Although neither the Fourth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has resolved the matter, the majority view in the federal courts is that the FDCPA's statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional bar. See, e.g., Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3d 935, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the FDCPA's statute of limitations is not jurisdictional); Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2000) ("the statute of limitations provision in the FDCPA is not a jurisdictional restriction"); Clark v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1066-68 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (concluding, after in-depth analysis, that "the presumption that statutory time limits are not jurisdictional has not been rebutted by anything in the language or legislative history of the FDCPA"). To be sure, one federal appeals court has concluded otherwise.
But many other circuit and district courts have addressed the issue. While there are some cases finding that the FDCPA's statute of limitations is jurisdictional, the majority of courts, and all of the courts that have fully analyzed the issue, have determined that the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional. See, e.g., Marshal-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2000); Clark v. Bonded Adjustment Co., Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1066 (E.D. Wash. 2001); Salgado v. Harvard Collection Servs., Inc., 2004 WL 2011399, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2001). While the statute of limitations includes the title "jurisdiction," in the United States Code, it was enacted with that title by Congress. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub.L. No. 95-109, § 813(d), 91 Stat. 874, 881 (1977).
One circuit has held that § 1692k(d) is jurisdictional in nature Mattson v. U.S. West Communications, 967 F.2d 259 (CA. 8, 1992). However, a more persuasive opinion for this court is Clark v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 176 F.Sup.2d 1062, 1067 (E.D. Wash., 2001), which cites Irwin v. Dept. Of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990), in stating that: "There is a 'rebuttable presumption' that statutory time limits are not jurisdictional, and therefore equitable tolling or estoppel is available in suits against private defendants and suits against the United States." The section in question is entitled "Jurisdiction" but as Clark points out that codification in the U.S. Code cannot prevail over statutory language, 176 F.Sup.2d page 1067 and the heading "Jurisdiction" as enacted and printed in the statutes at large does not include this heading, id. p. 1068.
See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 1226, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998).See United States v. Welden, 111 U.S. 95, 98 n. 4, 84 S.Ct. 1082, 1085 n. 4, 12 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964); see also Clark v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 176 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1067-68 (E.D.Wash. 2001). We are aware of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' statement in reviewing this section that it was "not at liberty to disregard the jurisdictional limitations Congress has placed upon the federal courts."
We are equally unpersuaded by Riddle's argument that Johnson's FDCPA suit, filed on the one-year anniversary of the violation, is not "within one year" of the violation. See Maloy v. Phillips, 64 F.3d 607, 608 (11th Cir. 1995); Clark v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 176 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1065-68 (E.D.Wash. 2001). Riddle does not dispute that, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a suit filed on the one-year anniversary of accrual of the claim is filed "within" one year, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) ("In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed . . . by any applicable statute, the day of the act . . . from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included.
The large majority of courts that have considered and analyzed the question have concluded that the one year period is subject to tolling. See, e.g., Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir.2000); Clark v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 176 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1068 (E.D.Wash.2001) (stating "the presumption that statutory time limits are not jurisdictional has not been rebutted by anything in the language or legislative history of the FDCPA"). This Court believes that, given the opportunity to consider the matter directly, the Eighth Circuit would agree with these courts.
The large majority of courts that have considered and analyzed the question have concluded that the one year period is subject to tolling. See, e.g., Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2000); Clark v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1068 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (stating "the presumption that statutory time limits are not jurisdictional has not been rebutted by anything in the language or legislative history of the FDCPA"). This Court believes that, given the opportunity to consider the matter directly, the Eighth Circuit would agree with these courts.
The large majority of courts that have considered and analyzed the question have concluded that the one year period is subject to tolling. See, e.g., Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2000); Clark v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 176 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1068 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (stating "the presumption that statutory time limits are not jurisdictional has not been rebutted by anything in the language or legislative history of the FDCPA"). This Court believes that, given the opportunity to consider the matter directly, the Eighth Circuit would agree with these courts.
The large majority of courts that have considered and analyzed the question have concluded that the one year period is subject to tolling. See, e.g., Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2000); Clark v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1068 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (stating "the presumption that statutory time limits are not jurisdictional has not been rebutted by anything in the language or legislative history of the FDCPA"). This Court believes that, given the opportunity to consider the matter directly, the Eighth Circuit would agree with these courts.
Plaintiff properly commenced the lawsuit on Monday, November 19, 2012. See Clark v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 176 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1068 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (finding that Rule 6(a) applies to the statute of limitations in the FDCPA and that the plaintiffs timely filed their action on the following Monday when the last alleged violation of the Act fell on a Saturday). The Court is not persuaded by Defendants' argument that the tolling of the statute of limitations began earlier since the alleged communication between Northland and Midland occurred before the mailing date.