Opinion
No. FA98-0147294S
January 12, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR MODIFICATION (#132) POST-JUDGMENT
The defendant wife filed a post-judgment motion to modify the dissolution judgment, specifically the allocation of the tax deductions (also referred to as dependency exemptions) for the minor children. The separation agreement of the parties, entered as a court order at the time of the dissolution in 1999 states in pertinent part: "The plaintiff [husband] shall claim the minor children, Hannah and Stephen, as his dependents on his federal income tax return, for this year and all subsequent years, and the defendant shall claim Maegan as her dependent on federal income tax returns, for this year and all subsequent years, so long as [the] defendant [does] not remarry."
The defendant argues that modification is appropriate because of the plaintiff's remarriage and his ability to claim as tax deductions his two step-children. The plaintiff argues in opposition that allocations of tax deductions in the dissolution judgment are in the nature of property distributions, which pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212a and 46b-86, are non-modifiable. See, e.g., Kenny v. Kenny, 226 Conn. 219, 222, 627 A.2d 426 (1993) (trial court lacks continuing jurisdiction with respect to the distribution of property in a dissolution decree after the four-month period for opening or setting aside a civil judgment has passed.); Bunche v. Bunche, 180 Conn. 285, 289, 429 A.2d 874 (1980) (even while Superior Court lacks continuing jurisdiction over that portion of a dissolution judgment providing for the assignment of property of one party to the other party, the court may have jurisdiction over an order for the periodic payment of permanent alimony or support depending on different factors, including substantial change in circumstances).
Connecticut's appellate courts have not yet directly addressed whether the allocation of tax deductions is a modifiable post-judgment; however, they have examined these deductions in the context of child support. Our Supreme Court has held that amendments to the Internal Revenue Code have not divested the state courts of their authority to allocate the deduction to a non-custodial parent. Serrano v. Serrano, 213 Conn. 1, 566 A.2d 413 (1989). Our Supreme Court has also held that the allocation of tax deductions is one factor to be considered in determining the applicability of the Child Support Guidelines. Battersby v. Battersby, 218 Conn. 467, 590 A.2d 427 (1991).
The appellate courts of several other states have addressed this issue. Most have held that the allocation of tax deductions is modifiable. The Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio trial courts may exercise their authority to allocate a child dependency deduction to a noncustodial parent, as long as the record demonstrates that the interest of the child would be furthered. Bobo v. Jewell, 38 Ohio St.3d 330, 528 N.E.2d 180 (1988). The North Carolina Court of Appeals has held that "where the parties waive the enforcement of their separation agreement by asking the court to determine child support in accordance with North Carolina law, the court shall apply the Guidelines in their entirety." Ticconi v. Ticconi, 161 N.C.App.Ct. 730, 589 S.E.2d 371 (2003). That court further held that the provision of the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines as to tax deduction allocation can override the dissolution agreement of the parties as to this issue, thus allowing the court to modify allocation. Minnesota's Court of Appeals has held that modification of the allocation of dependency exemptions is permissible and analogous to modification of child support obligations. In Re Marriage of Nelsen v. Thompson, No. A03-1616 (Minn.App.Ct., June 15, 2004). The Iowa Court of Appeals held that dependency exemptions are to be considered with child support and are modifiable. In Re the Marriage of Crow, No. 2-694/01-1924 (Iowa Ct.App., November 25, 2002). In deciding whether or not modification of allocations was appropriate in one case, the Vermont Appellate Court has interpreted 15 V.S.A. § 661. "Vermont's Child Support Guidelines explicitly acknowledge the effect that dependency exemptions have upon available income of parties in a divorce. Section 661 of Title 15 requires the court to consider the parties' respective tax liabilities in calculating a maintenance supplement obligation." Adamson v. Dodge, 174 Vt. 311, 816 A.2d 455 (2002). While the court in that case held that the trial court erred in granting the modification, authority of the court to modify was implicit in the court's analysis.
According to federal law, the custodial parent is entitled to available dependency exemptions. 26 U.S.C. § 152(e).
At the trial level, Connecticut courts have addressed the issue as one of contract law and have distributed the tax deductions according to their interpretation of the dissolution agreement's provisions. See Koldys v. Koldys, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 043717 (December 4, 1992, Pickett, J.) ( 8 Conn. L. Rptr. 35); Kaiser v. Kaiser, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 339639 (October 10, 1996, Alander, J.) ( 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 662). It is submitted that this approach is applicable to the present issue.
In a similar matter where the agreement of the parties earlier had been ordered incorporated by reference into the dissolution decree, the court held that "[a] judgment rendered in accordance with such a stipulation of the parties is to be regarded and construed as a contract . . .
"In interpreting contract items, we have repeatedly stated that the intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and that the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract . . . Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaiser v. Kaiser, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 339639.
The language of the dissolution agreement presently before the court clearly and unambiguously states that the plaintiff will have two tax deductions and the defendant one, until such time as the defendant remarries. The language of the agreement indicates that it was the parties' intent to provide each of them with a certain number of tax deductions, as long as they were available, unless there was a material change of circumstances in regard to the defendant's marital status. The conditional provision with respect to the defendant's marital status suggests that the parties made this agreement based on the assumption that the court could modify the tax deduction allocation if this one particular event took place. Based on the language of the agreement, the triggering event has not taken place, therefore, any reallocation is not appropriate. The fact that the parties foresaw a contingent event that might lead to a reallocation of the tax credits based on the defendant's remarrying implied that they viewed these tax credits in the nature of support and not property; however, there is no need to reach that issue in the present case because the language of the agreement is unambiguous and clear. Therefore, the motion for modification is denied.
CUTSUMPAS, J