Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2161-14T3
02-03-2016
MATTHEW CHRZANOWSKI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent-Respondent.
Michael J. Confusione argued the cause for appellant (Hegge & Confusione, L.L.C., attorneys; Mr. Confusione, on the brief). Robert S. Garrison, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Garrison, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Lihotz and Fasciale. On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System, Docket No. 2-10-281775. Michael J. Confusione argued the cause for appellant (Hegge & Confusione, L.L.C., attorneys; Mr. Confusione, on the brief). Robert S. Garrison, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Garrison, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Matthew Chrzanowski appeals from a December 11, 2014 final agency decision by the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System (the Board) denying his petition for accidental disability retirement benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43. In reaching this result, the Board adopted an initial recommendation by an administrative law judge (ALJ), who resolved the dispute by granting respondent's motion for summary decision. We affirm.
Chrzanowski worked for the Mount Laurel Township Municipal Utilities Authority as a water repairer/water treatment plant operator for several years. His job duties included "installing, maintaining, and repairing mains, pipes, valves, pumps, hydrants, and related equipment." While performing his usual job duties, namely repairing a fire hydrant, he began lifting a hydrant by grabbing the "upper stem" and injured his back, leg, and foot. He sustained permanent injuries.
The Board granted Chrzanowski ordinary disability benefits, but denied his petition for accidental disability retirement benefits, concluding the accident was not "undesigned and unexpected." The Board denied the petition because the accident was not "undesigned and unexpected." As a result, the Board concluded that the accident did not qualify as a traumatic event. Chrzanowski then filed his administrative appeal and the matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23.
The main question before the ALJ was whether the accident was "undesigned and unexpected," thereby satisfying the traumatic event requirement as set forth in Richardson v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System, 192 N.J. 189, 212-13 (2007). The ALJ concluded the accident was not "undesigned and unexpected" because, although Chrzanowski did not expect that he would be injured when he lifted up the fire hydrant, the injury was "not extraordinary or unusual in common experience[.]" The Board then adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions in the final agency decision under review.
On appeal, Chrzanowski argues he satisfied the traumatic event test because his accident was "undesigned and unexpected." He contends the Board and the ALJ misconstrued Richardson and reached an arbitrary result. Chrzanowski maintains that he exerted more force on the day of the accident because the stem of the fire hydrant was embedded in the ground two feet deeper than unusual. Chrzanowski asserts he felt "unexpected and a much greater amount of resistance and force" as he pulled up on the hydrant's stem.
"The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 219 (2006). In our review, "'the test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). Succinctly,
[o]ur review of administrative agency action is limited. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). "An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." Id. at 27-28. However, because "questions of law are the province of the judicial branch," Steven L. Lefelt et al., 37 New Jersey Practice: Administrative Law Practice § 7.19 at 387 (2d ed. 2000), we are "in no way bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue," Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973), particularly when "that interpretation is inaccurate or contrary to legislative objectives," G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 170 (1999). Like all matters of law, we apply de novo review to an agency's interpretation of a statute or case law. Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002).
[Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citation omitted).]
To obtain accidental disability retirement benefits, an employee must prove
1. that he is permanently and totally disabled;
2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is
a. identifiable as to time and place,
b. undesigned and unexpected, and
c. caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work);
Our focus, like the ALJ and the Board, is on whether the event was "undesigned and unexpected," thereby satisfying the traumatic event requirement. As a result, we apply a de novo standard of review because the issue on appeal pertains solely to a question of law. We conclude that Chrzanowski failed to satisfy the traumatic event requirement as outlined in Richardson, and the Board's final decision was not arbitrary.
3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the member's regular or assigned duties;
4. that the disability was not the result of the member's willful negligence; an[d]
5. that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated from performing his usual or any other duty.
[Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 212-13.]
