Evidence of similar crimes is admissible for such a purpose. See Nations v. State, 145 So.2d 259 (Fla.App.2d 1962); Cantrell v. State, 193 So.2d 444 (Fla.App.2d 1966); Christie v. State, 246 So.2d 605 (Fla.App.2d 1971); Green v. State, 121 Fla. 307, 163 So. 712 (1935). However, the testimony relating to Anna King should have been excluded.
Thus, evidence of this second robbery was admissible to show a common scheme. Cf. Christie v. State, 246 So.2d 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971). Moreover, even if the evidence of the second robbery was not admissible, the error would be harmless in view of the overwhelming eyewitness testimony identifying Hamilton as the perpetrator of the instant robbery.
Thereafter, in Williams v. State, 143 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1962), the court again dealt with the same defendant. Prosecutorial overkill has more recently been criticized in two Second District Court of Appeal cases. See Davis v. State, 276 So.2d 846, 849 (Fla.2d DCA 1973); Christie v. State, 246 So.2d 605, 606 (Fla.2d DCA 1971). In that case, the defendant had been arrested for the murder of the proprietor of the H K Market, who had been shot to death in the course of a robbery.
Abundant proof that the Appellant was present aiding and abetting Lavon Sasnett in the beating of Dicks was adduced at the trial and the jury was properly instructed under F.S. Sec. 776.011, F.S.A. As to the incidental evidence admitted at the trial showing Appellant's subsequent return to the Oyster Bar and threats against the bar owner, it would be improper, as Appellant contends, were its sole purpose be to show bad character or propensity of the Appellant to commit the crime charged, Williams v. State, Fla., 110 So.2d 654. However, in Christie v. State, Fla.App., 246 So.2d 605, we said, "This 2nd District Court in Green v. State, Fla.App. 1966, 190 So.2d 42 (followed in Winkfield v. State, Fla.App. 1968, 209 So.2d 468) endeavored to analyze Williams in the light of the many previous Florida cases on the point in question; and in the course of our opinion in Green we said * * * Evidence of other offenses which was admissible before Williams has been generally held admissible since Williams, and will undoubtedly continue so to be held in the future; and vice versa as to inadmissibility.
Southeastern Sales and Service Co. v. Watson, 172 So.2d 239 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Re Drain, 311 Ill. App. 481, 36 N.E.2d 608 (1941): Floyd v. Christian Church Widows and Orphans Home of Kentucky, 296 Ky. 196, 176 S.W.2d 125 (1943). Perry Publications, Inc. v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 246 So.2d 605 (4th D.C.A.Fla. 1971). In Floyd, supra, it was held that the charity must perform acts or incur expenses in reliance upon the strength of the pledge.
We have had occasion in the past to remind trial Courts of the necessity of exercising caution in admitting evidence of extraneous and disconnected offenses not clearly relevant to the facts in the case being tried. Winkfield v. State, Fla.App. 1968, 209 So.2d 468; Green v. State, supra; Dixon v. State, Fla.App. 1966, 191 So.2d 94; Harris v. State, Fla.App. 1966, 183 So.2d 291; San Fratello v. State, Fla. App. 1963, 154 So.2d 327; Sciortino v. State, Fla.App. 1959, 115 So.2d 93; Wilson v. State, Fla.App. 1965, 171 So.2d 903; Farnell v. State, Fla.App. 1968, 214 So.2d 753; Sikes v. State, case No. 69-299, opinion filed March 10, 1971, but not yet published, and Christie v. State, Fla.App., 246 So.2d 605, opinion filed April 7, 1971, but not yet published. And our sister appellate Courts have likewise held. Steppe v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 193 So.2d 617; Hooper v. State, Fla.App. 1959, 115 So.2d 769; Jones v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 194 So.2d 24; Horner v. State, Fla.App. 1963, 149 So.2d 863; Jordan v. State, Fla.App. 1965, 171 So.2d 418; Andrews v. State, Fla. App. 1965, 172 So.2d 505; and Norris v. State, Fla.App. 1963, 158 So.2d 803.