Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. N081058
Siggins, J.
Deputy Sheriff Daryl L. Chilimidos appeals from the trial court’s refusal to vacate a contractual arbitration award that rejected his grievance appeal of a disciplinary reduction in pay. Chilimidos contends the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the applicable collective bargaining memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Contra Costa County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association and the County of Contra Costa. We conclude that Chilimidos’s petition alleged, at most, an error of law that was not reviewable by the court. (See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 12.) We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
While he was on duty as a patrol officer, Chilimidos arrested a female pedestrian and performed a cursory search before he transported her to a detention facility. When she got there another deputy searched and booked the arrestee, and found a small plastic bag that contained methamphetamine in the back pocket of her pants. Chilimidos prepared an initial report and a probable cause declaration that stated he found the methamphetamine. Two days later, Chilimidos submitted a supplemental report that stated the methamphetamine was found by the booking deputy. Chilimidos was interviewed as part of an internal investigation that was conducted regarding the inconsistencies between his two reports. The investigation resulted in a determination that Chilimidos had violated departmental regulations regarding report writing and unbecoming conduct, and Sheriff Rupf concluded the appropriate penalty was to reduce Chilimidos’s pay by 5 percent for six months.
A third allegation, regarding the filing of a false report, was not sustained. Sheriff Rupf later testified “that if [Chilimidos] had not written his supplemental report (which corrected the deficiency in the original report), termination would have been considered.”
Chilimidos received a notice of proposed action (a “Skelly” notice) that was signed by George Lawrence, who was then undersheriff, on a signature line designated for the “Appointing Authority.” The notice stated that the Contra Costa Sheriff’s Department (the Department) proposed to reduce Chilimidos’s compensation by 5 percent for six months, and charged: “There is a discrepancy between your sworn declaration and report on the one hand and your supplemental report on the other. Your failure to initially provide an accurate declaration and report is a discredit to this Office and jeopardized the prosecution of your arrestee.” It was alleged that Chilimidos’s conduct violated the Department’s policies on unbecoming conduct and the writing of crime reports, and was cause for disciplinary action under the MOU. Following a Skelly hearing, Chilimidos received an order and notice of action that reduced his compensation and was signed by Undersheriff Lawrence on a signature line designated for the “Department Head.” The Contra Costa County Sheriffs’ Association grieved the discipline on behalf of Chilimidos, and the matter was arbitrated.
“Skelly” refers to the procedures required by Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, in personnel proceedings brought against public employees who have a cognizable property interest in their continued employment.
The arbitrator issued his opinion and award following a hearing and the parties’ submission of posthearing briefs. The arbitrator’s written decision reviewed the factual history of the arrest, Chilimidos’s writing of reports, and the internal investigation of the incident by Sergeant Dave Clark, who recommended that allegations of unbecoming conduct and deficient report writing be sustained against Chilimidos. The arbitrator continued: “Clark’s report did not recommend any level of discipline. The disciplinary decision was made through the Department’s established process known as a ‘Round Table.’ Sheriff Warren Rupf presided over the Round Table meeting, at which others in [Chilimidos’s] chain-of-command were present. Sergeant Clark also attended the meeting, but he did not participate in the decision to impose discipline. Based on the discussions at the Round Table, Sheriff Rupf concluded... that a five per cent pay reduction for a six month period of time was the appropriate penalty in this matter. The Sheriff emphasized the absolute necessity of writing accurate reports in a law enforcement context and testified that he concluded that [Chilimidos] breached this responsibility with respect to his conduct herein.”
The arbitrator also noted that “the Sheriff testified, without contradiction, that there are occasions when he is out of the office and not available to sign documents, and that in such short-term absences he implicitly delegates this ministerial authority to the Undersheriff. Sheriff Rupf further testified that he explicitly delegated this signing authority in this particular disciplinary case.”
The arbitrator stated: “While it would have been preferable and more compliant with the authority solely vested with the Sheriff for Sheriff Rupf to have signed the two documents in question, the Arbitrator is not persuaded that this deficiency invalidates the disciplinary action imposed here. There is no dispute that the ‘appointing authority,’ Sheriff Rupf, was, in fact, the final decision-maker with regard to this disciplinary action; accordingly, [Chilimidos] received the substantive benefit of the requirement that the disciplinary decision was to be made by the ‘appointing authority.’ The fact that another official signed the document, on Sheriff Rupf’s behalf, does not change that material fact.” The arbitrator “concluded that the discipline herein should not be reversed due to Lawrence’s ministerial signing of the two notice documents reflecting the Sheriff’s decisions.” The arbitrator ultimately determined that the County of Contra Costa had just cause for the six-month reduction in pay imposed on Chilimidos, and denied the grievance.
In a footnote, the arbitrator noted the sheriff’s unrebutted testimony that the same issue arose in “at least one prior arbitration” where “the Department’s position was sustained....”
