Opinion
Index Nos. 2023-51512 904703-21
09-26-2023
Vishnu Vardhan Chinni and ASHWINI KALAGOTLA, Plaintiffs, v. Christopher M. Mendez, PARK HILL LANE ASSOCIATES and PHLA, LLC, Defendants. (Action No. 1.) NLVEDITHA RAJ GUDUR Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of RAGHAVA ENUMADI, Plaintiff, v. PARK HILL LANE ASSOCIATES, CHRISTOPHER M. MENDEZ and PHLA, LLC, Defendants. (Action No. 2.)
Phelan, Phelan & Danek LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiffs (John Phelan and Timothy Brennan of counsel) Barclay Damon, LLP Attorneys for Defendants Park Hill Lane Associates and PHLA, LLC (Michael Murphy and Brienna Christiano of counsel)
Unpublished Opinion
Phelan, Phelan & Danek LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiffs (John Phelan and Timothy Brennan of counsel)
Barclay Damon, LLP Attorneys for Defendants Park Hill Lane Associates and PHLA, LLC (Michael Murphy and Brienna Christiano of counsel)
Denise A. Hartman, Acting Justice of the Supreme Court
These consolidated cases arise from a motorcycle-pedestrian collision at an apartment complex owned by defendant Park Hill Lane Associates and PHLA, LLC and leased by defendant Park Hill Lane Associates (collectively, Park Hill defendants or defendants). Plaintiff Vishnu Vardhan Chinni, and his wife Ashwini Kalagotla, derivatively, sued defendants and motorcycle driver Christopher H. Mendez for injuries sustained in the collision. Nleveditha Raj Gudar, individually and as administrator of the Estate of Reghava Enumadi, sued the same defendants in a separate wrongful death/personal injuries action. The actions were consolidated by so-ordered stipulation dated November 23, 2021.
Discovery is now complete. Defendant Mendez has tendered the limit of his automobile insurance policy. The Park Hill defendants now move for summary judgment dismissing the complaints as against them. For the reasons that follow, the Park Hill defendants' motion is denied.
Background
The Pine Hills Apartment Complex (the complex) has 583 rental units. It consists of two main groupings of apartment buildings. The northern grouping borders Wards Lane, a public roadway, which runs east-west in the Village of Menands. The second grouping lies to the south of the northern grouping (hereinafter the southern grouping).
Two private roadways provide access from the complex to Wards Lane. The first, Park Lane East, runs north-south on the eastern side of both and provides access to and from both the northern and southern apartment groupings in the complex. The second, Park Lane West runs north-south on the western side of the northern part of the complex. Situated in between the northern and southern groupings is a connecting roadway between Park Lane East and Park Lane West and a common area that includes a swimming pool.
At the time of the accident, both Park Lane West and Park Lane East were posted with 10-mile-per-hour speed limit signs facing the southbound traffic entering the complex from Wards Lane. Both access roads accommodated two-way traffic and neither had speed bumps. Park Lane West, where the collision occurred, was bordered on one side by a retaining wall. Designated parking spaces were situated on the side of the roadway opposite the retaining wall. And there are no pedestrian sidewalks along either side of Park Lane West. But a system of radial pedestrian walkways, including one that intersects with Wards Lane, ran through the interior, residential portion of the northern grouping between Park Lane East and Park Lane West. A pedestrian sidewalk runs along east-west along Ward Lane on the north side of the residential area.
In 2021, plaintiff Chinni and the decedent Enumadi (hereinafter plaintiffs) were lessors and residents of separate apartments in the complex. Mendez was also a resident of that apartment complex. Approximately two weeks before the collision, Mendez had purchased a Suzuki motorcycle, which he parked in a parking spot at the complex. Mendez registered the motorcycle with the state Department of Motor Vehicles, but, at the time of the collision, had not obtained a license to operate the motorcycle.
Chinni and Enumadi were frequent walking companions. On the evening of April 25, 2021, at about 6:00 p.m., they met near the swimming pool area south of Park Lane West, and turned left to walk along Park Lane West towards Wards Lane. As they walked north along Park Lane West, they faced the southbound traffic accessing the apartment complex from Wards Lane. Chinni testified at his deposition that it was his and Enumadi's habit to walk along Park Lane West to Wards Lane, turn left, and then walk along Wards Lane to the nearby Dutch Village Apartments.
That evening, with little or no experience, Mendez attempted to operate the motorcycle on the complex grounds. He had watched a few videos to get basic instruction on how to operate it. He testified that he walked the motorcycle to an open parking area around the corner from his apartment. He turned it on and operated it for a couple minutes. He then drove it toward Park Lane West, turned left, and headed toward Wards Lane. He testified that he was driving between 5 and 15 miles per hour-he never left first gear-when he saw two pedestrians walking side by side in the middle of Park Lane West. They were traveling in the same direction, that is, northbound toward Wards Lane. When Mendez was about 100 feet behind the pedestrians, the motorcycle's front wheel popped up, causing him to panic and increase his speed. He did not know how to put on the brakes. Mendez veered toward the retaining wall, crashed into it, and was ejected from the motorcycle. The motorcycle continued on, ricocheted off the wall, and struck the two pedestrians.
The pedestrians were about 300 feet south of Wards Lane when the collision occurred. Chinni testified at his deposition that he heard a "big sound" that sounded like a motorcycle but did not see the motorcycle before the collision; his next memory was waking up at the hospital. Enumadi was also transported to the hospital with a serious head injury; he died several days later.
Mendez was ticketed for reckless driving, unreasonable speed, and operating the motorcycle with an out-of-class license. He pleaded guilty to reckless driving.
Analysis
"The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case" (McEleney v Riverview Assets, LLC, 201 A.D.3d 1159, 1160 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Thomas v Albany Hous. Auth., 216 A.D.3d 1381, 1381 [3d Dept 2023]). "If the movant makes such a showing, thereby satisfying this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate that a triable issue of fact exists. Upon such a motion, the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party" (Vickers v Parcells, 198 A.D.3d 1160, 1161 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Thomas v Albany Hous. Auth., 216 A.D.3d at 1381).
Duty and Breach
A property owner has a duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition (see Thomas v Albany Hous. Auth., 216 A.D.3d at 1381-1382; Greblewski v Strong Health MCO, LLC, 161 A.D.3d 1336, 1336 [3d Dept 2018]; Hendricks v Lee's Family, 301 A.D.2d 1013, 1013 [3d Dept 2003]). Liability may be imposed for any foreseeable injuries arising from an unsafe or dangerous condition (Vazquez v City of New York, 192 A.D.2d 522, 524 [2d Dept 1993], lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 661 [1993]). For a landowner to be liable for a defective condition upon its property, "it must be established that a defective condition existed and that the landowner affirmatively created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of its existence" (Streit v Katrine Apts. Assoc., Inc., 212 A.D.3d 957, 959 [3d Dept 2023], quoting Sloan v 216 Bedford Kings Corp., 208 A.D.3d 1192, 1194 [2d Dept 2022]; see Vickers v Parcells, 198 A.D.3d at 1162).
Defendants proffered the affidavit of licensed professional engineer Dr. Timothy McClure, Ph.D., PE. He reviewed the pleadings, discovery demands and responses, and deposition transcripts and exhibits. He visited the Pine Hills Apartment complex and inspected the location where the collision occurred. And he prepared a written report, which he annexed to his affidavit. McClure opined that (1) defendant Mendez's failure to adequately operate the Suzuki motorcycle was the sole cause of the collision; (2) defendants were not negligent in the design of Park Hill Lane Apartments, including Park Lane West; and (3) the design of Park Hill Lane Apartments did not cause the collision.
In expressing his opinion that defendants were not negligent, McClure opined that Park Lane West met Village of Menands and New York State roadway design standards for public roadways, with its 10-mile-per-hour speed limit, 206 feet of stopping sight distance, and less than a 4% grade-though observed that such standards did not apply to private roadways like Park Lane West. He noted that the designated adjacent parking along Park Lane West did not impinge on the width of the roadway's travel lanes, and that the operator of a properly controlled vehicle would have had adequate roadway width the pass the pedestrians or slow/stop if necessary to avoid any such pedestrians. McClure also pointed out that the defendants provided for pedestrian access to Wards Lane through a series of pedestrian walkways running through the interior of the northern grouping of apartment buildings between Park Lane East and Park Lane West.
The issue reduces to whether defendants have demonstrated that a reasonable jury could not find that defendants were negligent in failing to guard against pedestrian-vehicular accidents on the relatively narrow Park Lane West access road. Given the foreseeability of pedestrians on the access road, sharing it with vehicles that may or may not be not be safely operated, and where the roadway's width was constrained by the retaining wall on one side and a parking area on the other, defendants' expert's opinion arguably does not suffice to meet their prima facie burden of demonstrating that the design and conditions of Park Lane West were reasonably safe as a matter of law.