In Russo v. Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 62 N.J. 142, 154 (1973), our Supreme Court explained a traumatic event "may be found either in an unintended external event or in an unanticipated consequence of an intended external event if that consequence is extraordinary or unusual in common experience." Thus, a petitioner will not be entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits where he or she is injured undertaking his or her ordinary work effort, even if that effort is particularly strenuous. For example, in Cattani v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System, 69 N.J. 578, 580-81 (1976), the Court held that a firefighter working on an understaffed team, who was injured while performing unusually strenuous firefighting activity, was not entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits because his disability was the result of a preexisting condition and "work effort alone whether unusual or excessive[] cannot be considered a traumatic event." Id. at 586.
Later, in Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 192, the Court synthesized the traumatic event language, explaining that
an injury generated by a great rush of force is one example that will satisfy the traumatic event standard, but not the only example. Rather, the traumatic event standard will also be met by a work-connected event that is: (a) identifiable as to time and place; (b) undesigned and unexpected; and (c) caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work).In reaching this determination, the Court interpreted the words of the statute and described "traumatic event" as "essentially the same as what we historically understood an accident to be — an unexpected external happening that directly causes injury and is not the result of pre-existing disease alone or in combination with work effort." Id. at 212. The injury sustained must result from an external circumstance or event, not merely from the performance of strenuous work. Id. at 202. In Richardson, the Court made clear: "work effort itself . . . cannot be the traumatic event." Id. at 211. "The polestar of the inquiry is whether, during the regular performance of his [or her] job, an unexpected happening, not the result of pre-existing disease alone or in combination with the work, has occurred and directly resulted in the permanent and total disability of the member." Id. at 214. Such is not the case here.
On the day of the accident, Chrzanowski performed his ordinarily assigned work duty — fixing a fire hydrant — which was admittedly strenuous. Although Chrzanowski concedes lifting up fire hydrants was part of his ordinary work effort, he asserts that the incident was "undesigned and unexpected" because the fire hydrant was embedded deeper in the ground than usual. Relying on Moran v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System, 438 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2014), Chrzanowski argues the embedded fire hydrant constitutes an "external" event which caused him to injure himself as he exerted more physical effort to lift it. Chrzanowski's reliance on Moran is misplaced.
In Moran, the "external" event or series of events were far different than a fire hydrant embedded in the ground two feet deeper than usual. We stated
[t]he undesigned and unexpected event here was the combination of unusual circumstances that led to Moran's injury: the failure of the truck unit to arrive, and the discovery of victims trapped inside a fully engulfed burning building, at a point when Moran did not have available to him the tools that would ordinarily be used to break down the door. As a result, he was forced to carry out his paramount duty to rescue fire victims[ ] by manually kicking in the door. Had he not responded immediately to break down the door, the victims would have died.Moran therefore "encountered an unexpected life-and-death emergency for which he was carrying no tools." Id. at 351. He was required to immediately break down a fortified door by kicking it, which presented an unexpected and undesigned event. Id. at 354. We concluded this was an unusual situation — a circumstance in which Moran was not expected to find himself. Id. at 355. Here, by contrast, Chrzanowski expected to exert physical work effort when fixing the fire hydrant. In short, it is exactly a situation in which he expected to find himself.
[Id. at 354.]
We also reject Chrzanowski's reliance on Brooks v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 425 N.J. Super. 277 (App. Div. 2012). Brooks, a custodian, was confronted with a group of teenage boys attempting to carry a 300-pound weight bench into the school. Id. at 279. Brooks supervised this activity by making the boys put the bench down. Id. at 279-80. Brooks then "asked two of the boys to help him tip the weight bench on its end and lift it onto [a] flatbed truck." Id. at 280.
However, when the bench was "halfway up," the boys . . . dropped their side of the bench. [Brooks] heard his shoulder "snap" as the bench fell to the floor, which resulted in a total and permanent disability. [Brooks] said he did not drop his side of the bench when he saw the boys drop their side because one of his feet was directly underneath the bench.Brooks was injured from the students dropping their end, forcing the entire weight upon his shoulders. Here, there was no similar accident or external event that caused Chrzanowski's injury.
[Ibid.]
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION