Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. BC269040, Edward A. Ferns, Judge.
Lady Cage-Barile, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
MALLANO, Acting P. J.
In February 2003, plaintiff Church of Christ in Hollywood (Church) obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting an expelled member, defendant Lady Cage-Barile, from entering Church property.
In May 2006, Cage-Barile filed a motion to dissolve the injunction on the ground that, by statute, an injunction “shall have a duration of not more than three years.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (d); further section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.) The trial court denied the motion, stating that the injunction was not governed by section 527.6 but by section 533, which permits the dissolution of an injunction if there has been a change in the facts or the law or if the ends of justice would be served thereby. The trial court found that Cage-Barile had not made a sufficient showing under the applicable statute.
We agree with the trial court and affirm.
I
BACKGROUND
This is the third time this case has been before us. We rely on our prior opinions for the facts, primarily because Cage-Barile’s brief does not reference any facts in the record.
The Church, located in Los Angeles, is a nonprofit religious corporation. Pursuant to a set of bylaws, the Church is governed by a board of trustees, including officers such as president, secretary, and treasurer. The Church owns the land on which it is situated.
Cage-Barile is a former member of the congregation who disagreed with how the Church was run. In January 2001, she began to engage in disruptive conduct at the Church.
On occasion, Cage-Barile entered the Church building and followed certain members, shouting that they were adulterers, agents of Satan, and demon-worshipers. She shouted at Church leaders, calling them Satan’s agents because they allowed divorced and remarried persons to participate in Church ministries. Members of the young adult ministry were so intimidated by her conduct that they met secretly; those wishing to attend had to dial a central telephone number to learn the time and location of the meeting.
After learning that one congregant, who led a popular weekly Bible study, had been divorced and remarried, Cage-Barile started attending Bible study each week, loudly chastising him about his marital history. As a result, he left the Church. Cage-Barile also interfered with an Alcoholics Anonymous group by surreptitiously recording its meetings.
The minister, Daniel Rodriguez, and others repeatedly asked Cage-Barile not to return to the Church. Rodriguez asked her to attend services at a different church — one where she would respect the leadership. Cage-Barile refused these requests and said she would not change her behavior absent a court order.
In January 2002, the Church held a noticed meeting, to which the congregation was invited, in order to discuss Cage-Barile’s membership. Cage-Barile was allowed to present her views. The meeting was conducted in accordance with all religious and corporate procedures. At the end of the meeting, the Church terminated Cage-Barile’s membership.
By letter to Cage-Barile dated February 16, 2002, the Church informed her that “this letter constitutes formal written notice to you that your membership at the Church of Christ [in] Hollywood is terminated. You are no longer a member of this particular Church. You may not participate in Church activities, you may not vote, and you may not petition members. The termination procedures allowed by law were followed, you were allowed a hearing, and the board and membership reached a decision to terminate your membership in January 2002.”
The letter continued: “[T]his letter constitutes . . . [a] demand that you immediately cease and desist from your incessant harassment and intimidation of the Minister, the leaders, the Trustees, and the membership. . . . You are specifically not welcome to enter upon the Church premises . . . . If you attempt to enter upon the Church premises, you will be considered a trespasser.”
The letter proved fruitless. Cage-Barile continued to disrupt worship services. In Rodriguez’s words, “Lady Cage-Barile’s actions and course of conduct have caused me to suffer substantial emotional distress. I feel tense delivering sermons. Her constant harassment has made it extremely difficult for me to minister to my congregation. I had trouble concentrating because I knew she would confront me before, during, and after worship services or Bible study.”
As a consequence of Cage-Barile’s conduct, the Church lost members. Some of the members and children were frightened by her conduct, causing the Church to cancel ministries or hold meetings in secret. The Church could not freely hold events on its property.
On February 28, 2002, the Church and Rodriguez filed this action against Cage-Barile, seeking injunctive relief to bar her from (1) impeding ingress or egress on Church premises, (2) trespassing on Church property, and (3) approaching within 10 yards of, intimidating, interfering with, oppressing, or otherwise threatening the membership or leadership of the Church as they entered or exited the Church premises. (In discussing the court proceedings, we sometimes refer to the Church and Rodriguez collectively as the Church.)
On March 5, 2002, the Church sought a temporary restraining order. The trial court, Judge David P. Yaffee presiding, denied the application.
On March 31, 2002, Cage-Barile was seen removing Easter-related announcements from the Church bulletin board and tearing them up. A Church official asked her to stop it. She replied, “‘[T]here is no Easter in the Bible, ’” and continued to remove all of the remaining announcements. The missing items were soon replaced. Cage-Barile tore them down a second time.
On April 12, 2002, the Church again requested a restraining order. The trial court denied the application, stating that the requested relief, if granted, would interfere with Cage-Barile’s right to free speech (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.) and would entangle the court in a dispute over religious doctrine.
