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approving in dicta trial court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff where only evidence went to collectability of judgment against defendant
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Civil Action No. 03-2283.
August 24, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently before this Court is plaintiff Citibank, N.A.'s ("Citibank's") Motion to Assess Damages, filed pursuant to a grant of summary judgment in favor of Citibank and against William A. Hicks ("Hicks") for $191,443.84, plus interest from November 15, 2002, attorney's fees, and costs. By way of the current motion, Citibank requests that this Court enter judgment in the total amount of $281,586.31, plus interest in the amount of $29.21 per day from and after May 31, 2004 through the date of entry of judgment, which includes plaintiff's attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements in the amount of $73,801.12 and interest from and after November 15, 2002 to May 31, 2004 in the amount of $16,341.35. While there is no dispute as to plaintiff's calculation of principal and interest due under the judgment, defendant contests the amount of attorney's fees sought by plaintiff, stating that they are "manifestly unreasonable and not recoverable under applicable law." Defendant claims that plaintiff's recoverable legal fees should be reduced by $22,000.00 based on unreasonable use of multiple law firms and by $15,000 to eliminate duplicative efforts, time spent reacquainting new attorneys with the file, and other "churning." Therefore, defendant alleges that plaintiff is only entitled to recover $36,801.12 in legal fees. For the reasons set forth below, we will award attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements to Citibank in the amount of $45,832.36.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The relevant facts of the case, as found by the Court, were as follows:
On or about December 1, 2000, William Hicks, defendant, signed a promissory note ("the Note") for a loan in the amount of $225,300 from Andersen Financial Corporation ("AFC"). Hicks took his loan in order to purchase an equity portion of Arthur Andersen Limited Partnership ("Andersen"). Upon signing of the note, the funds were transferred to Andersen, as Hicks directed. Hicks then received a partnership interest from Andersen. AFC subsequently sold the Note to Charta Corporation ("Charta"), an affiliate of Citibank. . . . On April 1, 2002, Charta assigned the Note, along with all the other notes by Andersen partners bought from AFC, to Citibank, the plaintiff.
The Note provides for acceleration upon the occurrence of the "Servicing Termination Date," which the Charta Purchase Agreement ("the Agreement") defines as "the date upon which [AFC's] appointment as Collection Agent shall have been terminated by the Agent pursuant to Section 6.01 [of the Agreement]." The Note incorporates by reference the Agreement. Section 6.01 of the Agreement states that "[t]he Agent may at any time designate as Collection Agent any Person (including itself) to succeed the Seller or any successor Collection Agent, on the condition in each case that any such Person so designated shall agree to perform the duties and obligations of the Collection Agent pursuant to the terms hereof." On or about September 16, 2002, the appointment of AFC as Collection Agent, which was the "Seller" under the Purchase Agreements, was terminated. Accordingly, the Servicing Termination Date occurred on September 16, 2002.
Citibank notified Hicks on October 11, 2002 of the occurrence of the Service Termination Date, and advised him that it was exercising its right under the Agreement to accelerate the remaining balance. Citibank demanded that Hicks pay the remaining principal balance with interest by November 15, 2002. The amount due on that date was $187,750 for the remaining principal balance and $3,693.84 for combined interest and late fees, for a total balance of $191,443.84. Hicks has not made any payments on this balance, despite receiving a reminder letter from Citibank dated December 2, 2002. In addition to the $191,443.84 due on the Note, the Note provides for the collection of attorney's fees and expenses, collection costs and the costs of disbursements of any legal action undertaken to obtain payment on the Note.
Trial Court Memorandum and Order at pp. 1-3. (Internal citations omitted).
On April 11, 2003, Citibank filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Hicks claiming that Hicks breached the promissory note by failing to pay the remaining principal balance and interest in the amount of $191,443.84, which became due and payable on November 15, 2002. On April 29, 2004, Judge Yohn granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Judge Yohn found that the facts of the case were undisputed, that defendant's opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was based entirely on defenses affecting plaintiff's ability to collect on the Note, and that defendant failed to produce more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support these defenses. Trial Court Memorandum and Order at pp. 4-5.