Chilimidos petitioned to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. His petition was denied by the trial court for two independent reasons: “1. First, [Chilimidos] submitted to the arbitrator for decision the issue of whether the subject disciplinary notice was invalid. [Chilimidos] thereby waived the right to contend that the arbitrator lacked authority to decide this issue. [Citation.] [¶] 2. Second, arbitrators do not exceed their powers by making an error of fact or law. [Citation.] The petition in the case at bar raised, at best, only an error in the arbitrator’s application of those terms to a specific fact pattern.” Chilimidos timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
“It is well settled that the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow.” (California Faculty Assn. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 935, 943.) An arbitrator’s decision is generally not reviewable for errors of fact or law, except as provided by Code of Civil Procedure sections 1286.2 and 1286.6. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 11-13, 28.) Chilimidos relies on section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), which provides for the vacation of such awards when “[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.” We review the issue de novo. (California Faculty Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 945.) Chilimidos contends the arbitrator “exceeded his authority under the MOU by effectively amending provisions of it in violation of established public policy to support his decision and that his award should have been ordered vacated by the Court below.” We disagree.
Section 23.1 of the MOU provides, in relevant part: “The appointing authority may dismiss, suspend, demote, or reduce within class, any employee for cause.” The MOU defines the appointing authority as the “Department Head unless otherwise provided by statute or ordinance.” Section 23.6(C) states that an employee may appeal a disciplinary order through the grievance procedure set forth in section 24 of the MOU, which includes provisions for arbitration. Section 24.1(A) provides that the decisions of “arbitrators on matters properly before them shall be final and binding on the parties hereto, to the extent permitted by law.” Section 24.1(C) states that “[p]roposals to add to or change this MOU... shall not be arbitrable,” and “[no] arbitrator shall have the power to amend or modify this MOU... or to establish any new terms or conditions of employment.”
Chilimidos contends that only Sheriff Rupf was authorized to impose the disciplinary action at issue in this case, and the sheriff had no authority to delegate that power to Undersheriff Lawrence. Chilimidos claims the arbitrator “effectively had to amend the MOU to permit the imposition of disciplinary action against [Chilimidos] by an official who lacked the authority, Undersheriff Lawrence, which exceeded the Arbitrator’s authority under the MOU.” But Chilimidos ignores the arbitrator’s finding that “There is no dispute that the ‘appointing authority,’ Sheriff Rupf, was, in fact, the final decision-maker with regard to this disciplinary action; accordingly, [Chilimidos] received the substantive benefit of the requirement that the disciplinary decision was to be made by the ‘appointing authority.’ The fact that another official signed the document, on Sheriff Rupf’s behalf, does not change that material fact.”
“Absent an express and unambiguous limitation in the contract or the submission to arbitration, an arbitrator has the authority to find the facts, interpret the contract, and award any relief rationally related to his or her factual findings and contractual interpretation.” (Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1179, 1182.) Chilimidos points to no provision in the MOU that prohibited Sheriff Rupf from delegating the ministerial authority to issue the disciplinary notices that were signed by the undersheriff. (Cf. Bonshire v. Thompson (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 803, 805-806 [“when the arbitration clause of a contract specifically prohibits the arbitrator from considering extrinsic evidence, the arbitrator acts in excess of his or her powers in receiving such evidence, over objection, and using it as a basis for the ensuing award”].)
In fact, the MOU contemplates that ministerial duties such as giving notice may be performed by someone other than the appointing authority. Section 23.2 states that the appointing authority “shall cause” a notice of proposed action to be served on an employee. Allowing an undersheriff to sign disciplinary notices does not appear to entail a prohibited delegation of the exercise of judgment or discretion, and is generally in keeping with the powers and duties customarily vested in deputies of public officers. (Compare Civil Service Assn. v. Redevelopment Agency (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1225 with Gov. Code, §§ 7, 1194.) At most, the error Chilimidos alleges in the arbitrator’s interpretation of the MOU was an error of law that is not properly subject to judicial review. (See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 11-13, 28; see also Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd., supra, at p. 1186 [arbitrator did not exceed his powers “by failing to adopt a particular interpretation of the agreement”].)
Chilimidos also suggests the arbitrator’s award should be vacated because it violates “the public policy of legislative oversight of public employee contracts.” But the case he relies upon is distinguishable. (See Department of Personnel Administration v. California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1193.) In that case, the court determined the arbitrator exceeded her powers when she reformed the terms of a MOU in a manner that explicitly altered provisions ratified and approved by the Legislature, and removed a 10,000-hour cap on a particular type of paid leave for employees. (Id. at pp. 1195, 1196-1199.) No analogous reformation of the MOU occurred here.Moreover, our Supreme Court has cautioned that “Absent a clear expression of illegality or public policy undermining [the] strong [legislative] presumption in favor of private arbitration, an arbitral award should ordinarily stand immune from judicial scrutiny.” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 32.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Pollak, Acting P.J., Jenkins, J.