Opinion
No. UWY-CV0-096001772
September 14, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This memorandum of decision is issued in connection with the motion to set aside judgment, motion for remittitur and motion for collateral source reduction filed by the defendant, Nicholas Sciaretta on July 28, 2011 and August 1, 2011,
The defendant first moved to set aside the verdict entered by the jury in this action on July 21, 2011. The grounds set forth in the defendant's motion to set aside verdict are: (1) that the court erred in instructing the jury on the family car doctrine where the operator of the vehicle was not a family member identified in the statute, nor was the operator at the time acting as the agent of the family member in the car; (2) that the trial court erroneously relied upon Chen v. Bernadel, 101 Conn.App. 658, 922 A.2d 1142 (2007); (3) that the trial court erred in allowing certain late disclosed medical bills into evidence; and (4) that the trial court should set aside the jury's verdict and render a judgment for the defendant Nicholas Sciaretta since the evidence was insufficient to establish that the family car doctrine was applicable to facts in this action.
The defendant Nicholas Sciaretta has also moved to have the jury's award of $245,000 in non-economic damages reduced on the grounds that such award was not supported by the evidence and was excessive. Finally, the defendant has moved for a collateral source reduction of the economic damages awarded by the jury on July 21, 2011.
Oral argument was held on all of these motions on August 23, 2011.
I FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action was commenced in 2009 by the plaintiff Lauren Cima as against defendants Eric Sciaretta and Nicholas Sciaretta. This action arises out of a July 16, 2007, car accident in which Cima was a passenger in a vehicle that was struck by a vehicle owned by Nicholas Sciaretta and typically operated by his son Eric Sciaretta. At the time of the accident, however, the vehicle was being driven by a friend of Eric Sciaretta's, Stephen Sorbo. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was a nineteen-year-old college student actively involved in cheerleading and other activities. After the accident, her activities were changed substantially and she underwent years of treatment for the injuries sustained in the accident. The parties stipulated at trial that the plaintiff's life expectancy was 57.7 years.
Trial was conducted in this case on July 19, 2011 through July 21, 2011, and culminated in the jury reaching a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The evidence at trial was that Stephen Sorbo failed to stop at a stop sign and broad sided the vehicle Cima was riding in. At trial defendant Eric Sciaretta described the impact as significant and on a scale of "one-ten," described it as a "nine." The air bags deployed in Cima's vehicle and her head, arm, knee, and lower back were injured as a result of the impact. At trial, the defendants did not dispute that Sorbo failed to stop at the stop sign or that Cima was injured as a result of the impact. Instead, the defendants disputed the extent to which Cima was injured and that both Sciarettas were legally responsible in any way for the accident.
At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict as to count three of the complaint on plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim and as to the first two remaining negligence counts of the complaint as to defendants Eric Sciaretta and Nicholas Sciaretta. The court granted a directed verdict as to count three of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that was insufficient evidence offered at trial to support her negligent entrustment claim. The court also granted a directed verdict as to defendant Eric Sciaretta, who at the time of the accident was a passenger in the car, on the ground that since Eric Sciaretta was neither the operator of the vehicle at the time of the accident nor the owner of the vehicle, there was insufficient evidence to go to the jury with respect to the negligence claim made against him.
In reaching its verdict on July 21, 2011, the jury answered 17 jury interrogatories, including the first two interrogatories which dealt explicitly with the issue of whether Nicholas Sciaretta gave general authority, without restrictions, to Eric Sciaretta to use the family vehicle for his pleasure and convenience and whether Eric Sciaretta gave permission to operate the family car to Stephen Sorbo. The jury answered both of those interrogatories affirmatively and further found that the accident of July 16, 2007 proximately caused the injuries claimed by the plaintiff. The jury entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $256,058.56, which verdict included $245,000 in non-economic damages.