In addition to the grant of summary judgment in favor of Citibank in the sum of $191,443.84, Judge Yohn ordered that Hicks pay interest from November 15, 2002, attorney's fees, and the costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to the terms of the Note executed by the parties. Citibank now asks this Court to award the following: (1) attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements in the amount of $73,801.12; (2) interest from and after November 15, 2002 to May 31, 2004 in the amount of $16,341.35; and (3) interest in the amount of $29.21 per day from and after May 31, 2004 through the date of entry of judgment.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
Defendant does not dispute the enforceability of the fee-shifting provision contained in the Note, which provides for the award of reasonable attorney's fees, as follows: "Borrower agrees to pay the costs and expenses of the holder hereof, including reasonable attorney's fees and expenses, incurred in connection with collecting any amount due hereunder." Promissory Note, ¶ 7. The Note also contains a choice of law provision, which states that the Note shall be governed by the laws of the state of Illinois. Id. at ¶ 9.
According to federal law, "[i]n a diversity case, absent a conflicting applicable federal rule of procedure, state law governs not only the actual awarding of attorneys' fees but also the method of determining those fees." Dunkin' Donuts Inc., v. Guang Chyi Liu, 2002 WL 31375509, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2002) (citing Northern Heel Corp. v. Compo Industries, Inc., 851 F.2d 456, 475 (1st Cir. 1988)); Buse v. Vanguard Group of Investment Cos., No. 91-3560, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1242, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1998) (citations omitted)). In this case, the Note contains specific authority for the award of attorney's fees and neither party disputes the choice of law provision therein. Accordingly, this Court's determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees shall be guided by Illinois law.
III. DISCUSSION
Under Illinois law, "it is well established that a party seeking to recover attorney's fees from another party bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence from which the trial court can render a decision as to their reasonableness." Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. American National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 594 N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992) (citingMars v. Priester, 563 N.E.2d 977, 980 (Ill. 1990); Corkill Electric Co. v. City of Chicago, 554 N.E.2d 1027, 1034-35 (Ill. 1990)). The petition for attorney's fees must contain detailed records with information upon which the charges are predicated "specifying the services performed, by whom they were performed, the time expended and the hourly rate charged." Id. (citingMercado v. Calumet Federal Savings Loan Ass'n, 554 N.E.2d 305, 312 (Ill. 1990)). In addition to the information provided, Illinois case law has enumerated several factors to be considered in assessing what constitutes an award of reasonable attorneys' fees, including: the skill and standing of the attorneys employed, the nature of the case, the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the degree of responsibility required, the usual and customary charge for the same or similar services in the community, and whether there is a reasonable connection between the fees charged and the litigation. Id. (citing Blankenship v. Dialist Int'l Corp., 568 N.E.2d 503, 507-08 (Ill. 1991)). Furthermore, in determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees, the trial court may consider its own experience and knowledge of the value of legal services performed, which the court has acquired during the discharge of its professional duties. Kaiser v. MEPC American Properties, Inc., 518 N.E.2d 424, 431 (Ill.App.Ct. 1987). In determining whether specific legal services performed were reasonable, Illinois jurisprudence dictates that "[t]he test for determining the reasonableness of attorney fees incurred in a matter must be whether a reasonable attorney, based on the totality of the facts and circumstances known and available to him, should have performed the legal services at the time the services were performed in order to discharge his ethical obligations under the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility." Harris Trust and Savings Bank, 594 N.E.2d at 1314.
In the case at bar, Citibank seeks $73,801.12 in legal fees and costs billed by two law firms employed during the 12-month period in which this action was litigated. Significantly, this amount represents nearly 40 percent of the total judgment awarded to plaintiff. The legal fees incurred from Philadelphia firm, Drinker Biddle Reath, LLP ("DBR"), total $51,854.18, which includes 402.8 hours billed by 12 different professionals, whose hourly rates ranged from $115-$450. Plaintiff also employed the New York firm of Alonso, Andalkar Kahn, P.C. ("AAK"), which billed 121.3 hours by 5 different professionals, whose hourly rates ranged from $125-$325, for a total of $21,946.94. Plaintiff provided the required billing information from both DBR and AAK, specifying the legal services performed, by whom, the time expended on each task, and the hourly rate charged.
