Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-2037.
May 12, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Julio Christian initiated this pro se civil action on March 28, 2003 by filing a Complaint against the City of Philadelphia and various officials, including Mayor John Street; Police Officer Lawrence McKenny; District Attorney Lynne Abraham; Daniel Santucci, Representative of the District Attorney's Office; Todd Nickischer, an Attorney for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; then-Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Mike Fisher; and the Honorable Joyce S. Kean, a Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. Plaintiff alleges civil rights violations, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in connection with his arrest, prosecution and detention for seven months. Mr. Christian seeks damages in excess of $45 million.
In a September 16, 2003 Order, this Court dismissed the following parties as defendants: Attorney General Fisher, Judge Kean, District Attorney Abraham, and Messrs. Santucci and Nickischer. The only parties that remain as defendants are the City of Philadelphia, Mayor Street, and Officer McKenny (collectively "Defendants").
The Court notes that it did not deny a motion to dismiss filed by the City of Philadelphia, Mayor Street, or Officer McKenny. At the time the Court considered the earlier Motions to Dismiss, the file did not show service on these Defendants, and there had been no appearance by counsel for these Defendants.
Presently before the Court are two dispositive motions. Defendants have filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (Docket No. 28), seeking summary judgment as to Defendant City of Philadelphia and Mayor Street on all claims. The motion as to Officer McKenny is limited to certain claims made by the Plaintiff against Officer McKenny. On March 19, 2004, Mr. Christian filed a document titled "Dispositive Motion/Memorandum of Law — Statement of Undisputed Facts" (Docket No. 25), around which some dispute between the parties has arisen. The Defendants have interpreted Mr. Christian's document as advancing a Motion for Summary Judgment and have filed their reply in opposition. Insofar that discovery has occurred between the parties, that Plaintiff has filed in observance of the Court's deadline for dispositive motions, and that Mr. Christian fastidiously cites to the record in his papers, this Court also will construe the March 19, 2004 submission as Mr. Christian's Motion for Summary Judgment and will proceed accordingly.
While the current docket reflects the fact that Mr. Christian filed a document on March 19, 2004, (Docket No. 25), the docket does not recognize Mr. Christian's filing as apending motion.
The first ten pages of this document is Mr. Christian's Statement of Undisputed Facts. Nowhere in this section does the plaintiff articulate the standard for summary judgment motions or present his arguments in the context of Rule 56. On the eleventh page appears a "conclusion" which states legal argument, and then a declaration signed by Plaintiff. A two-page unsigned "Memorandum of Law" follows. The remainder of Plaintiff's filing consists of copies of various exhibits.
The Court also considers Mr. Christian's "Affidavit" (Docket No. 26), which was filed on April 5, 2004, and Mr. Christian's "Supplement to Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 30), which was filed on April 16, 2004.
For the reasons which follow, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in part and will deny Mr. Christian's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. Jurisdiction and Legal Standard
This Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Christian's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. "The purpose of Section 1983 is to provide a civil cause of action to protect persons against the misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible because the defendant was cloaked with the authority of the state."Douris v. Dougherty, 192 F. Supp.2d 358, 363 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id.
A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility for informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial, the moving party's initial burden can be met simply by "pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. After the moving party has met its initial burden, "the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut by making a factual showing "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
II. Discussion
A. Plaintiff's Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment
In Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts, which consists of 52 numbered paragraphs, and a conclusion and declaration signed by Plaintiff, the Plaintiff goes through many facts, including facts relating to Defendants originally named in this case but who were previously dismissed as parties. It appears paragraphs 27-31 relate to the Plaintiff's arrest by Officer McKenny and paragraph 31 asserts "that Defendant knew that probable cause did not exist, yet deprived Plaintiff of his rights in making illegal and malicious arrests." This statement does not identify the identity of the Defendant, but the Court will presume, from the other evidence in the case, that Plaintiff is referring to Defendant McKenny. However, the Court cannot consider this to be an undisputed fact, but is rather a conclusion of law. The City of Philadelphia has presented evidence from notes of testimony taken in connection with Plaintiff's arrest by Officer McKenny on the day in question, which present a genuine issue of fact for trial as to whether Officer McKenny had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Officer McKenny must be denied. As noted below, because the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants City of Philadelphia and Mayor Street, the Court will necessarily deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to these two Defendants.
B. Defendant City of Philadelphia's Motion for Summary Judgment
While the City of Philadelphia is the lead defendant in this case, appearing first in the caption, Mr. Christian does not specify on which grounds he brings suit against the City. On page four of his Complaint, the plaintiff lists the other defendants and makes certain allegations that conceivably indicate the liability of each party. On this page, Mr. Christian fails to make any allegations specific to the City of Philadelphia. In the section of his Complaint labeled "VI. Relief," the plaintiff writes that the City of Philadelphia is being sued under the "Habendum Clause." Interestingly, a habendum clause is "[t]hat part of a deed, usually following the premises, which sets forth the estate to be held and enjoyed by the grantee." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d Ed. 1969) (defining habendum clause). Clearly, whatever legal theory Plaintiff has attempted to invoke, this is not an action related to real property, and no habendum clause is involved in this litigation.
