[Citing numerous cases.]" See, also, Child v. Washed Sand Gravel Co., 181 Minn. 559 [ 233 N.W. 586, 587]. This construction of the word maintain as used in section 7, article VII of the trust indenture appears to be in accord with appellant's own views for on page three of their brief, they say:
As used in section 134 1/2 the phrase "all necessary materials and supplies" clearly relates to the acquisition of such items as are necessary for the operation and maintenance of existing equipment; nor can "materials and supplies" be reasonably construed to imply new equipment or a complete substitution of existing equipment. The phrase in section 134 1/2 "and, generally, to exercise all requisite and necessary authority to manage and direct the operation and maintenance of such road" means the right to conduct, to engage in, to act authoritatively in the business of such transportation ( State v. Thomason, 276 N.W. 619, 620), to continue that which is in existence ( Child v. Washed Sand Gravel Co., 181 Minn. 559; 233 N.W. 586, 587; maintenance connotes the acquisition of items necessary to the repair and preservation of an existing structure and incidental to the carrying on of the service. ( State ex rel. Kings County v. Murrow, 199 Wn. 685; 93 P. [2d] 304, 308.)
He discussed the meaning of the word "maintain" as used in the statute and was of the opinion that the Congress intended that cases brought under the statute should not be removed from the state to the federal court. The citations of Judge Otis with reference to the word "maintain" are approved and the following additional interpretations may be noted: In Vol. 26 Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., p. 57, the general meaning of the words "to maintain" signifies a continuance of existence. It was so held in Child v. Washed Sand Gravel Co., 181 Minn. 559, 233 N.W. 586, 587. In like manner, in a Nevada case, the word "maintained" as used in the statute was defined as comprehending the institution as well as the support of the action.
3. Although the present ex parte order is nonappealable, past decisions of this court manifest that an appeal would lie from an order adjudging appellant in contempt of court and sentencing its officers for refusal to comply with terms of the ex parte order. Paulson v. Johnson, 214 Minn. 202, 7 N.W.2d 338; Child v. Washed Sand Gravel Co. 181 Minn. 561, 233 N.W. 586; Menage v. Lustfield, 30 Minn. 487, 16 N.W. 398. Accordingly, to avoid multiplicity we will discuss the contention that the affidavit upon which the ex parte order here was based was inadequate for its support under § 575.07. 4. First it must be noted that the trial court's examination of the affidavit and the undisputed facts satisfied it that the requirements of § 575.07 had been met. This section requires merely that to support an order under § 575.07 the affidavit prove to the satisfaction of the trial judge (and not this court) that the third party have "property of the judgment debtor at the time" or be indebted to him in excess of $10. It seems clear under this provision that only where there has been an extreme disregard for this requirement should this court substitute its ideas as to what constitutes such satisfaction for those of the trial judge in this respect.
The King v. Council of the Metropolitan Borough of Poplar, 1 K.B. 72. See also Hayes v. Brockton, 313 Mass. 641, 651; Morton v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 496; Scranton v. Peoples Coal Co. 274 Penn. St. 63; Child v. Washed Sand Gravel Co. 181 Minn. 559; Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370; S.C. 135 F.2d 54; New York Central Railroad v. Conlin Buss Lines, Inc. 258 Mass. 498. It is not at all clear that compliance with the decree, to say nothing of penalties, could be escaped as suggested in the brief for the defendants by having the officers "resign from office before they could be held in contempt."
Further, it was found that the said cross-complaints were and ark wilfully false, sham, and fraudulent and known by defendants to be such; that neither the plaintiffs here nor either of them ever entered into any conspiracy with the other parties attempted to be joined as defendants in the cross-complaint as alleged therein; that the expense of a trial of the case in Texas would be so prohibitive as to mulct the estate of a large part of the value of the security; that there are (certain recited) material differences between the law of Texas and the law of Minnesota affecting the rights and duties of the parties hereto which would of necessity be to the detriment and damage of said plaintiffs if the cause were tried in Texas and that it was the purpose of the defendants to evade the law of Minnesota giving the interpretation of the rights of the parties. Case No. 28,234 was before this court as No. 28,161 and is reported in Child v. Washed Sand Gravel Co. 181 Minn. 559, 233 N.W. 586. That decision involved an appeal by Mr. Henry from an order finding him guilty of contempt of court and directing that he be committed to jail until he purge himself of such contempt. The contempt proceedings resulted from the refusal and neglect of defendant Henry (who was the sole surviving officer — president — and the principal stockholder in the Washed Sand Gravel Company) to comply with the permanent writ of injunction commanding the defendant therein to refrain from bringing, prosecuting, supporting, or maintaining any claim, suit, or action at law or in equity, whether in the form of an independent action or as a cross-complaint, complaint of reconvention, or counterclaim, or in any other form for (full recital of purposes) in the district court of Wharton county, and to file or cause to be filed written dismissals of such cross-actions.
Finally, appellants argue that the trial court erred in forfeiting the bail of a person who was not "the judgment debtor," the person individually liable on the judgment. But as a corporate agent, there is no question that Sabri was a person who could be required to answer for Omar Investments and SAFA. Child v. Washed Sand Gravel Co., 181 Minn. 559, 562, 233 N.W. 586, 587 (1930) (finding corporate agent may be punished for contempt for failure to appropriately respond to judicial order to corporation). As such, Sabri's bail deposit was subject to the powers of the court provided by Minn. Stat. § 550.011. There is no requirement that the court first make a determination that the bail deposit was a corporate asset.