Opinion
E068756
11-08-2021
CHOONG-DAE KANG et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. AGUINA, Defendant and Appellant.
Aguina, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. Law Offices of John M. Siciliano and John M. Siciliano for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIC10019528, Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge. Reversed.
Aguina, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of John M. Siciliano and John M. Siciliano for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
OPINION
FIELDS, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Aguina and plaintiff and respondent Choong-Dae Kang are formerly husband and wife. On March 23, 2015, the family court in Aguina and Kang's marital dissolution proceeding, Riverside County Superior Court case No. SWD015783, issued a status only judgment dissolving the marriage, effective February 6, 2015; but it did not enter a judgment determining or dividing Kang and Aguina's community estate. (Aguina v. Kang (Dec. 15, 2016, E063571) [nonpub. opn.] (Aguina II).) The record in this appeal does not indicate that the family court has since issued a judgment determining or dividing Kang and Aguina's community estate.
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our decisions in three prior appeals involving Kang and Aguina: (1) In re the Marriage of Aguina Aguina and Choong-Dae Kang (Dec. 10, 2014, E058806) [nonpub. opn.] (Aguina I); (2) Aguina II, supra, E063571; and (3) Choong-Dae Kang et al. v. Aguina (Jan. 16, 2019, E065768, E066587, E067169) [nonpub. opn.] (Aguina III). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
On March 3, 2015, the family court awarded Aguina $3,500 in monetary sanctions against Kang and her attorney, John M. Siciliano. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.250, subd. (d).) In January 2014, the court in this civil action entered a judgment in the principal amount of $574,500 against Aguina and in favor of plaintiffs and respondents, Kang; her two siblings, Myung-Ja Kang and Kwang-Sa Kang; and her father, Jae-Sung Kang. (Aguina III, supra, E065768 [at p. 1].) The judgment is based on plaintiffs' complaint in this civil action against Aguina for fraud and breach of contract concerning loans that Kang's mother made to Aguina in 2004. (Ibid. [at p. 5].)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Kang's mother died in 2008, and Kang's father died before the civil case was tried in 2013. (Aguina III, supra, E065768 [at p. 5].)
At a September 27, 2012 hearing in the family court, Aguina, Kang, and the other plaintiffs in this civil action stipulated, through their counsel, that any judgment plaintiffs may obtain in this civil action against Aguina would be a "community debt," and the family court accepted the stipulation. The stipulation was made so that plaintiffs could proceed with their suit against Aguina in this civil action, which resulted in the $574,500 judgment against Aguina. On June 27, 2017, the court in this civil action issued an order (the assignment/offset order), crediting Aguina's right to collect the $3,500 in sanctions against the $574,500 judgment against Aguina. (§ 708.510.)
Aguina appeals from the June 27, 2017 assignment/offset order, claiming that the court in this civil action did not have jurisdiction or was not authorized to issue the assignment/offset order because the order interfered with the family court's priority of jurisdiction to determine and divide Kang and Aguina's community estate. We agree. By crediting the $3,500 in sanctions against the $574,500 judgment, the court in this civil action effectively enforced the judgment solely against Aguina. This interfered with the family court's priority of jurisdiction to determine and divide Kang and Aguina's community estate, which includes a determination of whether there are sufficient community assets to pay the judgment, a community debt, and if not, the extent to which Kang and Aguina are each liable to pay the judgment.
On March 2, 2018, this court issued an order staying the proceedings in this appeal, but the stay was lifted on December 17, 2020.
II. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND
As noted, on March 23, 2015, the family court issued a status only judgment, terminating the marriage of Kang and Aguina effective February 6, 2015. (Aguina II, supra, E063571 [at pp. 6-7].) At that time, the family court did not enter a judgment concerning any other issues, including (1) whether the parties have any community assets, or (2) whether the $574,500 judgment against Aguina, a community debt, is to be satisfied in whole or in part from the parties' community assets, if any. Instead, the family court ordered that its previous orders would remain in effect and effectively reserved jurisdiction to determine and divide the parties' community estate. (Ibid.)
On November 17, 2016, the family court imposed a terminating sanction against Kang, and struck her responsive pleading in the family court case, thus authorizing the family court to determine and divide Kang and Aguina's community estate by default and without Kang's participation. (Aguina III, supra, E065768 [at p. 19].) And, as noted, the record in this appeal does not indicate if the family court has issued a judgment determining and dividing Kang and Aguina's community estate.