II DISCUSSION A. Motion to Set Aside Verdict
A motion to set aside or open a civil judgment is governed by General Statutes § 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-4. "A trial court may set aside a verdict on a finding that the verdict is manifestly unjust because, given the evidence presented, the jury mistakenly applied a legal principle or because there is no evidence to which the legal principles of the case could be applied . . . A verdict should not be set aside, however, where it is apparent that there was some evidence on which a jury might reasonably have reached its conclusion . . . This limitation on a trial court's discretion results from the constitutional right of litigants to have issues of fact determined by a jury . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deas v. Diaz, 121 Conn.App. 826, 841, 998 A.2d 200, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 905, 3 A.3d 69 (2010).
"The setting aside of a verdict can occur for two general reasons. First, a trial court may set aside a verdict on a finding that the verdict is manifestly unjust because, given the evidence presented, the jury mistakenly applied a legal principle or because there is no evidence to which the legal principles of the case could be applied . . . Second, a verdict may be set aside if its result justifies a suspicion that a juror or jurors were influenced by prejudice, corruption or partiality." (Citation omitted.) Novak v. Scalesse, 43 Conn.App. 94, 97-8, 681 A.2d 968, cert. granted, 239 Conn. 925, 682 A.2d 1004 (1996).
"A motion to set aside the verdict should be granted if the jury reasonably and legally could not have reached the determination that [it] did in fact reach . . . [i]f the jury, without conjecture, could not have found a required element Of the cause of action, it cannot withstand a motion to set aside the verdict . . . Thus, the role of the trial court on a motion to set aside the jury's verdict is not to sit as [an added] juror, but rather, to decide whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the jury could reasonably have reached the verdict that it did . . . As a corollary, it is the court's duty to set aside the verdict when it finds that it does manifest injustice, and is . . . palpably against the evidence." Marciano v. Kraner, 126 Conn.App. 171, 177, 10 A.3d 572, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 922, 14 A.3d 1007 (2011).
The defendant Nicholas Sciaretta first contends that there was insufficient evidence to charge the jury on the family car doctrine. Contrary to the defendant's recollection of the evidence at trial, the defendant Nicholas Sciaretta testified that he did not tell his son, Eric Sciaretta, that other individuals could not drive the car that he had entrusted to Eric Sciaretta. Instead Nicholas Sciaretta testified that "he [Eric Sciaretta] knew that was the case" and admitted he never verbalized that restriction to his son. Contrary to his father's testimony, Eric Sciaretta testified that his father had told him of this restriction.
It was thus left to the jury to determine the credibility of these witnesses with respect to any alleged restriction. It is the jury's province to assess the witnesses' testimony, including their demeanor on the witness stand. See Trzcinski v. Richey, 190 Conn. 285, 298, 460 A.2d 1269 (1983). The jury could have plausibly accepted either witnesses' testimony and it is clear they found the defendant Nicholas Sciaretta's version of events more credible than the defendant Eric Sciaretta's as demonstrated by the jury's affirmative answer to Jury Interrogatory No. 1 that Nicholas Sciaretta gave Eric Sciaretta "general authority, without restrictions, . . . to use the family vehicle for his son's pleasure and convenience." It was undisputed at trial that defendant Nicholas Sciaretta was the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident.
In Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn.App. 221, 518 A.2d 77 (1986), the Appellate Court found that "[a] parent's retention of title to a car has frequently been sufficient justification for application of the family car doctrine when the doctrine is otherwise applicable, even if the vehicle has been completely paid for by the child in question and the child has beneficial ownership." Id., at 227. This rule holds true as long as it has been "shown that the driver has received general authority from the owner to use the car for a family purpose, that is, for the pleasure or convenience of the family or a member of it." Id., at 228.