A. Hourly Rates
Plaintiff's Philadelphia counsel, DBR, provided the majority of legal services for this case. The hourly rates charged by DBR professionals ranged significantly from $115/hour to $450/hour. Given our knowledge of the usual and customary charge for similar legal services performed in the Philadelphia community, we find that the rates charged for the following five DBR attorneys were excessive: A.W. Putnam ($385/hour); J. Chesney ($410/hour); B. McDonnough ($360/hour); D.P. Bruton ($450/hour); and R. Malone ($405/hour).
Contrary to the general rule that the "unsuccessful litigant in a civil action is not responsible for the payment of his opponent's fees," the fee-shifting provision of the Note is an exception to the rule that makes defendant liable to plaintiff only for those fees which are reasonable. Kaiser, 518 N.E.2d at 427. While plaintiff is entitled to retain counsel at any level that it sees fit, it is not reasonable to expect the defendant to pay for premium legal services, including rates of top-billing partners, on a claim that is relatively straight-forward and has been litigated by plaintiff in a dozen other identical cases. Notably, even the partners of plaintiff's New York firm did not charge at the high rates billed by the specified partners of DBR. "A Michelangelo should not charge Sistine Chapel rates for painting a farmer's barn." Ursic v. Bethelehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677 (3d Cir. 1983). Therefore, based on this Court's knowledge and experience in awarding attorney's fees and in light of the rather unsophisticated nature of this claim, we grant the above-mentioned professionals of DBR a rate of $325/hour. Application of these new hourly rates to the total of 43.7 collective hours leads to a deduction in attorneys' fees of $3,650.
This deduction was calculated by adding the difference between each attorney's billable hours when multiplied by their original hourly rate and the hourly rate of $325 as determined by the Court.
B. Time Reasonably Expended
Under Illinois law, time spent on the case is a factor of utmost significance in determining an award of attorneys' fees.Ransom v. Ransom, 429 N.E.2d 594 (Ill.App.Ct. 1981). Furthermore, in a case where the issues are few, a determination of "whether the hours expended by counsel were actually necessary" should be given special consideration. In re marriage of Jacobson, 411 N.E.2d 947, 950 (Ill.App.Ct. 1980) (citingGasperini v. Gasperini, 373 N.E.2d 576, 582 (Ill. 1978)). The law clearly states that "it is not sufficient to merely multiply the number of hours expended by counsel, even as shown by detailed records, by whatever hourly rate is determined to be reasonable without consideration of other pertinent factors."Id. at 950 (citing Tippet v. Tippet, 383 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Ill. 1978)).
Defendant raises several arguments challenging the amount of time expended by plaintiff's counsel in litigating this case. Before addressing each argument, we make the observation that plaintiff's characterization of the lawsuit as a complex commercial transaction which required painstaking attention to detail is belied by the relatively straight-forward, four-page complaint, which contains only one claim for breach of contract. In addition, defendant notes that plaintiff was involved in identical lawsuits with dozens of other noteholders/former Andersen partners, suggesting that additional time which would ordinarily be necessary to address a unique legal issue is not reasonable in this case. However, it is also significant that plaintiff wholly prevailed on its summary judgment motion against defendant, successfully overcoming defendant's myriad of defenses.
1. Balance carried over to first invoice
Initially, Hicks points out that the first DBR invoice in support of its motion contains a "prior due balance" of $26,972.35 with no explanation detailing the nature of these charges. We agree that plaintiff did not provide the specificity required to recover this portion of DBR's legal fees, as the Court is not aware of what legal services were provided, who performed them, how much time was expended, or the hourly rates charged. However, a calculation of the total legal fees incurred, as represented by the billing statements, compared to the requested DBR legal fees in plaintiff's petition, leads this Court to believe that the $26,972.35 prior balance was not included in plaintiff's request for DBR fees. Therefore, we need not address this issue further.
2. Duplicative Efforts and Overstaffing
As his primary argument, Hicks makes a general observation that plaintiff's counsel engaged in overstaffing, which nearly assured that the invoices would be replete with duplicative efforts by attorneys from both law firms. Specifically, Hicks claims that staffing the case with 12 professionals from DBR and four professionals from AAK was unnecessary given the relatively little written work produced and plaintiff's familiarity with the type of case. Furthermore, he contends that much time was wasted editing and re-editing the same legal documents, as well as through endless attorney conferencing and e-mail exchanges (See discussion infra Section III, B, 3 related to attorney conferencing). Such duplicative efforts resulted in fees for which Hicks feels he is not now responsible.