On May 25, 2017, Kang filed a motion in this action for the assignment/offset order. Kang asked the court to direct Aguina to "assign[]or otherwise offset[]" his right to collect the $3,500 in sanctions, including interest, from Kang and Siciliano, against the $574,500 judgment. The motion was made pursuant to section 708.510, which provides: "(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, upon application of the judgment creditor on noticed motion, the court may order the judgment debtor to assign to the judgment creditor . . . all or part of a right to payment due or to become due, whether or not the right is conditioned on future developments . . . ."
The motion did not mention the parties' September 27, 2012 stipulation in the family court that any judgment entered against Aguina in this action would be a" 'community debt, '" which would be "split evenly" between Kang and Aguina, and the parties' further stipulation that five real properties, located in Murrieta, were Aguina's separate properties. (Aguina III, supra, E065768 [at p. 8].) Instead, the motion represented that Aguina was solely responsible for paying the $574,500 judgment. No part of the judgment had been satisfied, and Aguina was attempting to enforce the $3,500 sanctions order.
Aguina filed an opposition to the motion. Aguina pointed out that he, Kang, and the other plaintiffs in this action (Kang's family members) had stipulated in the family court that the $574,500 judgment was a "community debt" that he and Kang would share "50/50." He also noted that the family court had not issued a judgment determining and dividing his and Kang's community estate, and he indicated that his liability on the $574,500 judgment would be limited to half of the amount of the judgment, which could not be satisfied from his and Kang's community assets.
At a June 27, 2017 hearing, the court granted the motion, ruling as follows: "The court finds that the history of the [$3,500] monetary sanctions is irrelevant to this court's determination on this motion. The fact that the sanctions order is against both Mr. Siciliano and Kang is also irrelevant because the right to payment is conferred on Aguina. Aguina's right to payment is assignable to plaintiffs to do whatever they see fit in enforcing it. The fact that there is no final judgment in the family law proceedings has no bearing on the enforceability of the sanctions order or the judgment. [¶] The fact that Aguina and Kang stipulated that any debt owed in this action is community property in the family law proceeding has no bearing on the enforceability of the $574, [500] judgment by the plaintiffs in this action. The stipulation is for purposes of the distribution of assets in the family law proceedings only. The judgment was in favor of not only Kang, but the rest of the plaintiffs. [¶] Therefore, the motion is granted. The court orders [Aguina] to assign to plaintiffs all of the rights to payment due under the order dated March 3, 2015, issued by the family law court in case number SWD015783 to offset the judgment entered in this action." (Italics added.)
III. DISCUSSION
Aguina essentially claims that the court in this civil action lacked jurisdiction and was therefore not authorized to issue the June 27, 2017 assignment/offset order because the order interfered with the family court's priority of jurisdiction to determine and divide Kang and Aguina's community estate. We agree.
Aguina alternatively claims that the June 27, 2017 assignment/offset order violated section 916, subdivision (a), because the consolidated appeals in Aguina III were pending when the assignment/offset order was made. Section 916, subdivision (a), provides that "the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order . . . ." It is unnecessary to address this alternative claim, given our conclusion that the assignment/offset order interferes with the family court's priority of jurisdiction.
We applied the priority of jurisdiction doctrine in Aguina I and Aguina III. In Aguina I, Kang appealed from the family court's May 14, 2013 order discharging several prejudgment writs of attachment, which the court in this civil action issued on February 14, 2011, against five real properties located in Murrieta, and that Aguina was claiming were his separate properties, but that Kang was claiming belonged to the community. (Aguina I, supra, E058806 [at pp. 1-2, 6, 9-10, 17].) Kang argued that the family court lacked jurisdiction to discharge the writs because the family court lacked the" 'superior jurisdiction necessary to invalidate the orders of another department of the superior court.'" (Ibid. [at p. 14].) We rejected this claim based on the family court's priority of jurisdiction to determine the separate or community character of Kang's and Aguina's assets and to divide Kang and Aguina's community estate. (Ibid. [at pp. 14-18].)
We explained:" 'In practice, the superior court exercising jurisdiction under the Family Code is known as the "family court" (or "family law court"). But there is no separate "family court" per se. Rather, "family court" refers to the activities of superior court judicial officers handling litigation arising under the Family Code. The "family court" is not a separate court with special jurisdiction, but is instead the superior court performing one of its general duties.' (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2014) ¶ 3:3.10, p. 3-3, quoting In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 200 . . . .) [¶] . . . 'Even though a superior court is divided into branches or departments, pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 4, there is only one superior court in a county and jurisdiction is therefore vested in that court, not in any particular judge or department. Whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one and the same court. [Citation.] Because a superior court is but one tribunal, "[a]n order made in one department during the progress of a cause can neither be ignored nor overlooked in another department . . . ." [Citation.]' (Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1449.)