The defendant Nicholas Sciaretta repeatedly argues that this was not a family car doctrine case as the driver of the defendant's car was not a family member and that Stephen Sorbo was not an agent of the defendants. In his motion to set aside verdict, the defendant Nicholas Sciaretta repeatedly misstates the grounds upon which the directed verdict in favor of Eric Sciaretta was granted by this court. The court did not, at any time, find that there was insufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury as to whether Stephen Sorbo was the agent of Eric Sciaretta, nor did the court find that the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence whereby Stephen Sorbo could be the agent of Eric Sciaretta. To the contrary, there was abundant evidence admitted at trial that Eric Sciaretta had general authority, without restrictions, to operate the family vehicle and that Eric Sciaretta gave permission to Stephen Sorbo to drive the family motor vehicle in question.
In addition, notwithstanding the similarity of the facts in this action to the facts in Chen v. Benadel, 101 Conn.App. 658, 922 A.2d 1142 (2007), the defendant also contends that the jury's verdict should be set aside as the court erred in relying upon the Chen decision in charging the family car doctrine. This court disagrees.
In Chen, the defendant father, who owned the car at issue, first argued that although the car was registered in his name, he did not maintain any control of the vehicle, his son did, and therefore, the family car doctrine was inapplicable to the facts of the case. In Chen, the court found that when the father granted general authority to the son, he relinquished full control over his son's use of the car, and the son became an agent of the defendant. Id., at 666. "When a member of a family maintains a car for the pleasure, use and convenience of the family . . . he or she makes such pleasure and use a personal concern, thereby making those family members who use or enjoy the car his or agents, as if they were pursuing the affairs of the owner. The defendant, therefore is liable for any injuries to third parties, resulting from the negligent conduct or breach of duty by his agent, who was acting within the scope of the general authority granted to him by the defendant. Id.
In Chen, the defendant father also argued that the family par doctrine was not applicable because the individual who drove the car at the time of the accident was not a member of the defendant's family, therefore he could not be subjected to liability under the family car doctrine. The Appellate Court disagreed and found that the individual, Desrosier, "although not a member of the defendant's household, was authorized by the defendant's son, a member of the defendant's household to operate the vehicle, because the son had general authority from his father to use the car for his own pleasure and convenience. In light of the evidence of the evidence in the record, we conclude that Desrosiers' negligence could be considered that of the defendant's son under the family car doctrine." Id., at 667.
In Chen, the trial court cited to Costanzo v. Sturgill, 145 Conn. 92, 139 A.2d 51 (1958), in support of its finding that the son could give a third party permission to operate the family car because he had general authority to use the car for his pleasure and convenience. In Costanzo, the defendant father gave his son a vehicle he owned so that the son could more conveniently travel from the father's farm in Maryland to a naval base where the son was stationed. When he gave the car to the son, the father also gave his son instructions regarding its use. The son was told the car was to be used solely for the purpose of travel to and from the farm and that he could not allow anyone else to drive the car or ride in the car. The son exceeded the scope of the limited authority granted to him by his father when he drove the car with several friends and then let a friend drive the car. The friend drove the car into a tree in Connecticut. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the defendant father could not be held liable for the friend's negligence in driving the car and held that "[b]efore the [son], by permitting [the friend] to operate the car, could subject the owner, the [father], to liability, [the son] would have had to have general authority from his father to use the car for pleasure and convenience . . . The court did not find that any such general authority was given. Indeed, it found that the car was entrusted by the [father] to his son for a specific and limited purpose . . ." Costanzo v. Sturgill, supra, 145 Conn. 94.
In Chen, the Appellate Court found that the son had delegated the responsibility of driving to his friend and that the father did not give specific limiting instructions with regard to use of the car. In following "the rationale of Costanzo, the Appellate Court further found that under these circumstances the defendant father may be subjected to liability for the friend's negligence because the defendant's son had general authority to use the car for his own pleasure and convenience. See Chen v. Bernadel, supra, 101 Conn.App. 669.
