Opinion
C. A. 6:23-cv-04194-JFA-KFM
11-14-2023
Darrine Chieves, Plaintiff, v. Columbia Municipal Court Area Mental Health, Michael Delco, Elizabeth Hutto, Byron Roberts, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff, a civilly committed individual, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on August 22, 2023 (doc. 1). By order filed September 13, 2023, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening, including submission of an amended complaint (doc. 5). The plaintiff complied with the court's order, bringing his case into proper form and submitted an amended complaint on September 25, 2023 (doc. 7). Nevertheless, upon review, the plaintiff's amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff alleges that the State of South Carolina unnecessarily segregates individuals suffering from mental health impairments into adult care homes (doc. 7. at 4, 5). The plaintiff contends that his rights are being violated by the Richland County Probate Court and the Columbia Municipal Court Area Mental Health (“CMCAMH”) because he is being wrongfully institutionalized (id.). He further contends that being institutionalized constitutes housing discrimination (id.). He also contends that he was wrongfully arrested for trespassing (id. at 5).
The plaintiff's injuries include being attacked by other inmates while a pretrial detainee at the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center (id. at 6). For relief, the plaintiff seeks an order that he be reexamined as well as money damages (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants. For the reasons that follow, this action is subject to summary dismissal. As an initial matter, this case is substantially similar to another filed by the plaintiff in this court alleging similar constitutional violations. Chieves v. State of S.C. Richland Probate Ct. Commitment Div., C/A No. 6:23-cv-04195-JFA (D.S.C.). In that case, on October 30, 2023, the undersigned issued a report and recommendation recommending that the action be dismissed for multiple reasons. Id. at doc. 15. As such, in addition to the foregoing, the instant matter is also subject to dismissal as duplicative of the plaintiff's prior case at Case Number 6:23-cv-04195-JFA.
CMCAMH Not a Person under § 1983
One of the defendants in this action - CMCAMH - is subject to summary dismissal because it is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law; thus, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” Inanimate objects or groups of people, such as departments, buildings, facilities, and grounds cannot act under color of state law. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”); Rhodes v. Seventh Circuit Solicitors Ofc., C/A No. 9:09-cv-1863-JFA-BM, 2009 WL 2588487, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2009) (county public defender office and county solicitor office not persons subject to suit under § 1983). Here, the CMCAMH is not a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, it is entitled to summary dismissal.
No Personal Allegations
Although the individual defendants in this action, Mr. Delco, Ms. Hutto, and Mr. Roberts, are persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they are still subject to summary dismissal. These defendants do not appear in the plaintiff's amended complaint beyond the caption and being named as defendants (see doc. 7). Indeed, although these defendants' names appear in passing in documents attached to the plaintiff's amended complaint, it is unclear in what capacity these defendants were involved in the plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivations. Although the plaintiff's allegations must be liberally construed, the plaintiff must provide more than general and conclusory statements to allege a plausible claim for relief. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that liability under § 1983 “requires personal involvement”). Moreover, as recently reiterated by the Fourth Circuit, general, conclusory, and collective allegations against groups of defendants fail to allege a plausible claim. See Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 125 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2023) (recognizing that the plaintiff's complaint failed to meet the plausibility standard when it did not set forth who the defendants were beyond being employees where he was incarcerated or in what capacity the defendants interacted with the plaintiff). As such, the amended complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted against these defendants and they are entitled to summary dismissal.
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
To the extent the plaintiff's amended complaint could be construed as challenging commitment orders from the Richland County Probate Court or orders relating to a trespassing charge by the Columbia Municipal Court, this action is also subject to dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional and may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies . . . when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself.” Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006). As noted above, here, the plaintiff alleges that he is improperly held in a treatment facility and that he was wrongfully arrested for trespassing, claims that appear to request that orders entered in South Carolina state court proceedings be invalidated (doc. 7 at 4, 5, 6). It is well-settled, however, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction even when a challenge to state court decisions or rulings concerns federal constitutional issues; instead, only the United States Supreme Court may review those state-court decisions. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476-82 (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can be conducted only by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Davani, 434 F.3d at 719 (explaining how the expansive interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was limited by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)); see also Dukes v. Stone, C/A No. 3:08-cv-505-PMD-JRM, 2009 WL 398079, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2009) (explaining that only the United States Supreme Court is empowered with appellate authority to reverse or modify a state court judgment).