For a municipality such as the City of Philadelphia to be held liable under Section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality caused a deprivation of a constitutional right through an official policy, practice, or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Municipal custom can be demonstrated either by reference to express, codified policy or by evidence that a particular practice, although not authorized by law, is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes law. E.g., Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996). Further, Plaintiff must demonstrate causation, as "a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are the moving force behind the constitutional violation." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 So. Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (quotations and alteration omitted).
Mr. Christian refers the Court to two allegedly similar instances of official misconduct, from which he would have the Court infer the systemic disregard of those rights purportedly compromised in this case. He writes,
What appears to be a coincidence has become a common ritual being done intentionally, and knowledgablly [sic]. Please observe, in Commonwealth v. Boggs, MC# 0106-3757 the inmate served 16 months illegally without a hearing violating his due process rights. The case was dismissed yet, he was deprived of "Equal Protection Clause" under the 14th Amendment. Actually there's a conspiratorial bond between two powerful entities to deprive innocent victims of their federal rights because they're on state parole resulting in massive overcrowdedness [sic] of prisons where no crimes are being committed. On December 7, 2001 Commonwealth v. Velasquez, the inmate served 8 months time without a hearing where his maximum term expired before he was released. When he went to court the charges were dropped.
(Pl.'s Aff. in Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Partial Summ. J., Docket No. 30, at 6.) Even assuming that the City violated the criminal defendants' rights in these two cited cases and in Mr. Christian's own matter, the Court concludes that these three isolated instances, over several years, out of the countless cases that are prosecuted by the City of Philadelphia, are insufficient to support Plaintiff's allegations that there existed a municipal custom to deprive citizens' constitutional rights in this manner. See, e.g., Grillone v. City of Philadelphia, No. 02-6916, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4677, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2003) (granting summary judgment against plaintiff's "failure to train" claim where plaintiff could not identify widespread or repeated instances of similar violence"). Mr. Christian has not proved that this "custom" or given course of conduct is so well-settled and permanent to constitute law.E.g., Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).
The Plaintiff has also sued the City of Philadelphia under state law claims. The tort liability of the City of Philadelphia is governed and limited by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8541 et seq. Pursuant to the Act, municipalities are generally immune from tort liability. § 8541 of the Act provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8541. The Act subsequently sets forth eight exceptions to this general rule of immunity.
The Act provides that a local agency or its employees may be liable for damages arising from: (1) the operation of a motor vehicle; (2) the care, custody, or control of personal property; (3) the care, custody, or control of real property; (4) a dangerous condition of trees, traffic control signs or signals, and street lighting; (5) the dangerous condition of utility service facilities; (6) the dangerous condition of streets; (7) the dangerous condition of sidewalks; and (8) the care, control, or custody of animals. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522(b). Obviously, these exceptions do not apply to this case.
C. Defendant Mayor John Street's Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff has presented no evidence of any wrongdoing by Mayor Street. Mayor Street cannot be liable purely on the grounds that he is the head of City government which employed Officer McKenny. "Supervisory liability under Section 1983 cannot be based solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. . . ." Debellis v. Kulp, 166 F. Supp.2d 255, 277 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (quotation omitted). A supervisor may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a subordinate's unlawful conduct only if the supervisor directed, encouraged, tolerated, or acquiesced in that conduct. E.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995). Mr. Christian has not alleged that Mayor Street directed Officer McKenny to apprehend him in the absence of probable cause, nor has Plaintiff introduced any evidence, even when viewed most favorably, that could support such an allegation. The fact that Mayor Street occupies a supervisory position, standing alone, does not establish his liability. Debellis, 166 F. Supp.2d at 277.
Furthermore, as noted above, Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that the alleged wrongful conduct was the result of official custom or policy adopted by the City. Thus, Mayor Street is entitled to summary judgment in his favor.
D. Officer Lawrence McKenny's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
As noted above, Officer McKenny only moves for partial summary judgment as to claims under the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments. Because at least some of Plaintiff's claims against Officer McKenny must proceed to trial, and treating certain of Plaintiff's "Statement of Undisputed Facts" as constituting Plaintiff's declaration in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, which construed liberally, raise genuine issues of fact for trial, the Court will deny Officer McKenny's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to claims under the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution without prejudice, and reserve Officer McKenny's arguments for the time of trial.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of May, 2004, upon consideration of Plaintiff's "Dispositive Motion" (Docket No. 25), and treating it as a Motion for Summary Judgment, it is hereby ORDERED that it is DENIED.The Motion of Defendants City of Philadelphia and Mayor John Street for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Defendant Lawrence McKenny is DENIED without prejudice.
Defendants' Motion in Limine (Docket No. 37) is reserved until the time of trial.
The trial of this case will be held on June 2, 2004 at 9:30 a.m. Please call chambers at 267.299.7520 for the courtroom location. The parties shall be prepared with witnesses at that time.