But even assuming defendants' have met their burden of establishing prima facie that there was no breach of duty to design and maintain a safe pedestrian/vehicular traffic plan, plaintiffs have raised a question of fact on the issue. Plaintiffs proffered their own expert affidavit. Ernest J. Gailor, PE, a forensic consultant and engineer designer, who expressed that defendants negligently designed, constructed, and maintained the property with several dangerous and defective conditions. In particular, Gailor opined that the narrow width of Park Lane West and absence of sidewalks on either side of the shared roadway violated the policies of the Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials and "deviated from acceptable engineering principles." His opinion rests on the foreseeable amount of pedestrian traffic given the size of the apartment complex, the proximity to Wards Lane, plaintiff's testimony that he and his walking companion regularly walked along Park Lane West to access Wards Lane, and the other evidence submitted on the summary judgment motion. Defendants' argument that Gailor did not quantify pedestrian use of Park Lane West, did not cite specific design standards that were allegedly violated, and did not account for alternative pedestrian walkways elsewhere on the property goes to the weight a jury may give to such opinion; it does not require the Court to disregard it. Plaintiffs' opposition renders this a classic case of competing experts disagreeing on whether defendants breached their duty to provide a reasonably safe pedestrian accesses to Wards Lane-a credibility determination appropriate for the finder of fact (see Marra v Zaichenko, 214 A.D.3d 1165, 1168 [3d Dept 2023]; O'Keefe v Wohl, 184 A.D.3d 1046, 1048 [3d Dept 2020]).
Proximate Cause
In addition to the elements of duty and breach of duty, a plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the alleged injury." 'A defendant's negligence qualifies as a proximate cause where it is a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury'" (Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth., 39 N.Y.3d 443, 453 [2023], quoting Turturro v City of New York, 28 N.Y.3d 469, 483 [2016]). There" 'may be more than one proximate cause of an injury'" (Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth., 39 N.Y.3d at 454, quoting Turturro v City of New York, 28 N.Y.3d at 483-484). And" '[w]hen faced with a motion for summary judgment on proximate cause grounds, a plaintiff need not prove proximate cause by a preponderance of the evidence, which is plaintiff's burden at trial. Instead, in order to withstand summary judgment, a plaintiff need only raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether defendant's conduct proximately caused plaintiff's injuries'" (Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth., 39 N.Y.3d at 453, quoting Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 544, 550 [1998]).
As to their contention that Park Lane West's design or condition was not a proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries, defendants' papers again arguably fall short of meeting their summary judgment burden. Defendants' argument here rests on McClure's statement that there is no proof that more speed limit signs or speed bumps would have changed the course of the accident or the walking positions of plaintiffs where the evidence shows that Mendez was not operating the motorcycle at excess speed but lost control of it when its wheel came off the ground and, after he fell off, it continued into the retaining wall and collided plaintiffs-pedestrians. McClure added that there is no proof that a wider roadway or different design would have changed the course of the accident. But plaintiffs' expert expresses an opinion to the contrary. In Gailor's opinion, the design and condition of the roadway-with its lack of sidewalks and width of 17 to 19 feet being too narrow to accommodate two-lane vehicular traffic and pedestrian traffic at the same time-was a substantial contributing cause of the accident.
Like the issue of duty and breach, the issue of proximate cause involves competing expert opinions. The Court concludes that this issue is better left for a jury. Plaintiffs have raised a question of fact, for example as to whether the existence of sidewalk on either side Park Lane West, and/or limiting the roadway to one-lane traffic could have prevented plaintiffs from being injured in this vehicular accident even from an out-of-control motorcycle. Thus, whether the design or condition of the Park Lane West was a but-for substantial cause of the accident precludes summary judgment.
And defendants' assertion that Mendez's negligent conduct intervened as a superseding cause is rejected. "[W]hen the issue of proximate cause involves an intervening act, 'liability turns on whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence'" (Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth., 39 N.Y.3d at 455, quoting Hain v Jamison, 28 N.Y.3d 524, 529 [2016]). It is "well settled that where the acts of a third person intervene between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, the causal connection is not automatically severed" (Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth., 39 N.Y.3d at 454-455 [internal quotation marks, ellipsis and citation omitted]). "It is only where the intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant's conduct, that it may possibly break the causal nexus" (id. at 455 [internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted]). Still,"' [a]n intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause, and relieve an actor of responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent'" (id., quoting Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 316 [1980]).
Yet again defendants' proof does not meet summary judgment's demanding prima facie evidentiary burden. Mendez's violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was not so egregious to have broken any causal chain a superseding cause of plaintiffs' injuries. And defendants' evidence fails to address the foreseeability of a motorist like Mendez losing control of a vehicle and colliding with pedestrians in a narrow, shared private roadway. As with a great many proximate cause questions, the foreseeability of an intervening act is rarely answerable without trial.
Conclusion
Because defendants have not established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaints against them, their motion for summary judgment is denied.
Accordingly, it is
Ordered that the motion is denied.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court, the original of which is being uploaded to NYSCEF for electronic entry by the Albany County Clerk. Upon such entry, counsel for plaintiffs shall promptly serve notice of entry on all other parties entitled to such notice.