" 'Under the doctrine of priority jurisdiction, the first superior court to assume and exercise jurisdiction in the case acquires exclusive jurisdiction until the matter is disposed of. [Citations.] The doctrine avoids the risk of simultaneous proceedings or conflicting decisions. [Citation.]' (Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1135 . . .; Glade v. Glade, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450 [' "[T]he first court of equal dignity to assume and exercise jurisdiction over a matter acquires exclusive jurisdiction."' (Italics omitted.)].) Thus, it is beyond the jurisdictional authority of any other superior court department to interfere with or invalidate a ruling made by the department first to acquire jurisdiction over the matter, until judgment in that matter has become final. (Levin v. Smith, supra, at p. 1135; Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, 3:22, p. 3-13.)
"Here, the dissolution proceeding was filed in 2008, before the civil case was filed in 2010. Thus, the family court was the first department of the superior court to assume jurisdiction to determine and direct the disposition of Kang and Aguina's community property estate, and had exclusive jurisdiction, under the doctrine of priority jurisdiction, to rule on matters concerning the division and disposition of the parties' community estate. (Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 961 . . . ['After a family law court acquires jurisdiction to divide community property in a dissolution action, no other department of a superior court may make an order adversely affecting that division.'].)
"By issuing the right to attach order and the order for issuance of the writs on February 14, 2011, the court in the civil case interfered with the family court's exclusive jurisdiction in matters concerning the division and disposition of Kang and Aguina's community estate. At the time the writs were issued, Kang and Aguina were disputing whether the Murrieta real properties were community property assets or Aguina's separate properties. By allowing Kang and her coplaintiffs to encumber the properties with the writs, pending judgment in the civil case, the court in the civil case directly interfered with the family court's exclusive jurisdiction to make orders concerning the disposition, in the dissolution proceeding, of what Kang was then claiming were community assets. [¶] Thus, the family court was not without jurisdiction to issue its October 31, 2011, order directing Kang and Aguina to cooperate in the removal of the writs or its May 14, 2013, order discharging the writs-notwithstanding the February 14, 2011, right to attach order and order for the issuance of the writs in the civil case. Our conclusion is unaffected by the fact the civil case was not consolidated with the dissolution case and involved parties other than Kang and Aguina, namely, Kang's coplaintiffs." (Aguina I, supra, E058806 [at pp. 14-18].)
In Aguina III, supra, E065768, we again invoked the priority of jurisdiction doctrine in reversing two postjudgment orders issued by the court in this civil action following the entry of the $574,500 judgment in January 2014: (1) the civil court's July 12, 2016 order lifting the trial judge's (the Hon. Phillip Argento) April 2, 2014 order staying execution of the judgment, and (2) the civil court's October 19, 2016 order invalidating the family court's August 29, 2016 order, removing the abstract of judgment, or judgment lien, recorded on March 10, 2014, against Aguina's Murrieta properties to secure the payment of the $574,500 judgment. (Aguina III, supra, E065768 [at pp. 2, 16-26].) We agreed with Aguina that the court in this civil action exceeded its authority in issuing the July 12 and October 19, 2016 postjudgment orders because those orders allowed the plaintiffs in this civil action, including Kang, to enforce the $574,500 judgment solely against Aguina. We concluded that the orders "interfered with the family court's priority of jurisdiction to determine and divide Kang and Aguina's community estate." (Ibid. [at pp. 3, 25-26].)
Echoing our decision in Aguina I, supra, E058806, we noted in Aguina III, supra, E065768, that, under the doctrine of priority of jurisdiction, "the first judge or department to assume and exercise jurisdiction in a cause or matter acquires exclusive jurisdiction in the matter until it is disposed of. [Citations.] [¶] The doctrine of priority of jurisdiction avoids 'conflicting adjudications of the same subject matter' by different departments of the same superior court [citation] or by superior courts of different counties." (Aguina III, supra, E065768 [at p. 22].)
We noted that the doctrine "has been applied to invalidate superior court orders that may conflict or interfere with the family court's priority of jurisdiction to characterize and divide a community estate. (Askew v. Askew, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 961-962 [civil department of superior court had no authority to consider husband's civil suit against wife for fraud based on wife's 'false statements of love and sexual desire' given wife's previously-filed dissolution proceeding and family court's exclusive jurisdiction to characterize and divide community estate]; In re Marriage of Schenck (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1474, 1482-1484 . . . [civil law and motion department had no authority to order sale of family home to pay husband's support arrearages when family court had retained jurisdiction to divide community interests in the home].)" (Aguina III, supra, E065768 [at pp. 23-24].)