Plaintiff employed two law firms and a total of 17 professionals to handle the Hicks case. In addition, the record reveals that plaintiff submitted the following legal documents: Complaint (four pages); Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (five pages, plus supporting exhibits); Amended Complaint (six pages); Motion for Summary Judgment (25 pages, plus affidavit and supporting exhibits); Reply Brief (seven pages); Motion to Assess Damages (six pages, plus affidavits and supporting exhibits). In addition, plaintiff conducted two months of discovery and had oral argument before the Court on its summary judgment motion.
Upon examination of the billing records, the Court agrees that time spent by three AAK attorneys editing and re-editing legal documents and conferencing with DBR attorneys was duplicative, especially given the supervisory role AAK seemingly played in this litigation. Specifically, Alexandra C. Siskopoulos, Mark J. Alonso, and Manoj Andalkar billed significant hours for similar or identical tasks on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Invoices dated June 5, 2003 and July 9, 2003. The Court feels that employing two professionals, at most, from AAK would have been sufficient given the nature of the case and their supervisory capacity. Accordingly, we will deduct $7,825 from the fee petition for duplicative efforts and overstaffing with regard to work performed by AAK. We also acknowledge that two other AAK professionals billed under the Hicks case: Jaymee Kahn and Jaime J. Wang. However, the billable hours were so limited that we assume these professionals were called on to perform a specific task or offer additional expertise relevant to the litigation.
This deduction is taken based on the total billable hours incurred from AAK attorney Manoj Andalkar. Mr. Andalkar billed 31.3 hours at a rate of $250/hour.
Regarding overstaffing at DBR, a review of the billing records shows that the majority of work was done by two attorneys in the earlier stages of the case (M.C. Kochkodin and J. Chesney) with one attorney (A. Flame) joining in the later stages of the case. The remaining nine DBR professionals who billed under the Hicks case did so infrequently, indicating that they stepped in only to perform a specific function or offer expertise on a certain matter. Therefore, we find the number of attorneys employed by DBR to be reasonable and will not make a further deduction on this point.
3. Attorney Conferencing
Hicks raises the claim that plaintiff's counsel billed an inordinate amount of time for conferences and e-mail exchanges among attorneys and between law firms. Specifically, defendant cites the following invoices in which the tasks involve e-mailing correspondence between and among DBR personnel and/or AAK personnel: Invoice No. 400996, page 3 (more than 3 hours); Invoice No. 470551, page 1 (4.1 hours); Invoice No. 413852, page 1 (1.2 hours) and page 2 (2.1 hours).
The Court recognizes the value of attorney communication and conferencing in preparation and daily management of a lawsuit. However, we agree that the amount of time allocated to attorney conferencing in this case was unreasonable given the nature of this claim. Particularly, e-mail correspondence and conferencing between M.C. Kochkodin and J. Chesney of DBR was excessive. Invoices 376636, 394866, and 400996 reveal that conferencing between these two attorneys could be found in more than half of the task entries listed on those invoices. In addition, the billing records from AAK reveal that the majority of its attorneys' time was spent reviewing correspondence, responding to e-mails, and participating in telephone conferences with DBR attorneys, often with no explanation as to the substance of what was being reviewed.
Turning to the Third Circuit for guidance on this issue, we find persuasive its holding that when several attorneys bill a large number of hours for strategy and conferencing, a reduction in the fee request may be appropriate. Daggett v. Kimmelman, 811 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir. 1987). The records show that DBR spent 53.1 hours and AAK spent 58.3 hours on correspondence, e-mail, and/or telephone conferences. Thus, in total, 111.4 hours can be attributed to attorney conferencing. Given this excessive amount, it would be unreasonable to make defendant liable in damages for time spent on both sides of the correspondence and conferencing. Therefore, we find that defendant should be liable for one-half of the billable hours (55.7 hours) related to communication between and among DBR and/or AAK attorneys. Accordingly, we make a further deduction of $14,025.26 to the attorneys' fees requested in plaintiff's petition.
