City of Emory v. Lusk

21 Citing cases

  1. Samuels v. Nasir

    445 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. App. 2014)   Cited 9 times

    ” Id. “The party prevailing in the trial court should be given the option of accepting the remittitur or having the case remanded” for a new trial. Id. ; see also City of Emory v. Lusk, 278 S.W.3d 77, 89 (Tex.App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.) (conditionally affirming damages award after proposing remittitur and allowing appellants to either accept or reject the proposal within 15 days).Analysis

  2. Gathering v. Moore

    No. 10-10-00136-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 1, 2010)

    When there is no evidence to support a damages verdict, the court of appeals should render a take nothing judgment as to that amount. Larson v. Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987); City of Emory v. Lusk, 278 S.W.3d 77, 88 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2009, no pet.). If part of a damage verdict lacks sufficient evidentiary support, the proper course is to suggest a remittitur of that part of the verdict.

  3. United States v. Tracts 31A

    852 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2017)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that husband did not need the consent of wife to convey annuities that were his sole management property

    See id. Accordingly, to effect a valid conveyance of joint management community property, Texas law requires both spouses to join in the transaction. See, e.g. , City of Emory v. Lusk , 278 S.W.3d 77, 85 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.) ; see also, e.g. , 38 TEX. PRAC., MARITAL PROPERTY AND HOMESTEADS § 15.13 ("[I]f a spouse does not have a written power of attorney or other agreement, the spouse may not convey or otherwise dispose of joint management community property without the joinder of the other spouse.").

  4. In re Lyster

    24-40460-mxm-7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2024)

    Shiffers v. Est. of Ward, 762 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied). Tex. Fam. Code § 5.001; Washington-Jarmon v. OneWest Bank, 513 S.W.3d 103, 110 (Tex. App.-Hous. [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.); Geldard v. Watson, 214 S.W.3d 202, 207 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.); City of Emory v. L u s k , 278 S.W.3d 77, 85 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2009, no pet.); Jean v. Tyson-Jean, 118 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.App.-Hous. [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

  5. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Justiss

    56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 151 (Tex. 2012)   Cited 223 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, although a property owner may testify as to the value of his or her property, “the testimony must support a verdict, and conclusory or speculative statements do not”

    A trailer-park owner's testimony that he would lose $10,800 in lost leases because of a condemnation was merely a “naked and unsupported ... conclusion” and provided no evidence of diminished value. City of Emory v. Lusk, 278 S.W.3d 77, 88–89 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2009, no pet.) (holding that testimony was both speculative and conclusory). And an owner whose affidavit stated that his property had been damaged “between $1.8 and $2.2 million dollars based upon the reduction in value of the overall site” failed to provide evidence of damages because he did not state the basis for his opinion.

  6. Thompson v. Buechler

    No. 03-22-00034-CV (Tex. App. Jul. 27, 2023)

    "When the appellant is challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding on which it did not have the burden of proof at trial, the appellant must demonstrate on appeal that no evidence exists to support the adverse finding." See City of Emory v. Lusk, 278 S.W.3d 77, 86-87 (Tex. App-Tyler 2009, no pet.) (citing Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983)).

  7. Supply Pro, Inc. v. Ecosorb Int'l, Inc.

    NO. 01-15-00621-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 30, 2016)   Cited 4 times
    Considering legal sufficiency of evidence supporting award of exemplary damages based on fraud

    Appellants argue that Kempe's testimony should be excluded from our sufficiency review because it is conclusory and barred by the parol evidence rule. See City of Emory v. Lusk, 278 S.W.3d 77, 89 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.) ("A conclusory and nonprobative opinion is legally insufficient to support a jury verdict."). Evidence is legally conclusory if it does nothing more than state a legal conclusion, and it is factually conclusory if it does not provide the underlying facts to support a conclusion.

  8. Hill v. Premier IMS, Inc.

    NO. 01-15-00137-CV (Tex. App. May. 10, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    The testimony, however, was conclusory. See City of Emory v. Lusk, 278 S.W.3d 77, 89 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.) ("A conclusory and nonprobative opinion is legally insufficient to support a jury verdict"). The only evidence Premier proffered was that Hill said he would terminate the lease and the lease was not terminated.

  9. Scamardo v. 3D Farms

    No. 10-15-00163-CV (Tex. App. Jan. 7, 2016)   Cited 3 times
    Remanding to trial court with instructions to enter a mandatory injunction in appellant's favor

    These actions establish that appellant did not consent to appellee's admitted trespass. SeeMartinez, 977 S.W.2d at 334 (providing that a legal-sufficiency challenge may be sustained if, among other things, the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact); see also City of Emory v. Lusk, 278 S.W.3d 77, 85 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.) ("Consent is an agreement, approval, or permission as to some act or purpose, given voluntarily by a competent person. . . . Consent can be manifested by acts and conduct.

  10. Accurate Precision Plating, LLC v. Guerrero

    NO. 01-14-00706-CV (Tex. App. Nov. 24, 2015)   Cited 1 times
    Limiting Property Owner Rule to real and personal property that "has a market value" after noting that rule is based on presumption that property owners are familiar with their property and market for its potential sale

    ner Rule to property owners' claims of diminished value to homes and land due to permanent nuisance); Reid Rd. Mun. Util. Dist., 337 S.W.3d at 846 (concluding officer of defendant company's general partner was not qualified to testify to market value of partnership property under Property Owner Rule); Porras, 675 S.W.2d at 503 (applying Property Owner Rule to property owner's testimony regarding valuation of land); DZM, Inc. v. Garren, 467 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (finding property owner's testimony offered under Property Owner Rule regarding fair market value of various items of leased property was insufficient to establish value of items at time of alleged conversion); Smirl v. State, No. 01-12-00989-CV, 2014 WL 2507639, at *4-6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 3, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (upholding summary judgment against owner of leasehold because owner's affidavit testimony was insufficient evidence of valuation of leasehold interest); City of Emory v. Lusk, 278 S.W.3d 77, Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.) (applying Property Owner Rule to easement in inverse condemnation case); Royce Homes v. Humphrey, 244 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. denied) (applying Property Owner Rule to owner's claimed damages to home and land); Lefton v. Griffith, 136 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (applying Property Owner Rule to owner's valuation of store inventory and home). APP did not argue at trial—nor does it assert on appeal—that the "property" about which Mani sought to testify has a market value.