Opinion
CASE NO. 1007 CRD-7-90-4
MAY 22, 1991
The claimant was represented by Jeffrey Ginzberg, Esq., and Arnold Potash, Esq., Perelmutter, Potash Ginzberg, P.C.
The respondents were represented by Augustus R. Southworth III, Esq., William T. Blake, Jr. Esq., of Gage Henry.
This Petition for Review from the April 9, 1990 Ruling on Motion to Preclude Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner of the Eighth acting for the Seventh District was heard November 30, 1990 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Donald Doyle.
OPINION
This matter was before us on a previous occasion, Chute v. Mobil Shipping and Transportation Co., 5 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 119, 579 CRD-7-87 (1988). The present appeal is from the April 9, 1990 ruling denying claimant's Motion to Preclude defenses. We shall refer to the 1988 decision as Chute I and this proceeding as Chute II.
Claimant is the dependent widow of the decedent, arrival architect. The decedent was killed in a motor vehicle accident in Weston, CT while enroute home from a business trip. His widow originally filed a claim for survivors' benefits and subsequently a Motion to Preclude. That motion was granted. Thereafter respondents appealed. Chute I reversed the trier's ruling which had granted the Motion to Preclude and remanded the case for a determination as to whether there was an employee-employer relationship between the decedent and the respondent employer.
Then after the Seventh District commissioner's recusal, the matter was transferred to the Eighth District. The Eighth District commissioner held a series of hearings and rendered his April 9, 1990 decision, the subject of the present appeal.
The claimant argues (1) the commissioner erred in dismissing her claim on the basis that no contract of employment existed in Connecticut sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the Connecticut Commission, and (2) the decision below was voidable as it was rendered after the time period permitted by Sec. 31-300 C. G. S.
After the date of oral argument in Chute II, Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., 218 Conn. 181 (1991) aff'g 21 Conn. App. 610 (1990) was decided. While the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Court in Cleveland, it prescribed a new rule for conflicts of law issues in Workers' Compensation. The court held that the Workers' Compensation Act of Connecticut should be applied when "Connecticut is the place of the injury, the place of the employment contract or the place of the employment relation." Cleveland, supra, at 195.
Here, the conflicts Problem seems to be solved as the facts found by the commissioner establish that the decedent's injury occurred in Connecticut. However, under Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420 (1988), for subject matter jurisdiction to obtain, it must be found that there was an employer-employee relationship. This is the same question posed in Chute I as the basis for our remand. It still needs to be answered.
We therefore must sustain the appeal and remand again for a determination of the existence or non-existence of an employer-employee relationship at the time of the decedent's injury. The Commissioner hearing the matter on remand need not be concerned with the Motion to Preclude defenses. That issue was decided by our decision in Chute I.
In his April 9, 1990 ruling, the commissioner determined that Connecticut was not the situs of the relationship between Mobil and the decedent. Further proceedings must establish the legal nature of that relationship. If it was an employer-employee one, then there is in rem jurisdiction, and the case needs to be adjudicated on the merits. Since we so conclude, there is no necessity to decided the other issues raised on appeal.
We therefore reverse and remand to the Eighth District Commissioner for further proceedings.
Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Donald Doyle concur.