On May 13, 2002, the Church filed a petition for writ of mandate with this court, seeking a peremptory writ directing the trial court to grant the relief sought in the complaint. On May 24, 2002, we issued an order to show cause (OSC) why the trial court’s ruling should not be vacated. Cage-Barile did not file any papers or appear for argument. In a published opinion, Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1244, we reversed the trial court, concluding that the Church was likely to prevail on the merits of the case, and it would be irreparably harmed without prompt injunctive relief. We directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the temporary restraining order and to enter a new order granting the requested relief.
On September 17, 2002, the trial court issued an OSC and a temporary restraining order, setting the hearing on the preliminary injunction for October 8, 2002. On September 22, 2002, counsel for the Church personally served Cage-Barile with a copy of the summons, complaint, the trial court’s OSC and temporary restraining order, and the Church’s supporting declarations and memorandum of points and authorities. Counsel informed Cage-Barile of the nature of the documents.
On October 1, 2002, Cage-Barile filed a “Response to Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order [and] Opposition to Temporary Restraining Orders.”
At the October 8, 2002 hearing, Cage-Barile appeared and requested a continuance. The trial court continued the hearing until November 26, 2002. Cage-Barile appeared at the November 26 hearing, as did counsel for the Church. The trial court announced its intention to grant the requested relief and asked the Church’s counsel to prepare a proposed preliminary injunction. On December 3, 2002, the trial court formally signed the injunction, prohibiting Cage-Barile from: (1) tearing down or destroying Church literature; (2) obstructing or impeding ingress or egress on Church property; (3) disturbing or disquieting the assemblage of the congregation by profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior, or by any unnecessary noise; and (4) trespassing on Church property.
Cage-Barile did not file an answer to the complaint, and a default was entered. On February 14, 2003, the Church filed a request for a court judgment, a “Summary in Support of Default Judgment for Permanent Injunction, ” and supporting declarations. The parties appeared before the trial court on the same day. The trial court, Judge Edward A. Ferns presiding, entered a permanent injunction, which tracked the language of the preliminary injunction.
Later, Cage-Barile moved to set aside the default and the default judgment, contending she had not been properly served with process, and the default was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The trial court denied the motion. Cage-Barile filed an appeal, challenging the default and the denial of her motion to set it aside. She also argued that the injunction violated her constitutional and statutory rights. In an unpublished opinion, we rejected those contentions and affirmed (B168776, Dec. 21, 2004).
On May 22, 2006, Cage-Barile filed a motion in the trial court to dissolve the injunction under section 527.6, subdivision (d). The Church filed opposition. The trial court denied the motion by order dated July 14, 2006. Cage-Barile appealed.
II
DISCUSSION
Because this appeal involves the application of a statute to undisputed facts, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. (See Brasher’s Cascade Auto Auction v. Valley Auto Sales & Leasing (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1048; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1081.)
An injunction issued under section 527.6 is limited in duration to three years. (See § 527.6, subd. (d).) That section authorizes injunctive relief to prohibit “harassment, ” defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)
“Section 527.6 was enacted to provide an expedited procedure for preventing ‘harassment’ as defined. . . . The motivation for the statute was the experience of a young woman who was hounded by a male admirer who followed her, incessantly telephoned her, etc. . . . The statute was designed to provide a quick and simple procedure by which this type of wholly unjustifiable conduct, having no proper purpose, could be enjoined. . . . Nothing in the statute indicates that it was intended to supplant normal injunctive procedures applicable to cases concerning issues other than ‘harassment’ as statutorily defined.” (Byers v. Cathcart (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 805, 811, citations omitted.)
“Normal injunctive procedures allow time for research and investigation, pleading and other motions if necessary, discovery and preparation, etc., followed by opportunity for a full trial. . . . A temporary restraining order is initially available to stabilize a situation; a preliminary injunction can follow. Thereafter the matter can proceed to a full trial. If [a] matter ha[s] been handled according to normal injunctive procedures, [a] plaintiff [has] ample time to develop evidence and prepare [the] case . . . .
“Section 527.6, by contrast, provides a quick and truncated procedure. Offsetting the truncated nature of this procedure is the limited scope of the antiharassment orders which can legitimately follow. Section 527.6 provides for temporary restraining orders to handle immediate problems, followed quickly by a court hearing on a limited-scope antiharassment injunction — normally within 15 days, but in no case more than 22 days even if time is extended for good cause. . . . This expedited and summary proceeding is subject to several limitations designed to confine it to its proper scope. One such limitation is that any injunction which results cannot exceed three years in duration. Section 527.6 hence does not allow for final resolution of disputed rights.” (Byers v. Cathcart, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 811–812, citations omitted.)
A review of the record in this case establishes that the permanent injunction was not issued pursuant to section 527.6. Rather, the more general injunction statute, section 526, provided the basis for relief. Here, the injunction was not limited to the prohibition of harassment; it was broadly directed at protecting the Church’s property rights and prevented Cage-Barile from trespassing on Church premises. (See Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1252–1256.)
Consequently, section 533 governs the life of the injunction. That statute provides: “In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order.”
In the trial court, Cage-Barile offered no evidence of a change in facts, made no argument that the law had changed, and did not show that the ends of justice supported her position. Nor has she done so on appeal. The trial court therefore properly declined to dissolve the injunction.
III
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, J., JACKSON, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.