Further, we noted that the priority of jurisdiction doctrine had been applied "to restrain superior court orders in favor of the third party judgment creditor of one spouse, when the orders may interfere with the family court's jurisdiction and authority to characterize and divide the spouse's community estate with the nondebtor spouse. (In re Marriage of Van Hook (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 970, 980-982 . . . [third party judgment creditor of wife restrained from executing on community bank account and stock shares where family court had yet to enter judgment dividing community estate]; Glade v. Glade, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1449-1450, 1455-1456 [foreclosure action by husband's parents on community home stayed pending determination and division of community estate].)" (Aguina III, supra, E065768 [at p. 24].)
In Aguina III, we concluded that, "The family court had priority of jurisdiction to characterize and divide Aguina and Kang's community estate because proceedings on these issues were pending in the family court when the civil action was filed. Thus, the court in the civil action exceeded its authority, or the scope of its concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the family court, in lifting the April 2, 2014, order staying enforcement of the judgment and in invalidating or prohibiting the enforcement of the family court's August 29, 2016, order removing the abstract of judgment or judgment lien recorded against Aguina's five separate Murrieta real properties." (Aguina III, supra, E065768 [at pp. 3-4].) We also observed that, "[i]n lifting the April 2, 2014, order staying enforcement of the judgment, and in purporting to invalidate the family court's August 29, 2016, order removing the judgment lien from Aguina's Murrieta real properties, the court in the civil action allowed plaintiffs to satisfy the judgment by levying on and selling [Aguina's] Murrieta real properties. This could have allowed Kang to recover relief from Aguina not otherwise available to her in the family court proceedings. (Glade v. Glade, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1446-1450.)" (Aguina III, supra, E065768 [at p. 25].)
Here, too, the June 27, 2017 assignment/offset interfered with the family court's priority of jurisdiction to determine and divide Kang and Aguina's community estate. Like the July 12 and October 19, 2016 orders that we reversed in Aguina III as interfering with the family court's priority of jurisdiction, the June 27, 2017 assignment/offset order allows the plaintiffs in this civil action, including Kang, to enforce the $574,500 judgment solely against Aguina. But the judgment is a community debt, and the family court has yet to determine whether Kang and Aguina have sufficient community assets to pay the judgment in full and, more generally, to determine and divide Kang and Aguina's community estate. It is the family court, not the civil court, which must determine how much of the community debt Aguina must pay. As noted, on November 17, 2016, the family court imposed a terminating sanction against Kang, and thus authorized the family court to determine and divide Kang and Aguina's community estate by default and without Kang's participation. (Aguina III, supra, E065768 [at p. 19].) The assignment/offset order effectively allows the plaintiffs in this action, including Kang, to circumvent the family court's November 17, 2016 terminating sanction against Kang. The order may also allow Kang to recover relief from Aguina that she may not otherwise be able to obtain in the family court proceedings. (Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1446-1450.)
In issuing the June 27, 2017 assignment/offset order, the court in this civil action incorrectly observed that the community property character of the $574,500 judgment, and the fact that no final judgment had been issued in the family law proceeding, had "no bearing" on the enforceability of the judgment by the plaintiffs in this civil action, including Kang. The court correctly noted that the $574,500 judgment was also in favor of plaintiffs besides Kang, but incorrectly noted that the September 27, 2012 family court stipulation that the judgment was a community debt was "for purposes of the distribution of assets in the family law proceedings only."
As we explained in Aguina III, the priority of jurisdiction doctrine does not allow nonparties to a marital dissolution proceeding (e.g., the plaintiffs in this civil action, other than Kang) to circumvent the family court's priority of jurisdiction to determine and divide the parties' community estate, by enforcing a community property judgment against one of the parties to the marital dissolution proceeding, before the family court in the proceeding has determined and divided the parties' community estate. (Aguina III, supra, E065768 [at p. 23]; Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 961-962; In re Marriage of Schenck (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1474, 1482-1484.)
Plaintiffs maintain that Aguina has not met his burden of showing that the assignment/offset order is invalid and must be reversed. They point out that section 708.510 allows Aguina's right to payment of the $3,500 sanctions order to be credited against Aguina's obligation to pay the $574,500 judgment because the statute allows a judgment debtor's "right to payment due or to become due," to be assigned to the judgment creditor "whether or not the [judgment debtor's] right [to payment] is conditioned on future developments." (§ 708.510, subd. (a).)