This figure does not include hours billed from 06/02/03 through 06/30/03 found in the August 5, 2003 statement that are related to attorney conferencing. As discussed infra Section III, B, 10, these are duplicate hours resulting from a billing error and will be deducted in their entirety from the fee petition. This figure also does not include hours billed by AAK attorney Manoj Andalkar that are related to attorney conferencing. As discussed supra Section III, B, 2, attorney Andalkar's hours were deducted in their entirety to address duplicative efforts and overstaffing concerns.
This deduction was calculated by multiplying the average of the hourly rates charged by half of all hours billed as attorney conferencing. Thus, the hourly rates of the attorneys at DBR who billed the majority of conferencing hours were $210 (M.C. Kochkodin) and $325 (J. Chesney as found by the Court). Their average hourly rate is $267.50. The deduction for DBR was taken based on this hourly rate multiplied by half of the conferencing hours billed by DBR ($267.50 × 26.55 = $7,102.13). The hourly rates of the attorneys at AAK who billed the majority of conferencing hours were $150 (Alexander C. Sisko)and $325 (Mark J. Alonso) for an average of $237.50. The deduction for AAK was taken based on this hourly rate multiplied by half of the conferencing hours bill by AAK ($237.50 × 29.15 = $6,923.13). Together, $7,102.13 + $6,923.13 = $14,025.26.
4. Transition Costs
According to Hicks, Citibank should not be able to recover legal fees for the DBR time entries labeled "Citibank Transition." He points out that the records reveal that staffing changes on the Hicks case at DBR accounted for 2.8 hours of billable time, totaling $668. Invoice No. 413852, pages 4-5. We do not find it an unreasonable expenditure of time to bring on new attorneys and allow them to become acquainted with the case. Based on this Court's knowledge and experience, absent excessive charges allocated to a transition, a law firm's decision to re-assign attorneys within the firm will not be deemed unreasonable. Notably, defendant points to only one invoice containing three entries that total 2.8 hours dedicated to the transition, which primarily involved the addition of only one attorney (A. Flame). This small amount of time is well within a reasonable period to spend on this task.
5. Block-style Billing
Hicks asserts that plaintiff should not be able to recover attorneys' fees that are documented in block-style billing because it does not satisfy the requisite degree of specificity. He states that some of the time entries are up to 10 lines long with multiple tasks lumped together in large blocks of time, some of which exceed four hours.
Again borrowing from federal jurisprudence, we take the following approach to the issue of block-style billing:
Block billing is a common practice which itself saves time in that the attorney summarizes activities rather than detailing every task. While a substantial number of vague entries may be a reason to exclude hours . . . it is not a reason to exclude the entire entry. We believe the more appropriate approach would be to look at the entire block, comparing the listed activities and the time spent, and determining whether the hours reasonably correlate to all of the activities performed.United States ex rel. John Doe v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 54 F. Supp.2d 410, 415 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
In the case at bar, the entries for each attorney from each firm on each day are sufficiently specific for this Court to make a determination as to the reasonableness of the task itself and the time allotted for the task. Notably, in some instances, the attorneys have even allocated time for each specific task within a larger block of tasks. Hence, we reject Hicks' general challenge to the blockstyle billing employed by Citibank's counsel.
As block-style billing contains numerous tasks listed within one block of time, the Court must estimate the time spent on a particular task in order to deduct it. As such, our determination of the hours spent on attorney conferencing in Section III, B, 3 are based on reasonable estimates where those tasks are listed with others in a block-style entry. While this method may be less than precise, it is a necessary consequence of the attorneys' decisions to bill in this format.
6. Use of Multiple Law Firms
Further, Hicks challenges plaintiff's use of two law firms in the litigation, claiming that New York firm AAK's services were unnecessary since Philadelphia counsel DBR was running the case on a daily basis rather than acting in a local counsel role. We agree that the records reflect that the majority of the litigation was handled by DBR. However, we believe that plaintiff's use of AAK in a supervisory capacity is completely reasonable, especially in light of Citibank's various litigation of identical claims, presumably in different areas of the country and with different local counsel. Thus, Citibank's employment of a central New York law firm to oversee its various litigation against former noteholders/Andersen partners is a reasonable and efficient means of handling its business. In addition, this Court has addressed Hicks' argument that AAK went well beyond a supervisory role by deducting the legal fees for one AAK attorney under Section III, B, 2 for duplicative efforts and overstaffing. Therefore, we feel that no further deduction is appropriate here.
