Opinion
Case No. 1:03-CV-145.
January 5, 2005
ORDER
In accordance with the Opinion issued this date;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 115) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and Plaintiff's claim of assault and battery is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment. This suit was brought on behalf of Jeffrey Clark ("Decedent") who died while incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections. (Defs.' Br. at 1; Pl.'s Res. at 2.) Defendants have moved for dismissal and/or summary judgment of Plaintiff's state law claims because Defendants' actions were not the proximate cause of Jeffrey Clark's death and alleged suffering. (Defs.' Mot. at 18.)Since matters outside of the pleadings are presented by both Defendants and Plaintiff regarding this Motion, the Court will treat Defendants' Motion as made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Under the language of Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In assessing such a motion, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant's favor. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Traditionally, "a" proximate cause is the standard of the law of Michigan on the issue of proximate cause. However, the Michigan Supreme Court in Robinson v. City of Detroit, 613 N.W.2d 307 (Mich. 2000), has ruled that in a given case "the" is proper when there could be no other proximate cause — i.e., "the" reason decedent died was because she was a passenger in a vehicle which the driver crashed into a non-police vehicle while attempting to flee the police. Defendants here argue that, as governmental employees, each Defendant has governmental immunity under Michigan Compiled Laws § 691.1407. (Defs.' Mot at 18-19.) Citing to Robinson, Defendants further argue that, since it is impossible to tell who or what is "the" proximate cause of Decedent's death or alleged suffering, summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants. (Defs.' Mot. at 19.) Robinson held that "summary disposition . . . was proper because reasonable jurors could not find that the officers were the proximate cause of the injuries" suffered by plaintiff during a car chase, because plaintiff was the only cause of the injuries. Robinson, 613 N.W.2d 319 (internal citation omitted). The case at bar is distinguishable because, based on the record, a reasonable jury could find each or all of the Defendants grossly negligent and that he or they were "a" proximate (or even "the") cause of Decedent's death.
Another basis for distinguishing Robinson is that the instant case may be a case where one or more Defendants inflicted independently actionable injuries, i.e., separate torts.
In light of the record, the Court determines that summary judgment is unwarranted because there are genuine issues of material fact, including but not limited to whether each or all of the Defendants were "grossly negligent" in failing to obtain medical attention for Decedent and proximately caused his death. Defendants have failed to specify portions of the record identifying a "most immediate cause" of the death, other than their own conduct.
Defendants also move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Defs.' Mot. at 20.) Defendants argue that the Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over unsettled state law. Id. However, this Court is not barred from exercising supplemental jurisdiction simply because the Michigan Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this issue. When the Michigan Supreme Court has yet to decide an issue of state law, the Court shall follow the precedent set forth by the Michigan Court of Appeals. See Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2004) ("If the state supreme court has spoken on the issue, its decision should be followed; if, however, the only precedent is from the state's intermediate appellate courts, the intermediate court's decision should be followed absent a strong showing that the state supreme court would act in a different manner." (citing Lawler v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 900, 903 (6th Cir. 2003))); see also Mroz v. Lee, 5 F.3d 1016, 1020 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that Michigan law permits claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Ross v. Burns, 612 F.2d 271, 271 (6th Cir. 1980) (recognizing claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in light of decisions of the Michigan Court of Appeals). Defendants further argue that, even if the Court recognizes the state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff has failed to show a sufficient factual basis to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court disagrees. Upon review of the record, there are facts which, if proven, could lead a trier of fact to reasonably find in favor of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses her claim of assault and battery against Defendants. (Pl.'s Br. at 24.) Defendants have also moved for dismissal or summary judgment as to those claims. (Defs.' Br. at 20, 22.) The Court finds, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), that it is proper to dismiss the claims of assault and battery. These claims will be dismissed with prejudice since it would be prejudicial to Defendants to do otherwise. See e.g., Smoot v. Fox, 340 F.2d 301, 302-03 (6th Cir. 1964); FDIC v. Becker, 166 F.R.D. 14, 15-16 (D.M.D. 1996).
An Order in accordance with this Opinion shall issue.