Opinion
B307561
10-28-2022
Estate of BYUNG OK MIN, Deceased. v. YUNHEE MIN et al., Objectors and Respondents. CHRIS SUNG HOON MIN, Petitioner and Appellant,
Chris Sung Hoon Min, in pro per, for Petitioner and Appellant. Correll Law and Michelle J. Correll for Objectors and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BP161243 Ana Maria Luna, Judge.
Chris Sung Hoon Min, in pro per, for Petitioner and Appellant.
Correll Law and Michelle J. Correll for Objectors and Respondents.
STRATTON, P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Chris Sung Hoon Min wanted to probate a holographic will allegedly signed by his father. The trial court denied his multiple petitions to do so. The last petition was denied with prejudice. Appellant raises several claims of error on appeal. We decline to consider most of his arguments, as he has forfeited them by failing to refer to the record and cite legal authority to support his contentions. We otherwise find substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that appellant's March 2020 amended petition to probate his father's purported holographic will was time-barred under Probate Codesection 8226, subdivision (c). We affirm.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 18, 2015, Byung Ok Min died. His heirs are his four children: daughter Yunhee Min and sons Robert Min, Rene Min, and appellant Chris Sung Hoon Min. Appellant has incorrectly designated the Estate of Byung Ok Min as respondent. (Estate of Bright v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 827, 828-829 [An estate can neither sue nor be sued; instead, the estate is represented in litigation by a personal representative.].) We construe respondents to be siblings Yunhee, Robert, and Rene and personal representative Jeffrey Siegel. Siegel, as personal representative of the estate, has not made an appearance on appeal. We refer to the family members by their first names to avoid confusion.
On March 24, 2015, Yunhee filed a petition for letters of administration of her father's estate. She alleged her father died intestate with an estate worth $50,000 in personal property and $1 million in real property, i.e., an undivided 70 percent interest in an 8-unit apartment building located at 440 S. Wilton Place in Los Angeles, California.
Yunhee's petition came on for initial hearing on May 5, 2015. The Notice of Petition to Administer Estate includes appellant's name as an individual who received formal notice. It also includes proof of publication. And, indeed, the minute order of the hearing reflects "Sun Min" appeared. We infer "Sun Min" is appellant Chris Sung Hoon Min.
In this court's experience, a check mark beside an individual's name in a Los Angeles Superior Court probate minute order or a name written into the minute order indicates the individual was present at the hearing.
The petition was recommended for approval. However, the court continued the hearing and ordered "Mr. Min" to give notice of the continuance.
On June 16, 2015, the trial court again continued the hearing on Yunhee's petition and ordered objections to be filed by July 14, 2015. The next hearing was scheduled for July 28, 2015.
On July 14 and later on December 7, 2015, appellant, in pro per, filed objections to Yunhee's petition. He argued their father distrusted Yunhee, she had destroyed their father's will and she was "withholding additional assets of Decedent not listed on the Petition." He requested appointment of a neutral party as estate administrator instead of his sister.
A. Appellant's First Petition in 2015 (for Letters of Administration)
In addition to filing objections to Yunhee's petition, on September 8, 2015, appellant filed his own competing petition for letters to administer their father's intestate estate. That petition alleged an estate worth $500,000 in personal property and no real property.
For various reasons unrelated to this appeal, hearings to adjudicate Yunhee's petition and appellant's competing petition were continued for almost two years. During that time, appellant actively participated in the probate litigation by filing objections and attending hearings. For example, he was present on July 28, 2015 for a hearing on Yunhee's petition where he advised the court he was seeking counsel. On August 4, 2015, his counsel filed a notice of limited scope representation on his behalf which included his signature. He was present on August 4, 2015 at a hearing on Yunhee's petition. On September 21, 2015, he filed a notice of substitution of attorney. On October 6, 2015, December 8, 2015, January 12, 2016, August 16, 2016, November 15, 2016, January 25, 2017, and March 8, 2017, he was present in court for hearings on the pending petitions.
On August 25, 2017, Yunhee withdrew the petition she had filed and requested that her brother Rene Min be appointed special administrator until he could file a petition to be appointed administrator. In light of that information, the trial court denied Yunhee's petition without prejudice. Appellant was present at that hearing. Appellant was aware of and had filed objections to Yunhee's request for appointment of a special administrator.
While the issues of appointment of a special administrator, and alternatively appointment of appellant as administrator, were pending, appellant continued to file pleadings and to appear in court. He was present at hearings on September 7, 2017, October 12, 2017 (where he filed objections and was given a deadline by which to file more objections, which he did on November 8, 2017), and December 13, 2017 (where he was given another objection deadline of December 22, 2017, which he met).
On January 3, 2018, the court issued its Order for Probate, appointing private fiduciary Siegel as administrator and personal representative of decedent's estate. The appointment of a nonfamily member as administrator in effect sustained one of appellant's objections to Yunhee's initial petition. In its order, the court found decedent died intestate. The court further found: "All notices required by law have been given." On January 8, 2018, letters of administration were issued to Siegel.
We note Siegel did not file a separate petition as a basis of his appointment as administrator of the estate. The record of October 12, 2017 reflects the siblings had discussed and tentatively agreed it made sense to appoint a neutral administrator (as appellant had originally asserted). Then on October 12, 2017, appellant advised the court he had now changed his mind and did not agree to the appointment of Siegel "since I have a will, a letter will now, and that it's advisable that I wait until that is determined." The court appointed Siegel nonetheless.
B. Appellant's Second Petition in 2018 (for Probate of Will)
Nine days after Siegel was appointed administrator of the estate, on January 17, 2018, appellant filed a petition for probate of a holographic will dated August 1, 2007. The holographic will bequeathed all of decedent's interest in the Wilton Place property to appellant. Appellant alleged his father's estate included $500,000 in personal property and $2 million in real property (the Wilton Place apartment building). On March 16, 2018, appellant filed an amended petition for probate.
On April 10, 2018, the court denied without prejudice appellant's January 17, 2018 petition for probate and March 16, 2018 amended petition for probate. The court found "insufficient evidence has been provided to grant the matter on calendar this date based upon the reading of the moving papers and consideration of all presented evidence."
C. Appellant's Third Petition in 2020 (for Probate of Will)
Nearly two years later, on January 8, 2020, appellant filed another petition for probate of will and for letters of administration with will annexed. He asserted decedent's estate included $2.5 million in real property. He again requested that decedent's August 1, 2007 holographic will be admitted to probate.
On February 7, 2020, appellant filed a verified supplement to his petition for probate, arguing his petition was not time-barred by section 8226 because he "was not given proper legal notice of the administration" in this proceeding. He also stated he "obtained knowledge of the Will in September 2017."
On July 22, 2020, the probate court held a hearing on the petition. The central issue was whether the petition was time-barred by section 8226. The probate court denied appellant's petition with prejudice.
The court stated it was "looking at Probate Code [section] 8226 in conjunction with Judge Cowan's minute order of October 12th, 2017, where it appears that Chris Sung Hoon Min was present." In denying the petition the court found: "I think it's disingenuous for [appellant] to have appeared in 2017 and in 2018, and then to say that he didn't know that there was an administration of this estate going on. And he's been ordered to do things at different times, including file his petition, which . . . he did. It was heard and it was denied."
This appeal followed. We note appellant appeals only from the July 22, 2020 order denying as time-barred his third petition for probate.
DISCUSSION
We are mindful appellant is representing himself on appeal; however, he "is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys." (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210; see Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985 [the rules of civil procedure apply with equal force to selfrepresented parties as they do to those represented by attorneys].) He is thus bound to follow fundamental rules of appellate review, including: "[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment." (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)" 'All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.'" (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Further, we will not scour the record on our own in search of supporting evidence. (Sharadianlou v. Karp (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1149.)
Our review of the merits of this appeal is severely hampered by appellant's noncompliance with rules of appellate practice and procedure, as well as the California Rules of Court. Appellant fails to present cogent legal discussion and argument which refers to relevant evidence and the appellate record in general. Instead, he makes general contentions, including undeveloped assertions of error. This results in forfeiture.
To the extent we can, we address what appears to be appellant's main argument on appeal.
Without citation to authority, appellant contends the trial court "erred in finding that appellant's petition to probate a will was untimely as there is no substantial evidence to support that finding."
We review the record to determine whether the court's ruling is supported by substantial evidence, viewing all reasonable inferences in favor of the finding. (Estate of Carter (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1154.)
Section 8226 sets out what happens when an estate has been opened and a new or competing will is then discovered. (Estate of Kelly (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1372.) Subdivision (c) provides time limits, as follows: "If the proponent of a will has received notice of a petition for probate or a petition for letters of administration for a general personal representative, the proponent of the will may petition for probate of the will only within the later of either of the following time periods: [¶] (1) One hundred twenty days after issuance of the order admitting the first will to probate or determining the decedent to be intestate. [¶] (2) Sixty days after the proponent of the will first obtains knowledge of the will." (§ 8226, subd. (c).)
Here, on January 3, 2018, the probate court determined decedent died intestate. Thus, the 120-day period under section 8226, subdivision (c)(1) commenced January 3, 2018, and ended May 3, 2018. Appellant's third petition for probate was filed more than two years after the deadline-on January 8, 2020.
The alternative deadline under section 8226, subdivision (c)(2)-within 60 days of knowledge of the will-commenced when appellant gained knowledge of the will. According to his February 7, 2020 verified supplement to the petition for probate, he learned of the will sometime in September 2017. This means the 60-day window ended on or before November 30, 2017, long before the third petition for probate was filed. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's July 22, 2020 ruling.
