2021, proposing to (a) remove the incorrect air conditioning unit and install the correct unit; (b) correctly adjust the unit; (c) obtain a statement from a licensed contractor to stand behind Christopher's work; (d) have a licensed contractor perform any necessary repairs; and (e) remain at the job site until all work was completed. [Id. ¶ 18.] Plaintiff responded the following day with a list of outstanding items to be provided and tasks to be completed consistent with the original contract. [Id. ¶ 20.]
Around April 6, 2021, Christopher's agent filed a report with the Thirteenth Circuit Solicitor's Worthless Check Unit, claiming that Plaintiff had written a worthless check. [Id. ¶ 21.] On April 13, 2021, Defendant Carpenter, an employee of Defendant the Solicitor's Office, “sent Plaintiff a ‘Final Notice' stating her check to [Christopher] had been dishonored” and that “a warrant would be issued for her arrest if she did not pay the check in full.” [Id. ¶¶ 5, 22.] On April 19, 2021, Plaintiff sent Carpenter numerous documents, which Carpenter acknowledged receiving, explaining and supporting her claim that the contract had been breached and was legally unenforceable and, thus, she should not have to pay the remaining balance. [Id. ¶¶ 23-24.] The same day, an attorney also contacted Carpenter on Plaintiff's behalf. [Id. ¶ 25.]
Around April 27, 2021, “Carpenter, acting on behalf of [the Solicitor's Office,] swore under oath to Judge Mark Edmonds, a Greenville County Magistrate Judge, that Plaintiff had intended to defraud the alleged victim by writing a check that was dishonored and that a certified letter had been written to Plaintiff and Plaintiff had not responded to the letter.” [Id. ¶ 26.] Plaintiff asserts that none of these statements were true and that, at the time the warrant was sought, Carpenter “was aware Plaintiff had no intent to defraud and there was an ongoing, valid dispute over the contract” and that “Plaintiff had responded to the certified letter.” [Id. ¶¶ 27-29.] Plaintiff asserts that these false statements misled the magistrate and that, if he had been provided the truth, he would not have issued the arrest warrant. [Id. ¶¶ 30-31.]
Around June 3, 2021, the Greenville County Sheriff's Office publicly arrested Plaintiff in front of her neighbors on a charge the Moving Defendants knew was not supported by probable cause. [Id. ¶ 33.] She was also strip searched and remained in custody for one day. [Id.] “The baseless prosecution of Plaintiff aggressively continued until January 27, 2022,” when “an assistant solicitor finally agreed to dismiss th[e] case.” [Id. ¶ 34.]
The Complaint asserts the following causes of action: claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, negligence, and defamation against Christopher [id. ¶¶ 35-57]; claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, negligent training and supervision, and negligence and gross negligence against the Solicitor's Office [id. ¶¶ 58-74, 85-87]; and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her Fourth Amendment rights against Carpenter [id. ¶¶ 75-84]. Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages, fees and costs, and any other relief the Court deems just and proper. [Id. at 10-11.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.”).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)-the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the defendant's liability. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”'” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
The Moving Defendants argue that the Solicitor's Office has absolute prosecutorial immunity for the state-law claims asserted against it; that the Solicitor's Office's prosecutorial immunity should extend to Carpenter, a non-attorney employee of the Solicitor's Office; that Carpenter is entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to any claims for damages against her in her official capacity; that the Solicitor's Office is entitled to sovereign immunity; and that to the extent Carpenter is not entitled to absolute immunity, she is entitled to qualified immunity. [Doc. 6-1.] The Court addresses these immunities in turn.
In South Carolina, regional prosecutors are called Solicitors and Assistant Solicitors. See S.C. Const. art. V, § 24; S.C. Code § 1-7-310.
The Complaint makes clear that Carpenter is sued in her individual capacity. [Doc. 1-1 ¶ 75.] Accordingly, the Court need not address this argument.
Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity
“[A]bsolute [prosecutorial] immunity safeguards the process, not the person, [and] extends only to actions ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.'” Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 117 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)). To determine whether an action is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, courts employ a functional approach, looking to “the nature of the function performed, without regard to the identity of the actor who performed it, the harm that the conduct may have caused, or even the question whether it was lawful.” Id. at 118 (internal quotation marks omitted). The party claiming absolute immunity has the burden to establish such immunity for each function challenged. Id.
When employing this functional approach, courts look to whether the function challenged casts the prosecutor in a role as an advocate, which entitles her to absolute immunity, or as an administrator or investigative officer, which does not entitle her to absolute immunity. Id. As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has summarized,
The same functional approach applies when determining whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity under state law. Williams v. Condon, 553 S.E.2d 496, 509 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (“We hold a prosecutor in the employ of this state is immune from personal liability under § 1983 or the South Carolina Tort Claims Act for actions relating to the prosecution of an individual as a criminal defendant-regardless of the prosecutor's motivation-provided the actions complained of were committed while the prosecutor was acting as an “advocate, ” as defined by Imbler v. Pachtman and its progeny.”).
A prosecutor acts as an advocate when she professionally evaluates evidence assembled by the police, Buckley [v. Fitzsimmons], 509 U.S. [259,] 273 [(1993)], decides to seek an arrest warrant, Kalina [v. Fletcher], 522 U.S. [118,] 130 [(1997)], prepares and files charging documents, id., participates in a probable cause hearing, Burns [v. Reed], 500 U.S. [478,] 492 [(1991)], and presents evidence at trial, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 .... In contrast, a prosecutor does not act as an advocate, but rather in an investigative or administrative capacity, when she gives legal advice to police during an investigation, Burns, 500 U.S. at 493, . . . investigates a case before a probable cause determination, Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274, . . . and personally attests to the truth of averments in a statement of probable cause, Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129.Id.