In the present case, the jury reasonably could have found based on the evidence presented at trial that the defendant Nicholas Sciaretta gave general authority to Eric Sciaretta, without restrictions, to drive the family vehicle owned by defendant Nicholas Sciaretta. Based on the testimony of Eric Sciaretta at trial, the jury also reasonably could have found that Eric Sciaretta gave permission to Stephen Sorbo to drive this family vehicle. Since Eric Sciaretta was found to have been given general authority, without restrictions, to drive the family vehicle owned by defendant Nicholas Sciaretta and Eric Sciaretta entrusted the driving of the family car to Stephen Sorbo, then Stephen Sorbo's negligence can be imputed to the owner of the vehicle, defendant Nicholas Sciaretta. The defendant's motion to set aside the verdict on this ground is denied.
The defendant next claims that the verdict should be set aside as he did not get certain medical bills relating to plaintiff's injuries until four days before trial. At the hearing on defendant's motion to set aside verdict, defendant's counsel admitted that the corresponding treating medical records that related to these bills had been produced by the plaintiff months prior to trial and that his expert had reviewed them. Defendant's counsel then conceded that the only thing the defendants did not have in their possession more than four days prior to trial was "certain" medical bills relating to treatment, which bills amounted to approximately $3,500 and that he had the majority of medical bills relating to the plaintiff's injuries well before to that time. Defendant's counsel also acknowledged that he had been given authorizations for these same bills months before trial.
Defendant has not set forth a sufficient basis on how he was prejudiced by the production of these certain medical bills four days prior to trial and/or how it impacted any aspect of the preparation of his defense. Defendant's motion to set aside the verdict on this ground is denied.
B. — Motion forRemittitur
The defendant Nicholas Sciaretta next moves to have the jury's award of $245,000 in non-economic damages reduced as such award was not supported by the evidence and was excessive. The grounds cited by the defendant are that (1) plaintiff had a pre-existing condition in her back which was reflected in the medical records in evidence and that the medical records do not establish that the treatment plaintiff incurred and the plaintiff's back condition were due to a trauma sustained on July 16, 2007; (2) that the plaintiff produced no medical provider reflecting she sustained a permanent injury from this loss; (3) the medical records did not establish her current symptoms for the July 16, 2007 accident; and (4) there are no medical records substantiating that the plaintiff's activities are restricted as a result of the trauma on July 16, 2007. The defendant did not provide a suggested amount as to the reduction it requested in the jury's award of $245,000 and leaves this to the court's discretion.
"When ruling on a motion for remittitur, the trial court [is] required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict." Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 810, 614 A.2d 414 (1992). In considering a motion for remittitur, the court may not simply substitute its view of the evidence for that of the jury. "Although, the trial court has broad legal discretion in this area, it is not without its limits." Wickers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 189, 745 A.2d 789 (2000). "Litigants have a constitutional right to have factual issues resolved by the jury . . . This right embraces the determination of damages when there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded persons as to the amount that should be awarded . . . The amount of a damage award is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact, in this case, the jury . . . The size of the verdict alone does not determine whether it is excessive." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn. 508, 536, 729 A.2d 740, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 929, 120 S.Ct. 326, 145 L. Ed.2d 254 (1999). "A conclusion that the jury exercised merely poor judgment is likewise insufficient . . . The ultimate test which must be applied to the verdict by the trial court is whether the jury's award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury were influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wichers v. Hatch, supra, 252 Conn. 187.
"Proper consideration for noneconomic damages cannot be computed by a mathematical formula, and there is no precise rule for the assessment of damages . . . The plaintiff need not prove damages with mathematical exactitude; rather the plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for the trier to make a fair and reasonable estimate . . . A generous award of noneconomic damages should be sustained if it does not shock the sense of justice . . . The fact that a jury returns a verdict in excess of what the trial judge would have awarded does not alone establish that the verdict was excessive . . . [T]he court should not act as the seventh juror with absolute veto power. Whether the court would have reached a different [result] is not in itself decisive . . . The court's proper function is to determine whether the evidence, reviewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, reasonably supports the jury's verdict." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Chaves, 78 Conn.App. 342, 346-47, 826 A.2d 1286 (2003).