Appellant also argues "proper notice was never given to heirs and creditors." As to the notice issue, as part of its January 3, 2018 order appointing Siegel as administrator of the estate, the probate court found "[a]ll notices required by law have been given." Indeed, the record reflects appellant was sent formal notice of the initial hearing date of Yunhee's petition for letters of administration on the Judicial Council-approved form. Yunhee's petition was the one which started the probate court proceedings.
This formal notice complies with Estate of Kelly, which holds that the time bar of section 8226 does not begin to run until formal notice is given of the petition for letters of administration. In Estate of Kelly, the proponent of the will of decedent, although aware of the proceedings, received no formal notice of the petition for letters of administration. The court strictly construed the language of section 8226 and determined that actual notice of the proceedings was not sufficient notice. Instead, formal written notice must be shown. (Estate of Kelly, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1374-1375.) Such notice has been shown here.
In the trial court, appellant did not dispute that he received written notice of Yunhee's initial petition. Instead, he argued he was also entitled to written notice that the court was considering Siegel's appointment. We reject that contention. We agree there was no formal written notice of Siegel's appointment because Siegel filed no petition for which written notice could be given. Siegel's appointment appears to be an accommodation to appellant's objection to his sister as administrator; that is, the court effectuated appellant's initial contention that a neutral administrator should be appointed. In the record on appeal, we find no formal order denying appellant's first petition for letters of administration. It appears to us, and we so infer, that the probate court granted appellant's first petition, substituting in Siegel as the proposed administrator. Thus, no formal notice was necessary as it was appellant's petition that was granted, albeit as amended.
Alternatively, the record reflects the court orally noticed appellant personally at the October 12, 2017 hearing that it was considering Siegel's appointment. Applying de novo review, we find that oral notice from the court to appellant personally suffices under the statute. (See Estate of Kelly, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375 [legislative enactments must be interpreted to avoid absurd results]; Estate of Earley (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 369, 375 [we must interpret section 8226 to avoid a construction that would lead to unreasonable, impractical, or arbitrary results].)
We also find actual notice of Siegel's appointment sufficient under the unique circumstances presented here. In addition to being on notice of the initial petition, appellant was on actual notice of the probate proceedings from their inception. Appellant appeared at the initial hearing date and thereafter. Appellant's numerous personal appearances at hearings on the various petitions and the pleadings he filed show he was actively engaged in the litigation which started one month after his father died. At the October 12, 2017 hearing, he was specifically asked to state his position on Siegel's appointment, which appears to us to be a compromise fashioned by the court to address appellant's initial desire that a neutral party administer the estate. The court's findings that appellant was on proper formal and actual notice both when it appointed Siegel as administrator and when it denied appellant's final petition are supported by substantial evidence.
Appellant's other contentions are: 1) "the trial court erred in denying with prejudice appellant's petition to probate a will without making a ruling on the validity of the lodged certified will"; 2) "decedent's last words in his will were discarded . . . as the trial court didn't make any ruling on the validity of the deceased's certified will"; 3) "the trial court's denial with prejudice to decedent's will should not have happened to someone who loved this country so greatly in its ideas and beliefs as the decedent did"; and 4) the trial court "erred in assuming that this case . . is an Intestacy based on [Siegel's] appointment of 10-122017."
These contentions are forfeited. Appellant does not support these contentions with citation to legal authority or case law. A party is required in his or her brief to "[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), italics added; Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.) An appellant who does not provide adequate legal authority and analysis to support a contention forfeits that contention. (Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948; Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) A reviewing court has no obligation to "develop appellants' argument for them." (In re Marriage of Falcone &Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; see also Pizarro v. Reynoso, at pp. 179, 181; see Ellenberger v. Espinosa (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 943, 948 ["We are not required to make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error [in] a trial court's action."].)
Finally, appellant argues the trial court "erred in denying with prejudice appellant's petition fatally ending the petition to probate a will without material fact." He claims the trial court "re[lied] on the hearsay of the opposing attorneys as a material fact and without consideration of the real material facts." We disagree. The reporter's transcript of the July 22, 2020 hearing shows counsel did not testify; they made oral argument and answered questions posed by the trial court. The trial court actually read its own minute orders from prior proceedings into the record, as support for the court's order denying appellant's petition for probate. The reporter's transcript reflects the court's statements: "I am looking at Probate Code [section] 8226 in conjunction with Judge Cowan's minute order of October 12th, 2017, where it appears that Chris Sung Hoon Min was present." (Italics added.) There is nothing in the record before us that indicates the trial court erred in this regard.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs on appeal.
We concur: WILEY, J., HARUTUNIAN, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.