Opinion
98 Civ. 7816 (JSM)
July, 2000
Jeffrey Christopher, pro se.
Michael J. Krieger, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York New York, New York, for defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Jeffrey W. Christopher brings this action for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112-12117. The defendants now move for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
Under the familiar burden-shifting framework for analyzing summary judgment motions in discriminatory discharge cases, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) his job performance was satisfactory; (3) he was discharged; and (4) the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 92 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973). If the plaintiff is successful in meeting this threshold requirement, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge. See Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 172 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 399 (1999). Finally, if such a reason is articulated, the plaintiff must offer evidence tending to show that the reason is a mere pretext, and the real reason for the discharge was discriminatory animus. See id.
The McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies to discrimination claims under Title VII as well as the ADA. See Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1998) (ADA).
In this case, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that his employment was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Rosen v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 532 (2d Cir. 1991). In July 1996, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with a supervisor that resulted in his being brought up on charges. Acting with the advice of counsel, Plaintiff entered into a settlement in which he agreed that the penalty for the charges was dismissal from the Police Department and that the penalty would be suspended on the proviso that he would be placed on probation for one year with the understanding that "the Police Commissioner may impose the penalty of Dismissal or any lesser penalty he deems appropriate at any time during the period." Within three months of the commencement of the probationary period, Plaintiff was arrested for violating an Order of Protection by assaulting his common-law wife. As a result of this incident, he was dismissed from the police force.
There is nothing in the circumstances of Plaintiff's termination that suggests that either his race or his disability played any role in the decision to dismiss him for violating the conditions of his probation. While plaintiff has presented statistics indicating that minority officers are disciplined in higher percentages than white officers, those statistics do not isolate cases in which officers on probation are subsequently arrested for assault. Thus, they do not support an inference that the termination of Plaintiff was the result of discrimination. See Henry v. Daytop Village, Inc., 42 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that a discrimination plaintiff and other employees are not similarly situated if they have not engaged in comparable conduct); Mazzella v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1531, 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 814 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that to be similarly situated, employees "must have reported to the same supervisor as the plaintiff [and] must have been subject to the same standards of performance evaluation and discipline").
Plaintiff also contends that his problems were the result of depression, which is a disability. While this may be true, there is nothing to suggest that he was terminated because of his depression rather than for violating the terms of his probation. The fact that Plaintiff's anti-social behavior may find its roots in his depression does not mean that that behavior cannot be a proper basis for disciplinary action. See Altman v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 903 F. Supp. 503, 514 (S.D.N Y 1995), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that although one cannot be disciplined for being an alcoholic, one can be disciplined for being drunk on the job).
Finally, Plaintiff contends that he was terminated in order to avoid paying him a disability pension in violation of ERISA. ERISA prohibits employers from dismissing an employee in order to avoid paying pension benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140. To defeat summary judgment, a plaintiff "must show that his employer had the specific intent to engage in conduct prohibited by that section; if loss of benefits was merely a consequence of, as opposed to a motivating factor behind, the termination, the plaintiff's claim will fail." Brink v. Union Carbide Corp., 41 F. Supp.2d 406, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Here, Plaintiff's termination was clearly justified by his violation of the terms of his probation, and there is no evidence that he was terminated to avoid paying him a pension.
Since Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to establish that his termination occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination or an inference that it was motivated by an intent to deprive him of a pension, the complaint is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.