Opinion
CV166021911S
03-21-2018
Joseph CIANCOLA v. IDS PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STEVENS, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff in this action is Joseph Ciancola. The defendant is IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company. The plaintiff’s complaint alleges the following. The defendant issued a contract for automobile insurance to Gloria Ciancola, which included coverage for underinsured motorist coverage. The plaintiff was a covered insured under this policy. This policy was in full force and effect in October 2013. In October 2013, the plaintiff was operating a 2005 Harley Davidson motorcycle in Orange, Connecticut when his motorcycle was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a 2010 Honda Pilot operated by Claudinei Moreira. The collision was caused by the negligence of Moreira, and as a result of the accident, the plaintiff incurred economic and noneconomic damages. As a result of a claim made by the plaintiff against Moreira, the plaintiff received compensation for his damages from Moreira’s motor vehicle liability insurance policy. This payment, however, failed to compensate him fully for the damages he sustained. The plaintiff sought further compensation for his injuries from the defendant under the underinsured motorist provision of the insurance policy. The defendant has wrongly refused to honor the plaintiff’s claim and make payment under the policy. In its answer to the complaint, the defendant denies the plaintiff’s claim that it is legally responsible for the plaintiff’s damages under the terms of the underinsured motorist policy.
Pending before the court is the defendant’s August 15, 2017 motion for summary judgment. On December 13, 2017, the plaintiff filed his memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. On December 18, 2017, the court heard oral argument on the motion. For the following reasons, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
DISCUSSION
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment " shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." " In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact ... A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 820-21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015). When a party moves for summary judgment " and there [are] no contradictory affidavits, the court properly decide[s] the motion by looking only to the sufficiency of the [movant’s] affidavits and other proof." Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 795, 653 A.2d 122 (1995).
In the present action, the defendant relies on the terms of the parties’ contract of insurance to maintain that it has no legal liability for the plaintiff’s claim. " Under our law, the terms of an insurance policy are to be construed according to the general rules of contract construction ... The determinative question is the intent of the parties, that is, what coverage ... the [plaintiff] expected to receive and what the defendant was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy ... If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning ... However, [w]hen the words of an insurance contract are, without violence, susceptible of two [equally responsible] interpretations, that which will sustain the claim and cover the loss must, in preference, be adopted ... [T]his rule of construction favorable to the insured extends to exclusion clauses ...
" Our jurisprudence makes clear, however, that [a]lthough ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer, when the language is plain, no such construction is to be applied ... Indeed, courts cannot indulge in a forced construction ignoring provisions or so distorting them as to accord a meaning other than that evidently intended by the parties." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 769-71.
The specific provision of the insurance contract relied on by the defendant states the following in relevant part: " We will pay compensatory damages which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of a motor vehicle because of bodily injury caused by accident. We’ll pay these damages for bodily injury an insured person suffers: a) in a car accident while occupying a private passenger car or utility car ..." Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B. The general definitions section of the policy states that a " [p]rivate passenger car means a four-wheel car of the private passenger type" and that a " [u]tility car means ... a car with a rated load capacity of 2,000 pounds or less of the pick-up, van or panel truck type." Id.
As indicated during the oral argument on the defendant’s motion, various aspects of the insurance contract drafted by the defendant are not well constructed or organized. However, the provisions applicable to the defendant’s motion regarding underinsured motorist coverage are clear. The policy explicitly provides that the plaintiff is entitled to underinsured motorist coverage when " in a car accident while occupying a private passenger car or utility car." The terms of the insurance policy, therefore, do not provide underinsured motorist coverage to the plaintiff because when the subject accident occurred, the plaintiff was riding a motorcycle and was not " occupying a private passenger car or utility car." Contrary to the defendant’s position, however, this conclusion does not end the inquiry because the question next turns to whether, under Connecticut law, the defendant can exclude motorcycles from underinsured motorist coverage as provided in the parties’ insurance contract. Based on the applicable insurance statutes and case law, the court answers this question in the negative.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Citrano v. Berkshire Mutual Ins. Co., 171 Conn. 248, 368 A.2d 54 (1976), is on point and controlling. In Citrano, the plaintiff was injured when the operator of a motorcycle on which she was riding as a passenger negligently drove the motorcycle off the road. Id., 250. The driver did not have any insurance to compensate the plaintiff for her losses, and as a result, the plaintiff made a claim for uninsured motorist coverage against the defendant insurance company, but her claim was denied. Id., 250, 256. Similar to the defendant’s policy in the present case, the policy at issue in Citrano did not provide uninsured motorist coverage when the insured’s injuries were caused while she was using a motorcycle. Id., 250. In Citrano, the Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the provisions of the parties’ insurance contract, Connecticut statutes required the insurance policy " to be read as including coverage for damages caused by the operator of an uninsured motorcycle." Id., 252. Although the accident in Citrano involved a single motorcycle, and the accident in the present case involves multiple vehicles, this distinction is without legal significance and the holding of Citrano is fully applicable here. Accord, Sentry Ins. v. Schroeders, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-313414 (July 2, 1993, Moraghan, J.) (9 Conn.L.Rptr. 375).
