Summary
In Crotty, citizens of Cincinnati brought suit alleging that enforcement of the state fluoridation laws violated the first amendment and the equal protection clause.
Summary of this case from City of Canton, Ohio v. MaynardOpinion
No. 76-795
Decided April 20, 1977.
Environmental protection — Director's order to fluoridate municipally-owned water supply — Review procedure — Claims of danger to health.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.
On November 19, 1975, this court decided the case of Cincinnati v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St.2d 58, 337 N.E.2d 773, affirming an order by the Ohio Director of Environmental Protection directing the city of Cincinnati, a respondent herein, to add fluoride to its water supply system, and decided further the case of Canton v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St.2d 62, 337 N.E.2d 766, which held generally that statutes requiring fluoridation of municipal water supplies are valid as an exercise of the state police power. On February 26, 1976, the relators, as taxpayers and water users of the city of Cincinnati, filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas, pursuant to R.C. 733.59, alleging that the respondents' contemplated addition of fluoride to the drinking water of the city as directed in the order affirmed in Cincinnati v. Whitman, supra, would deprive relators of certain constitutional rights. Relators sought, inter alia, temporary and permanent injunctions barring the addition of fluoride to the city's water supply, and sought, further, declaratory judgments that such addition constitutes a violation of due process, an interference by the state with relators' free exercise of religion, and a violation of equal protection. Appended to the complaint were affidavits asserting that the sodium fluoride to be added to the water is a carcinogen. The court allowed a temporary restraining order to prevent the respondents from taking any action which would result in the addition of fluorides to the water.
On March 5, 1976, the respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the persons of the respondents and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. The trial court found that the relators were not entitled to any relief and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
A motion to certify the record was granted by this court upon the sole issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the complaint and the applicability of Canton v. Whitman, supra.
Mr. Robert E. Manley, for appellees.
Mr. Thomas A. Luebbers, city solicitor, Mr. Philip S. Olinger and Ms. Patricia W. Morrison, for appellants City of Cincinnati et al.
Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general, and Mr. Bruce E. Cryder, for appellant Director of Environmental Protection.
It is a generally accepted rule that in absence of fraud or collusion, a judgment for or against a governmental body, such as a municipal corporation, is binding and conclusive as res judicata on all residents, citizens and taxpayers with respect to matters adjudicated which are of general and public interest, except where the proceedings were not of an adversary character. This rule is in accordance with the general policy favoring finality of judgments where a matter has been litigated upon the merits. Where, as here, the case involves a single cause of action, the prior judgment is conclusive not only as to what was determined in the prior action, but also as to all material facts or questions which properly might have been litigated in the case. The claims that fluoridation infringes upon religious freedom and upon equal protection are matters which properly could have been litigated in the prior action and which also were dismissed by this court in Canton v. Whitman, supra ( 44 Ohio St.2d 62), and Kraus v. Cleveland (1955), 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609.
Thoms v. Greenwood (1878), 6 Ohio Dec. Rep. 639, affirmed 3 W.L.B. 1057; Cincinnati Union Stock Yards Co. v. Cincinnati (1913), 1 Ohio App. 452; Griffin v. Roseburg (Ore. 1970), 464 P.2d 691; Greenberg v. Chicago (1912), 256 Ill. 213, 99 N.E. 1039; 1 Freeman on Judgments 956 (5 Ed. 1925); 50 Corpus Juris Secundum 337-40; 46 American Jurisprudence 2d 742.
Lakewood v. Rees (1937), 132 Ohio St. 399, 8 N.E.2d 250.
Schimke v. Earley (1962), 173 Ohio St. 521, 184 N.E.2d 209; Quinn v. State, ex rel. Leroy (1928), 118 Ohio St. 48, 160 N.E. 453.
A more difficult question is raised by the claim that fluoride is a carcinogen based on statistics that the cancer death rate has increased in certain cities with fluoridated water, while remaining the same in certain other cities which do not fluoridate. The evidence for this claim has not been tested by litigation and is disputed by other authorities. This evidence has also been submitted to federal agencies and to the Congress. If scientifically proved, these claims could raise legitimate questions as to the constitutionality of fluoridation as a public health measure, and, since these claims are based upon very recent studies, the purposes underlying the principle of res judicata would probably not be served by barring litigation to determine the validity of the claims. However, in the present cause, the complaint was properly dismissed by the Court of Common Pleas for a different reason.
Congressional Record, Dec. 16, 1975, Page H12732; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second Session, Part 7, pages 1018-21 and 1063-70 (1976).
The claim which was presented is in actual effect a claim that the order of the Director of Environmental Protection, affirmed in Cincinnati v. Whitman, supra, should now be reversed because the presence of fluorides in public water supplies is a danger to health. Under R.C. 6111.12, the statutory procedure for claims that a public water supply is impure and dangerous to health is by complaint to the Environmental Protection Agency. Further, under R.C. 3745.04, an appeal "for an order vacating or modifying the action of the Director of Environmental Protection" may be brought before the Environmental Board of Review and "the Environmental Board of Review has exclusive original jurisdiction over any matter which may, under * * * [R.C. 3745.04], be brought before it." Appeal thereafter may be taken only "to the Court of Appeals of Franklin County, or, if the appeal arises from the alleged violation of a law or regulation, to the Court of Appeals of the district in which the violation was alleged to have occurred." R.C. 3745.06.
It is apparent that this statutory scheme for review of actions by the Director of Environmental Protection is exclusive, and that the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County accordingly lacked jurisdiciton over the complaint at bar, which seeks to have an order issued by the director set aside. For that reason, the complaint was properly dismissed by the trial court, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, STERN, SWEENEY and LOCHER, JJ., concur.
CELEBREZZE and W. BROWN, JJ., dissent.
STERN, J., retired, assigned to active duty under authority of Section 6(C), Article IV, Constitution, sitting for P. BROWN, J.