Opinion
Civil Action CV-18-128
03-11-2020
CITY OE AUBURN, Plaintiff, v. EVENTY-SIX SPRING, LLC, Defendant.
ORDER ON MOTION TO KERMRAD
Valerie Stanfill, Justice
This land use complaint was filed on November 22, 2019 in the Lcwiston District court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80K. It alleges that Defendant violated various life safety provisions of Auburn's Lcwiston's Code of Ordinances in the multi-unit property and has failed to remedy the violations after notices were given, Plaintiff seeks to have Defendants remove the occupants, abate the violations, pay civil penalties and pay attorneys' fees and costs. Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 76C, Defendant removed the matter to Superior Court on the date set for the answer to the complaint. Plaintiff has now moved to remand the matter to District Court, arguing the removal was improvident as there is not a right to a jury trial. M.R. Civ. P. 76C(c).
"[A] defendant... who is charged with a violation of land use laws and ordinances in the District Court pursuant to Rule 80K may avail himself of his constitutional right to a jury trial by a removal to the Superior Court for a jury trial pursuant to Rule 76C." City of Biddeford v. Holland, 2005 ME 121J 14, 886A.2d 1281, If there is not a right to a jury trial, however, the court will remand the matter to the district court. The question in this case is whether Defendant has a right to a jury trial.
The Constitution of Maine guarantees that "in all civil suits, and in all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury, except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced. . . ." Me, Const, art. I, § 20, The Law Court has been clear that there is a right to a jury trial on all legal claims, but not on equitable claims. E.g., Bowden v. Grindle, 651 A.2d 347, 349 (Me. 1994); Town of Falmouth v. Long, 578 A.2d 1168, 1171 (Me. 1990). The determination depends on the type of relief requested in the claim. Bowden, 651 A.2d at 350. As noted above, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief coupled with a claim for civil penalties, fees and costs.
In Long, the Law Court stated as follows:
We have consistently held that the determination of remedies for zoning violations is an exercise of the court's equitable powers. See Town of Shapleigh v. Shikles, 427 A.2d 460, 464 (Me. 1981). The mere inclusion of an ancillary request for a civil penalty does not convert an equitable proceeding into an action at law., . . The Town in the instant case does not "exclusively seek a money recovery." Instead, it primarily pursues injunctive relief and requests the imposition of a civil penalty only as a secondary measure. This distinguishes the case at bar from DePaolo and leads us to conclude that the court properly considered this enforcement action as equitable in nature and therefore committed no error in denying Long a jury trial on the civil penalty issue.Long, 578 A.2d at 1171-72. On the other hand, in Holland, the claim for injunctive relief had already been determined, and the only issues before the court related to penalties and fees. In that case, the Law Court held that there was a right to a jury trial. Holland, 2005 ME 121, ¶ 14.
The question, then turns on whether a claim for injunctive relief coupled with the request for penalties permits removal for a jury trial.
To determine whether a claim is legal or equitable, we consider the basic nature of the issue presented and the remedy sought by the plaintiff. If the damages sought are not incidental to equitable relief but in the alternative as full compensation for the Injury alleged plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial.Avery v. Whatley, 670 A.2d 922, 924-25 (Me. 1996), citing Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1019 (Me, .ancillary to the primary remedy sought, this case must be considered equitable in nature. Therefore, there is no right to a jury trial and removal was improvidently granted.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand is granted; the case is remanded to Lewiston District Court forthwith. This order may be incorporated on the docket of the case by reference pursuant to Me, R. Civ. P. 79(a).