7. Charges Unrelated to the Lawsuit
According to Hicks, the DBR invoices contain billable hours for legal services provided in connection with other Citibank litigation, unrelated to the Hicks case. Hicks specifically cites Invoice No. 376636, page 2, where DBR billed 1.4 hours ($539.00) and listed as one of ten tasks performed in that time, "draft extensive e-mail memo to M. Alonso covering POs in state court cases and separate evaluation of Hicks matter." Notably, only the first portion of this task is unrelated to the case, since there is a clear reference to Hicks within the entry. Thus, we will allocate .2 hours to this unrelated entry and deduct $77. Hicks also cites Invoice No. 407551, page 2, where DBR billed .30 hours ($123.00) and specified "Bellwoar" within the entry. The Court also notes a similar entry of .5 hours ($117.50) specifying "Bellwoar" on page 4 of Invoice No. 400996. It appears that these entries are completely unrelated to this case and were mistakenly included in the computation of attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in this matter. In addition, Invoice No. 445060, page 1, contains an entry for .6 hours ($189), which specifies, "Review Hicks, Lanziseara and Pittman files regarding status. . . ." As Hicks is not responsible for work related to the Lanziseara or Pittman files, we will deduct two-thirds of that charge ($126) from plaintiff's fee petition. Therefore, the Court will deduct a total of $443.50 from the requested award based on charges unrelated to the Hicks lawsuit.
8. Related Costs
Hicks cites Harris Trust and Savings Bank, 594 N.E.2d at 1315, for the proposition that Citibank is not entitled to recover for ordinary office expenses, such as photocopying, fax charges, and computerized research fees. However, this Court again believes that these expenses were not included in plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees, based on a calculation of the total legal fees incurred, as represented by the billing statements, compared to the requested legal fees by plaintiff. Therefore, we need not address this issue further.
9. Billing Errors
Plaintiff submitted billing statements from New York law firm AAK with statement dates from June 5, 2003 through May 3, 2004 (no statements were submitted for February, March or April of 2004). The statement dated August 5, 2003, however, contains time entries that duplicate those found in the July 9, 2003 statement. Specifically, the July 9, 2003 statement encompasses time entries dated 06/02/03 through 06/30/03 and the August 5, 2003 statement contains time entries dated 06/02/03 through 7/01/03. The addition of two entries from July in the August statement indicate that AAK billed twice for work done from 06/02/03 through 06/30/03. As this is a clear billing error on AAK's part, we will deduct an additional $2025 from plaintiff's fee petition to correct the duplicated billing.
C. Total Deductions from Citibank's Petition
To summarize the rulings set forth in this opinion, the Court provides the following calculation of plaintiff's recoverable attorneys' fees:
DEDUCTIONS:
Unreasonable hourly rates: $ 3,650.00 Duplicative efforts and overstaffing $ 7,825.00 Attorney conferencing: $14,025.26 Charges unrelated to the lawsuit: $ 443.50 Billing errors $ 2,025.00
TOTAL AMOUNT REQUESTED: $73,801.12 TOTAL DEDUCTIONS: $27,968.76 TOTAL ATTORNEYS' FEE AWARD: $45,832.36
IV. CONCLUSION
Having thoroughly reviewed the legal memoranda and supporting exhibits before it, this Court, for the reasons set forth in detail above, awards Citibank: (1) an award of attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $45,832.36; (2) interest from and after November 15, 2002 to May 31, 2004 in the amount of $16,341.35; and (3) interest of $29.21 per day from and after May 31, 2004 through the date of entry of judgment. Adding in the principal sum of $191,443.84, the total judgment award is $253,617.55 plus interest in the amount of $29.21 per day from and after May 31, 2004 through the date of entry of judgment.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this ____ day of August, 2004, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion to Assess Damages and Defendant's Response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED and that damages are assessed in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the aggregate amount of $253,617.55 plus interest in the amount of $29.21 per day from an after May 31, 2004 through the date of entry of judgment.It is so ORDERED.