In her objection to the defendant's motion for remittitur, the plaintiff contends that the evidence did support the jury's award of $245,000 in non-economic damages. In support of her position, the plaintiff first directs this court to Question No. 3 on the Jury Interrogatories, in which the jury affirmatively found that the July 16, 2007 accident proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. The jury was also presented with evidence that the plaintiff had, at the time of trial, a life expectancy of 57.7 years. In response to the defendant's position that the plaintiff offered no medical evidence that her treatment and condition were related to the July 16, 2007 accident, the plaintiff recites multiple examples of evidence the jury had before it in which a medical provider causally related the injuries sustained and claimed in this case to the July 16, 2007 accident and the treatment rendered therein. While the defendant argued to the jury that the plaintiff's cessation of back treatment from March 2008 through October 2008 was due to her full recovery from the injury, the plaintiff equally argued to the jury that the reason for the cessation of treatment was significant knee surgery and recovery during that time period.
It was within the jury's province to assess the witnesses' testimony, including their demeanor on the witness stand. See Trzcinski v. Richey, supra, 190 Conn. 298. The jury could have plausibly accepted either argument and it is clear they found the plaintiff's version of events more credible than the defendant's. In addition, it was well within the jury's province to assess the plaintiff's testimony as to the incident, its aftermath, its affect on her physically and emotionally and her ability to enjoy her usual life's activities. Both the defendant Eric Sciaretta and the plaintiff testified at trial that this was a significant car crash and the defendant Eric Sciaretta, himself, described the impact as a "nine" on a scale of "one-ten." The plaintiff testified extensively about her lower back pain and the difference between the pain and her activities prior to the accident and after the accident. The trial occurred four years after the accident and the jury was presented with evidence as to the treatment the plaintiff had, the pain she had suffered throughout that time period and the activities which she could and could not do. The plaintiff offered into evidence extensive medical records as to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff and the treatment she underwent for such injuries.
The court finds that the jury reasonably could have inferred from the evidence presented at trial that the plaintiff's low back pain and subsequent treatment was related to the motor vehicle accident of July 16, 2007. The defendant's Motion for Remittitur on this ground is denied.
The defendant also contends that without expert testimony, a jury could not determine whether the present complaints of pain and suffering and the aspect of permanent injury could be determined. In Royston v. Factor, 1 Conn.App. 576, 577, 474 A.2d 108, cert. denied, 194 Conn. 801, 477 A.2d 1021 (1984), the Connecticut Appellate Court held that "[a] trier of facts can conclude, by inference, that an injury will be permanent even though there is no medical testimony expressly substantiating permanency." Thereafter the Appellate Court reaffirmed this principle in Parker v. Supermarkets General Corp., 36 Conn.App. 647, 652 A.2d 1047 (1995). In Parker, the Appellate Court held the principle set forth in Royston "is based on the recognition by Connecticut courts that jurors are able to evaluate for themselves the testimony of the plaintiff, as well as the duration of the injury, the likelihood of its continuance in the future, and the lack of total recovery by the time of trial." Id., at 650-51 citing to Trani v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 142 Conn. 541, 543-44, 116 A.2d 167 (1955).
"The permanent effects of an aggravation of a pre-existing injury are as apparent to a jury as the permanent effects of any other injury, as long as the nature and scope of the [preexisting] injury is revealed to the jury through testimony at trial. If the jury is aware of the plaintiff's condition before the accident, and compares that to the plaintiff's condition after the accident, then the jury can logically infer that the aggravation of the injury, reflected by the change in the plaintiff's condition will be permanent . . . It is appropriate for the trial court to submit the issue of the permanency of an aggravated injury to the jury if a proper foundation has been laid concerning the plaintiff's condition before and after the injury and if some evidence of permanency has been introduced at trial." (Citations omitted.) Parker v. Supermarkets General Corporation, supra, 36 Conn.App. 651.