Indeed, Aguina's right to payment of the $3,500 in sanctions is not conditioned upon any future developments. In issuing the March 3, 2015 sanctions order, the family court ordered Kang and Siciliano to pay the $3,500 sum within 30 days. As plaintiffs acknowledge, the $3,500 sanction order was a "separate, independent judgment" against Kang and Siciliano.
But as we have explained, by crediting Aguina's right to payment of the $3,500 in sanctions against the $574,500 judgment, the court in this civil action interfered with the family court's priority of jurisdiction to determine and divide Kang and Aguina's community estate. Section 708.510, subdivision (a), applies "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law." Under the priority of jurisdiction doctrine, plaintiffs' right to enforce the judgment solely against Aguina, which plaintiffs have agreed is a community debt, is subject to the family court's pending determination and division of Kang and Aguina's community estate.
Plaintiffs claim that Aguina "appears to argue" that plaintiffs' right to payment of the judgment "is conditioned on future developments" regarding the resolution of community assets in the family court proceeding. Plaintiffs claim this argument is incorrect because "such future developments do not preclude an assignment" under section 708.510, subdivision (a). Plaintiffs are confusing their right to payment of the judgment with Aguina's right to payment of the $3,500 sanctions order. Section 708.510 allows a judgment debtor's right to payment to be assigned to a judgment creditor, regardless of whether the right to payment is conditioned on future developments, but the statute does not concern whether the judgment creditor's right to payment of the judgment is conditioned on future developments.
Regarding Aguina's claim that the court in this civil action lacked jurisdiction to issue the assignment/offset order, plaintiffs claim that a similar jurisdictional challenge was rejected in Weingarten Realty Investors v. Chiang (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 163 (Weingarten). We disagree. Weingarten has no bearing on this case.
The trial court in Weingarten assigned a judgment debtor's interest in properties that had escheated to the state to the judgment creditor. (Weingarten, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p.166.) When the judgment creditor filed claims for the properties with the state controller (former § 1540, subd. (a); Stats. 2005, ch. 706, §15), the controller denied the claims, asserting that only an" 'owner, '" who had a legal right to the properties before the properties escheated to the state (former § 1540, subd. (d)) could recover the escheated properties from the state under former section 1540. (Weingarten, p. 166.)
Weingarten rejected the controller's argument. It interpreted former section 1540, subdivision (a), which generally allowed "[a]ny person" who claimed an interest in property paid or delivered to the controller to file a claim to the property with the controller, as allowing the judgment creditor to claim the judgment debtor's escheated properties that the trial court had assigned to the judgment creditor. (Weingarten, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169-170.) Weingarten held that claimants under former section 1540, subdivision (a), were not limited to" 'owners, '" as defined in section 1540, subdivision (d). (Weingarten, at p. 170.)
Effective January 1, 2014, former section 1540 was amended to provide that "(a) Any person . . . who claims to have been the owner, as defined in subdivision (d) of property paid or delivered to the Controller . . . may file a claim to the property . . . ." (Stats. 2013, ch. 128, § 1, italics added.) Former section 1540, subdivision (a), provided that "Any person . . . who claims an interest in property paid or delivered to the Controller . . . may file a claim to the property. (Weingarten, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 168, italics added.) The 2013 legislation also amended subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 1540 and rewrote subdivision (d) to clarify that, "Only an owner, as defined in this subdivision, may file a claim with the Controller pursuant to this article." (Stats. 2013, ch. 128, § 1.)
Plaintiffs point out that, on appeal in Weingarten, the controller argued that the trial court in Weingarten "lacked jurisdiction over the property and the controller," and that the Weingarten court rejected this claim. (Weingarten, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 166-170.) Here, too, plaintiffs argue that the court in this civil action "clearly had jurisdiction over [Aguina] as a defendant" in this civil action and "thus had the power to issue the assignment." We agree that the court in this civil action had jurisdiction over Aguina as a defendant, and the court also had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' fraud and breach of contract claims against Aguina in this civil action. Again, however, the court exceeded its authority and interfered with the family court's priority of jurisdiction by crediting Aguina's right to payment of the $3,500 sanctions order against the judgment, which all of the parties in this civil action have agreed is a community debt of Kang and Aguina's community estate.
III. DISPOSITION
The June 27, 2017 assignment/offset order is reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior court with directions that the allocation and responsibility for payment of the community debt, specifically, the $574,500 judgment, shall be determined by the family court. Aguina shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)
We concur: RAMIREZ, P. J., MILLER, J.