Opinion
No. 112114.
03-20-2015
CITY OF OVERLAND PARK, Kansas, Appellee, v. James L. BROOKS, Appellant.
James L. Brooks, appellant pro se. John J. Knoll, senior assistant city attorney, for appellee.
James L. Brooks, appellant pro se.
John J. Knoll, senior assistant city attorney, for appellee.
Before McANANY, P.J., ATCHESON, J., and HEBERT, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
James L. Brooks appeals the dismissal of his appeal from Overland Park Municipal Court after his convictions for failure to maintain exterior trim in good repair and unlawful outdoor storage at a one- or two-family dwelling. Brooks failed to appear after the City of Overland Park issued a citation to him for these claimed ordinance violations, so the court issued an arrest warrant. After his arrest, Brooks executed an appearance bond in the sum of $500 and pled not guilty to the charges.
At trial in the municipal court Brooks was found guilty of both charges, and the court entered a $500 fine for each conviction. The court also ordered an “[a]ppearance bond on appeal” in the amount of $1,098.50 ($500 for each fine and then $98.50 district court docket fee).
Brooks appealed to the Johnson County District Court. He did not file any type of a bond. Thus, the City moved to dismiss Brooks' appeal based on a jurisdictional defect. The district court dismissed the appeal, finding that Brooks' failure to pay his appearance bond deprived the district court of jurisdiction under K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–3609.
Brooks appealed. On appeal to this court, we reversed and remanded the case to the district court, having found the bond Brooks had failed to pay was an appeal bond authorized under K.S.A. 12–4602, which is not jurisdictional. This court noted: “[S]ince Brooks timely filed his notice of appeal he should be given the opportunity to pay the appeal bond within a reasonable time as ordered by the municipal court in order for the district court to hear the case.” City of Overland Park v. Brooks, No. 108,961, 2013 WL 3970206, at *7 (Kan.App.2013) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 298 Kan. –––– (February 12, 2014).
Following further proceedings on remand, the City renewed its motion to dismiss, alleging that Brooks failed to file the required appeal bond despite the fact that the parties had appeared in the district court four times since the remand.
In response to the City's motion, Brooks argued there was still a controversy as to whether the bond was an appeal bond or an appearance bond. He failed to recognize that this question was settled by the Court of Appeals in his first appeal of this case. He made no excuse for his failure to pay the appeal bond, nor did he ask for a continuance to provide him additional time to post the appeal bond. Accordingly, the district court granted the City's motion to dismiss.
Brooks appeals again. The controlling issue on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case based on Brooks' failure to pay the appeal bond within a reasonable time. Resolution of this issue involves the interpretation of statutes. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise unlimited review. State v. Eddy, 299 Kan. 29, 32, 321 P.3d 12 (2014).
The right to appeal is limited by statutory requirements. See State v. Gill, 287 Kan. 289, 293–94, 196 P.3d 369 (2008). K.S.A.2013 Supp. 12–4601 provides that an accused person may take an appeal to the district court in the county in which the municipal court is located. K.S.A. 12–4602 provides authority for the municipal court judge to set an appeal bond in addition to an appearance bond and directs the aggrieved party to the appeal procedure in K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–3609.
In Brooks' first appeal, this court found that he should be given a “reasonable time” to pay the bond. Brooks, 2013 WL 3970206, at *7. Ten months later, Brooks had not paid the bond and the district court dismissed the appeal for a second time.
Brooks claims the municipal court had no authority to order that an appeal bond be filed. This issue was previously decided in his first appeal, and the law-of-the-case doctrine prevents relitigation of the same issues within successive stages of the same lawsuit. Thoroughbred Assocs. v. Kansas City Royalty Co., 297 Kan. 1193, 1212, 308 P.3d 1238 (2013).
The law-of-the-case doctrine typically bars repetitive arguments on successive appeals in the same action. State v. Collier, 263 Kan. 629, Syl. ¶ 3, 952 P.2d 1326 (1998). Generally, an argument once made to and resolved by an appellate court becomes “the settled law” in that case and cannot be challenged in a second appeal. 263 Kan. 629, Syl. ¶ 3. The doctrine promotes the finality of the judicial process by eliminating “indefinite relitigation of the same issue” in an ongoing case. 263 Kan. 629, Syl. ¶ 2.
Brooks makes no argument that he should have been allowed additional time to pay the appeal bond or that he intended to pay the appeal bond. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing Brooks' appeal based on his failure to pay the appeal bond within a reasonable time.
Brooks also complains that the City was allowed to file its motion to dismiss out of time. The City filed its motion 5 days after the deadline set by the court had passed, explaining that the delay was due to staff departure and the fact that a prosecutor was not assigned to the case until the date motions were due. The district court granted the City leave to file its motion out of time. “The issue of whether a party's conduct constitutes excusable neglect should be decided on a case-by-case basis, and consideration should be given to whether the party's conduct reflects neglectful indifference or reckless indifference.” Canaan v. Bartee, 272 Kan. 720, Syl. ¶ 8, 35 P.3d 841 (2001). Brooks' assertion that excusable neglect must be based on a conflict with another court order is not supported by the law. There is no indication that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the City to file its motion 5 days after the motions deadline had passed.
Next, Brooks argues that the district court violated K.S.A. 60–407(e) and (f) in quashing the subpoenas of various judges and officials. Brooks had subpoenaed these individuals to provide testimony in his municipal court case even though there is no indication that their testimony would be relevant to the charges in the case. This issue became moot when the case was dismissed for Brooks' failure to post the appeal bond.
Brooks makes additional and unsupported allegations that the Court of Appeals issued an advisory opinion, failed to rule on issues that were properly raised, ignored rules of procedure and precedent, and created new legislation in the first appeal in this case. Brooks' complaints are unfounded and not supported in the record.
Brooks also asserts that District Court Judge Brenda M. Cameron acted dishonestly and unethically in ruling on the motions in the case. However, none of Brooks' allegations are supported by evidence in the record on appeal. There is no evidence of judicial misconduct or an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.