In the specific context of seeking an arrest warrant, the Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor's “activities in connection with the preparation and filing of [an] information and [a] motion for an arrest warrant . . . are protected by absolute immunity” because they are part of her advocative function. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129. However, when the prosecutor personally attests to the truth of averments in support of probable cause while seeking an arrest warrant, she is not functioning as an advocate but instead is acting as a witness and is, thus, not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 129-31; see Annappareddy v. Lating, No. 1:18-cv-03012-JFA, 2023 WL 2540306, at *10 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2023) (concluding that an FBI agent's “attestation to the . . . truth [of an affidavit in support of search and seizure warrants] was a function akin to that of a witness and not performed in an advocative role”).
Here, as stated, the Complaint alleges that Carpenter “swore under oath to Judge Mark Edmonds, a Greenville County Magistrate Judge, that Plaintiff had intended to defraud the alleged victim by writing a check that was dishonored and that a certified letter had been written to Plaintiff and Plaintiff had not responded to the letter.” [Doc. 1-1 ¶ 26.] Thus, the function Carpenter is alleged to have been performing is that of a witness attesting to the truth of averments in support of probable cause. As such, neither she nor the Solicitor's Office is entitled to absolute immunity. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A conscientious prosecutor reading our cases should now conclude that there is . . . only qualified immunity for testimony as a witness in support of [an arrest] warrant.“).
Because the Court concludes that the function challenged is not advocative and, thus, that neither of the Moving Defendants is entitled to absolute immunity, the Court need not address the Moving Defendants' argument that prosecutorial immunity should extend to a non-attorney employee in a prosecutor's office.
Sovereign Immunity
“Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent.” Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, an example of sovereign immunity, Stewart v. North Carolina, 393 F.3d 484, 488 (4th Cir. 2005), provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Supreme Court of the United States has “held that, despite the limited terms of the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court [can]not entertain a suit brought by a citizen against his own State.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to ‘arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity,” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted), because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself,” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Here, the Court finds that the Solicitor's Office has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Although Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute, the Supreme Court has recognized only two circumstances when an individual may sue a State: “[f]irst, Congress may authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment”; and “[s]econd, a State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit.” Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). In Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the State of Georgia had waived its immunity from suit by removing the case from state court to federal court, thereby voluntarily invoking the federal court's jurisdiction. 535 U.S. 613, 619-20 (2002). The State had already explicitly waived immunity in state court with respect to the claims at issue but attempted to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit with respect to the same state-law claims after it had removed the case to federal court. Id. at 616-17. The Supreme Court determined that the State of Georgia could not escape its previous waiver of immunity simply by removing the case to federal court. Id. at 620-24.
“Courts in this District have previously held that a Circuit Solicitor is a state official and a Circuit Solicitor's Office is an integral part of the State of South Carolina and, as such, both are immune from a suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Massey v. Stumbo, No. 6:21-cv-00396-DCC, 2022 WL 842910, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2022).
The Complaint in this action asserts state-law claims against the Solicitor's Office pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”). The SCTCA waives the State's sovereign immunity in state court for certain tort claims, see S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10, et. seq., but it specifically reserves South Carolina's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court, see S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e) (“Nothing in this chapter is construed as a waiver of the state's . . . immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”). Because South Carolina has “generally consented to suit for tort claims filed against it in state court,” the Solicitor's Office's “voluntary removal of this case to federal court has waived the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in this Court for those types of claims.” Briggs v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., No. 9:13-cv-1348-RMG, 2014 WL 1278173, at *21 (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2014). Accordingly, the Solicitor's Office is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case.
Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not “violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity does not protect an official who violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id. Further, qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a court must determine “‘whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all[ ] and . . . whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.'” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999)). “[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness' of the action[,] assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established' at the time it was taken.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). For purposes of this analysis, a right is “clearly established” if “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 640.
Here, the Court finds that the record is insufficient to conclude Carpenter is entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff has plausibly alleged sufficient facts to establish that her clearly established constitutional rights were violated when Carpenter made false statements to the magistrate judge to obtain the arrest warrant. See Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 386-87 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss that asserts qualified immunity, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that her constitutional rights were violated); Miller v. Prince George's Cnty., 475 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “the Supreme Court has long held that a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment if, in order to obtain a warrant, he deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth makes material false statements or omits material facts”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Complaint specifically alleges that Carpenter swore under oath to the magistrate judge “that Plaintiff had intended to defraud the alleged victim by writing a check that was dishonored and that a certified letter had been written to Plaintiff and Plaintiff had not responded to the letter.” [Doc. 1-1 ¶ 26.] It further alleges that none of these statements were true and that, at the time the warrant was sought, Carpenter “was aware Plaintiff had no intent to defraud and there was an ongoing, valid dispute over the contract” and knew that “Plaintiff had responded to the certified letter.” [Id. ¶¶ 27-29.] Finally, the Complaint alleges that these false statements misled the magistrate and that, if he had been provided the truth, he would not have issued the arrest warrant. [Id. ¶¶30-31.] In arguing that she is entitled to qualified immunity, Carpenter seems to ignore the Complaint's allegations that she made knowingly false statements to the magistrate judge and instead relies on case law holding that qualified immunity protects officials for “mistaken judgments” and “bad guesses in gray areas.” [Doc. 6-1 at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).] However, given that the Complaint alleges more than mistaken judgment or bad guesses-specifically that, in obtaining the arrest warrant in this case, Carpenter knowingly made material false statements to the magistrate judge-she is not entitled to qualified immunity.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that the motion to dismiss [Doc. 6] be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.