Opinion
2022-06468 Index No. 717918/18
08-23-2023
Maurice G. CHRISTIAN, respondent, v. MY CAR AUTO TRANSPORT, INC., et al., appellants.
Carman, Callahan & Ingham, LLP, Farmingdale, NY (James M. Carman of counsel), for appellants. William Schwitzer & Associates, P.C., New York, NY (Travis K. Wong of counsel), for respondent.
Carman, Callahan & Ingham, LLP, Farmingdale, NY (James M. Carman of counsel), for appellants.
William Schwitzer & Associates, P.C., New York, NY (Travis K. Wong of counsel), for respondent.
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, J.P., LINDA CHRISTOPHER, WILLIAM G. FORD, JANICE A. TAYLOR, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Robert J. McDonald, J.), dated May 19, 2022. The order denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident. In an order dated May 19, 2022, the Supreme Court denied the motion. The defendants appeal.
The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendants failed to submit competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Zennia v. Ramsey, 208 A.D.3d 735, 735, 171 N.Y.S.3d 921 ; Melika v. Caraballo, 187 A.D.3d 1173, 1173, 131 N.Y.S.3d 589 ; Staubitz v. Yaser, 41 A.D.3d 698, 699, 839 N.Y.S.2d 113 ). Further, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine were not caused by the accident (see Zennia v. Ramsey, 208 A.D.3d at 735, 171 N.Y.S.3d 921 ; Luigi v. Avis Cab Co., Inc., 96 A.D.3d 809, 949 N.Y.S.2d 61 ; Reyes v. Diaz, 82 A.D.3d 484, 917 N.Y.S.2d 632 ; see generally Jilani v. Palmer, 83 A.D.3d 786, 787, 920 N.Y.S.2d 424 ).
Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, it is not necessary to determine whether the submissions by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642 ; Che Hong Kim v. Kossoff, 90 A.D.3d 969, 969, 934 N.Y.S.2d 867 ).
IANNACCI, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, FORD and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.