Under the statutory scheme, insurers are required to provide uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for all motor vehicles for which automobile liability insurance must be provided. General Statutes § 38a-336(a). Automobile insurance policies must provide liability insurance for losses arising from ownership or use of a motor vehicle; General Statutes § 38a-335; and a motorcycle is defined as a " motor vehicle." General Statutes § 14-1(55). More specifically, General Statutes § 38a-336 states that an automobile insurance policy shall provide uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for the protection of insureds " who are legally entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury ... from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles." This statute requires underinsured motorist coverage to the plaintiff under the policy issued by the defendant and does not authorize the defendant to exclude such coverage from the policy because of the plaintiff’s operation of a motorcycle. Indeed, in Citrano the insurance commissioner had issued regulations that authorized the exclusion of motorcycles from the type of vehicles for which uninsured motorist coverage was required and the Supreme Court found that such regulations exceeded the insurance commissioner’s authority and were void. Citrano v. Berkshire Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 171 Conn. 253-56.
General Statutes § 38a-336(a)(1)(A) provides the following: " Each automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to section 38a-334, with limits for bodily injury or death not less than those specified in subsection (a) of section 14-112, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury, including death resulting therefrom, from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles and insured motor vehicles, the insurer of which becomes insolvent prior to payment of such damages."
General Statutes § 38a-335(a) provides the following: " Each automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to section 38a-334 against loss resulting from the liability imposed by law, with limits not less than those specified in subsection (a) of section 14-112, for damages because of bodily injury or death of any person and injury to or destruction of property arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a specific motor vehicle or motor vehicles within any state, territory, or possession of the United States of America or Canada."
General Statutes § 14-1(55) provides the following in relevant part: " ‘Motorcycle’ means ... a motor vehicle, with or without a side car, that has (i) not more than three wheels in contact with the ground, (ii) a saddle or seat which the rider straddles or a platform on which the rider stands, and (iii) handlebars with which the rider controls the movement of the vehicle."
Under General Statutes § 38a-336(c), an insurer is not required to provide uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage for a motor vehicle or a motorcycle when the insured is occupying this vehicle, the vehicle is owned by the insured and it is uninsured or underinsured. The defendant makes no argument that this provision is applicable under the circumstances presented in this case where the underinsured vehicle is owned by Moreira, a third party.
" The public policy behind uninsured motorist coverage, therefore, requires an insurer to provide uninsured motorist benefits to any insured under the automobile liability policy. [O]nce an automobile liability policy is issued extending [liability] coverage to a certain class of insureds ... uninsured motorist coverage must be offered to cover the same class of insureds ... It is well-settled that an insurer may not exclude from uninsured/underinsured coverage any situation other than the exclusions authorized by law ... A definition that limits coverage to an extent different from the coverage required by law is an exclusion of coverage that cannot be given effect ... The remedial purpose of underinsured motorist coverage is to make whole a person injured at the hands of an uninsured/underinsured motorist ... The effect of Sec. 38a-336 is to prevent insurers from limiting the scope of uninsured/underinsured coverage to insureds other than in the ways authorized." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sentry Ins. v. Schroeders, supra, 9 Conn.L.Rptr. 376.
The defendant’s reliance on Marcolini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 160 Conn. 280, 278 A.2d 796 (1971), is misplaced. In Marcolini, the Supreme Court held that an automobile insurance policy may exclude uninsured motorist coverage to an insured when operating a motorcycle; id., 285; but as fully addressed by the court subsequently in Citrano, the Marcolini decision was issued before the legislature’s enactment of the statutory scheme discussed above. Citrano v. Berkshire Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 171 Conn. 252.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.