In the present case, there were numerous medical records and testimony offered into evidence by the plaintiff that demonstrated the lower back pain and injury she had prior to the July 16, 2007 accident, the difference in her pain and low back injury after the July 16, 2007 accident, and that at the time of the last medical treatment in 2009 the plaintiff still suffered pain and incapacity a year and half after the accident, which injuries were attributable to the July 16, 2007 accident. The nature of plaintiff's injury and source of injury were confirmed by the medical reports.
While such records did not have a permanency rating or finding of permanency, the testimony and medical evidence offered at trial were that the plaintiff had a low back problem prior to the accident that was different than the low back pain she had after the July 16, 2007 accident. The testimony and evidence offered also set forth that such pain continued from the time of the July 16, 2007, motor vehicle accident to the time of trial, four years after the accident, and such injuries were likely to continue for the remainder of the plaintiff's life. The court finds that a sufficient foundation was laid by the plaintiff concerning the plaintiff's condition before and after the accident.
As set forth above, the parties stipulated that the plaintiff had a life expectancy of 57.7 years. The plaintiff and another witness offered testimony at trial as to the activities the plaintiff enjoyed prior to the accident and her limitations and/or preclusion from such activities years after the accident. The jury reasonably could have inferred from the evidence offered that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff from the July 16, 2007 accident were permanent. The court also had the opportunity to assess the testimony of the plaintiff and to review the medical record exhibits offered at trial. The court finds the jury could have properly concluded from the medical records that if the disability existed a year and a half after the accident, it would in all probability continue.
"Damages may be awarded for pain and suffering, past, present and future, resulting from injuries as long as the evidence affords a basis for a reasonable estimate by the trier of fact of the amount . . . An award of damages for pain and suffering is peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact the fact that it is difficult to measure pain and suffering in terms of money does not prevent a recovery for that element of damages.
Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of fact, but proper compensation for pain and suffering cannot be computed by a mathematical formula, and there is no ironclad rule for the assessment of damages . . . The award of damages for pain and suffering will be sustained even though generous, if it does not shock the sense of justice." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vickers v. Jessup, 32 Conn.App. 360, 372-73, 629 A.2d 457, cert. granted on other grounds, 227 Conn. 992, 632 A.2d 701 (1993).
In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, the court finds that the noneconomic damages verdict returned by the jury was reasonably supported by the evidence at trial. The court also finds that the jury's verdict of $245,000 in noneconomic damages was not excessive or exhorbitant. The court acknowledges that $245,000 for non-economic damages is a considerable sum. However, given the extent of the permanent physical injuries, the rehabilitation endured by the plaintiff and the loss of the plaintiff's enjoyment of her usual life's activities, which were virtually unchallenged by any opposing medical evidence, the verdict does not shock the court's sense of justice and falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages.
The award for the plaintiff was supported by the evidence and the defendant's Motion for Remittitur is denied.
C. Collateral Source Reduction
The defendant next moves for a collateral source reduction of $1,450.58 from the plaintiff's medical bills, which accounts for the reduction in the collateral source number for the premium paid to secure medical payments coverage on the auto policy. The plaintiff contends that the collateral source reduction should be $764.71, which also accounts for the reduction in the collateral source number for the premium paid to secure medical payments coverage on the auto policy. The relevant medical expenses are a bill to Waterbury Hospital, Valley Orthopedic Specialists and React Physical Therapy, which is a member of the Carlson Therapy Network. The other medical expenses were paid by a group health insurer and the premiums paid to secure that coverage exceeded the bills paid by the group health insurer and there is no collateral source reduction for those medical expenses. The difference in the parties' collateral source calculations is $685.87, which difference is comprised solely of write-offs made by the medical providers on their bills.
A collateral source hearing was held in this matter on August 23, 2011. At that hearing the court requested to review the medical bills at issue upon which the defendant was claiming a write-off. After a short recess, the parties reported that they had reached a stipulation as to the amounts of the write offs and no bills were offered in evidence to the court. Since the plaintiff has stipulated that $685.87 in medical bills were in fact "write-offs," the court will proceed accordingly.
