Additionally, the December 2018 conduct predated all of Applewhite's protected activity (see supra note 25); the DOE therefore could not have acted in retaliation for later-occurring activity. Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F.Supp.3d 306, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[T]he requisite causal connection will falter if the employer's complained-of conduct began before the employee's corresponding protected activity.”

While no bright line rule exists, "[t]he cases that accept mere temporal proximity ... as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be very close" (Wang v Palmisano, 157 F.Supp 3d 306, 327 [SD NY 2016] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "Courts have repeatedly held that as little as a few months

“[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and “draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” Daniel v. T&M Protection Resources, Inc., 992 F.Supp.2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F.Supp.3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same). But when a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court may consider “materials outside the complaint to the extent that they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” Alsaifullah v. Furco, No. 12-CV-2907, 2013 WL 3972514, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), including “documents that a pro se litigant attaches to his opposition papers,” Agu v. Rhea, No. 09-CV-4732, 2010 WL 5186839, at *4 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2010) (italics omitted).

However, courts in this Circuit “have found that where even very close temporal proximity exists, the requisite causal connection will falter if the employer's complained-of-conduct began before the employee's corresponding protected activity.” See Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F.Supp.3d 306, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (collecting cases); see also Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (“where timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected activity, an inference of retaliation does not arise.”

Wangv.Palmisano, 157 F.Supp.3d 306, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Here, Plaintiff does not plead direct evidence of retaliatory animus.

Because Bernheim is proceeding pro se, “the Court must construe [her] pleadings liberally and ‘interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'” Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F.Supp.3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Maisonet v. Metro. Hosp. & Health Hosp. Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d 345, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)); Henriquez-Ford v. Council of Sch. Sup'rs & Adm'rs, No. 14-CV-2496 (JPO), 2015 WL 3867565, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2015) (“[T]he Court interprets the pro se Amended Complaint in this action with ‘special solicitude,' to raise the ‘strongest [claims] that [it] suggest[s].'” (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006)).

If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, "'the burden shifts to the employer to give a legitimate . . . reason for its actions[.]'" Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F. Supp. 3d 306, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2014)). Then, "'the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's explanation is a pretext for . . . retaliation.'"

Additionally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F.Supp.3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same).

Additionally, as noted, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F.Supp.3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same).

” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F.Supp.3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same).