The relevant statute in this inquiry is General Statutes § 52-225a(c), which provides that the court shall, as part of a collateral source hearing, receive evidence concerning amounts "paid, contributed or forfeited . . . by, or on behalf, of a claimant . . . to secure his right to any collateral source benefit which he has received as a result of such injury . . ."
Under Jones v. Kramer, 267 Conn. 336, 838 A.2d 170 (2004), the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that as part of tort reform, Connecticut General Statutes § 52-225a was extended to "prevent plaintiffs from obtaining double recoveries, i.e., collecting economic damages from a defendant and also receiving collateral source payments." Id., at 346. "Succinctly put, § 52-225a provides that the trial court shall reduce an award for economic damages by an amount equal to the total amount of collateral sources that have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, less any premium paid by or on behalf of the claimant to secure the benefit of such collateral source payments." Id., at 345. The Supreme Court stated that § 52-225a "must be construed to allow only payments specifically corresponding with items of damages included in the jury's verdict to be deducted as collateral sources from the economic damages award." Id., at 348. The defendant has the burden of proving "that the items of damages corresponding with the desired collateral source reduction actually are included in the award." Id., at 350.
General Statutes § 52-255a sets forth that amounts "forfeited" by a medical care provider shall be considered as a collateral source deduction. The defendant has cited to Olivero v. Ferrante, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 04 4001161 (March 22, 2010, Sheedy, J.) for the proposition that write offs of a medical provider are collateral source payments pursuant to § 52-225a(c). In Olivero, the trial court held that under the factual circumstances present in that case, the write-offs/fee adjustments taken should be characterized as collateral source payments for which the defendants were entitled to a reduction of the economic damages awarded. In making this finding, the trial court relied upon the presence of the term "forfeited" in § 52-225a(c) and found that "to distinguish between actual sums paid providers and writeoffs/fee adjustments would frustrate the purpose of the statute . . ." Olivero v. Ferrante, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 04 4001161.
In Hassett v. New Haven, 49 Conn.Sup. 7, 10, 858 A.2d 922 (2004), aff'd, 91 Conn.App. 245, 247, 880 A.2d 975 (2005), the trial court held that voluntary forgiveness of a debt is not a collateral source within the meaning of § 52-225b because the debt is not forgiven pursuant to an insurance contract or agreement. See Id., at 10. The Appellate Court adopted the trial court's reasoning as "a proper statement of the issues and the applicable law concerning those issues." Hassett v. New Haven, supra, 91 Conn.App. 247. Several trial courts have held that "involuntary forgiveness" of a debt, like the adjustments made by medical providers as a condition of their contract with a health care insurer is a collateral source payment within the meaning of § 52-225b for the purposes of calculating a reduction in economic damages pursuant to § 52-225a. See Bonsanti v. Newman, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 03 0401098 (February 3, 2006, Gilardi, J.); Furlong v. Merriman, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 04400416 (May 4, 2006, Shapiro, J).
The court has reviewed the relevant medical bills that reflect the write-offs. It is clear from reviewing the bills that the write-offs were adjustments made by the medical providers as a condition of their contract with a health care provider. There is no dispute that the plaintiff has already received the benefit of the medical providers' allowances, and such amounts were subtracted from the amount she was billed. The plaintiff should not receive that amount again by having it included in the jury's economic damages award.
Based on the foregoing, the defendant's Motion for Collateral Source Reduction is granted in the total amount of $1,450.58 and the jury's July 21, 2011 economic damages award in the amount of $11,058.56 shall be reduced by $1,450.58 to $9,607.98. This reduces the total verdict rendered in plaintiffs favor to $254,607.98.
III CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the defendant's Motions to Set Aside and for Remittitur of the verdict entered in this action are denied. The defendant's Motion for Collateral Source Reduction is granted in the total amount of $1,450.58 and the jury's July 21, 2011 economic damages award in the amount of$l 1,058.56 shall be reduced by $1,450.58 to $9,607.98 . This reduces the total verdict rendered in plaintiff's favor to $254,607.98.