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine gets its name from two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court finding that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments where the district court is requested to review and reject those judgments. See Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
The doctrine applies even if the state court litigation has not reached a state's highest court. See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 892-93 & nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (providing that a federal court must accord full faith and credit to a state court judgment); Robart Wood & Wire Prods. Corp. v. Namaco Indus., 797 F.2d 176, 178 (4th Cir. 1986). As such, because the plaintiff's amended complaint appears to seek an order from this court vacating orders entered in South Carolina state courts concerning his civil commitment and involving a trespassing charge, the instant action is subject to summary dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Frivolous
In addition to the foregoing, the plaintiff's amended complaint is also subject to summary dismissal because it is frivolous. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, the court is to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Here, the plaintiff's vague allegations, as outlined above, do not raise a cognizable federal claim. It is well-settled that the court has the authority to dismiss claims that are obviously “fantastic” or “delusional.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994); Raiford v. FBI, C/A No. 1:10-cv-2751-MBS-JRM, 2010 WL 6737887, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 2020729 (D.S.C. May 23, 2011) (explaining a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”). In reviewing a complaint for frivolousness or malice, the court looks to see whether the complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Harley v. United States, 349 F.Supp.2d 980, 981 (M.D. N.C. 2004) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)). The Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review the complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
Here, even reviewing it in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's amended complaint is comprised of factual allegations that are not credible, and which fail to state a claim for relief. For example, the plaintiff's conclusory claims that the defendants are responsible for injuries he sustained while at the Detention Center (when he was attacked by other detainees) is clearly frivolous, and fails to show any arguable basis in fact or law. See Neal v. Duke Energy, No. 6:11-cv-1420-HFF-KFM, 2011 WL 5083181, at *4 (D.S.C. June 30, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5082193 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2011) (dismissing action upon finding plaintiff's factual allegations were frivolous, fanciful, and delusional where plaintiff claimed defendants clandestinely placed a GPS device in her car while it was in the shop for repairs and that she was being stalked by the defendants, noting the allegations were “made without any viable factual supporting allegations and appears to be the product of paranoid fantasy”); Feurtado v. McNair, No. 3:05-cv-1933-SB, 2006 WL 1663792, at *2 (D.S.C. Jun. 15, 2006) (noting that frivolousness encompasses inarguable legal conclusions and fanciful factual allegations), aff'd, 227 Fed.Appx. 303 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. dismissed, 553 U.S. 1029 (2008). Further, the plaintiff's assertions that his continued inpatient mental health treatment is housing discrimination is likewise frivolous as it is based on a meritless legal theory. As such, in light of the foregoing, the undersigned also recommends that this action also be dismissed as frivolous.
Litigation History
Of note, the plaintiff in this matter is a prolific pro se filer who has been previously subject to the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because of his frivolous and abusive filing practices. See Chieves v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, et al., C/A No. 6:01-cv-00379-JFA, at docs. 4; 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2001) (recognizing that the plaintiff was subject to the three strikes provision of § 1915(g)). As set forth in Exhibit A, the plaintiff has filed more than 16 cases that were dismissed as frivolous. See infra Exhibit A. Although the plaintiff is currently not barred by the three strikes division of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because he is not a prisoner, he is warned for a second time that federal courts may issue prefiling restrictions when vexatious conduct hinders the court from fulfilling its constitutional duty. Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004) (published). This “drastic remedy must be used sparingly” to ensure “constitutional guarantees of due process of law and access to the courts.” Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff is specifically warned that continuing to file vexatious, frivolous, or duplicative lawsuits may result in the imposition of prefiling restrictions.
The plaintiff was similarly warned in the report and recommendation issued in Chieves v. State of S.C. Richland Probate Ct. Commitment Div., C/A No. 6:23-cv-04195-JFA, at doc. 15 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2023).
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the amended complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). It is further recommended that the United States District Judge assigned to this case warn the plaintiff regarding the entry of sanctions (including prefiling restrictions) in the future should the plaintiff continue to file such cases in this court. The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the last page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
EXHIBIT A
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
Chieves v. William S. Hall Psychiatric Inst., et al., C/A No. 6:99-cv-03853-JFA, at doc. 8 (D.S.C. Mar. 10, 2000) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2))
Chieves v. William S. Hall Psychiatric Inst., et al., C/A No. 6:99-cv-03867-JFA, at doc. 8 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2))
Chieves v. William S. Hall Psychiatric Inst., et al., C/A No. 6:99-cv-03939-JFA-WMC, at doc. 4 (D.S.C. Mar. 10, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
Chieves v. Richland Cnty. Pub. Def., et al., C/A No. 6:99-cv-03941-JFA-WMC, at doc. 4 (D.S.C. Mar. 10, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
Chieves v. Richland Cnty. Solic. Off., et al., C/A No. 6:99-cv-03943-JFA, at doc. 6 (D.S.C. Jan. 14, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2))
Chieves v. S.C. Dep't of Vocational Rehab., et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00123-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Apr. 18, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A)
Chieves v. Lindenwold Fine Jewelers, et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00141-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2000) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim)
Chieves v. Lindenwold Fine Jewelers, et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00143-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2000) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim)
Chieves v. Lindenwold Fine Jewelers, et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00145-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2000) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim)
Chieves v. Lindenwold Fine Jewelers, et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00147-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2000) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim)
Chieves v. Lindenwold Fine Jewelers, et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00149-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2000) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim)
Chieves v. Lindenwold Fine Jewelers, et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00151-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2000) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim)
Chieves v. Lindenwold Fine Jewelers, et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00153-JFA-WMC, at doc. 4 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2000) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim)
Chieves v. Draper, C/A No. 3:00-cv-00439-JFA, at doc. 7 (D.S.C. May 25, 2000) (dismissing civil action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2))
Chieves v. U.S. Solic. for 5th Cir. Ct., et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00441-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) "
Chieves v. Sneed, C/A No. 3:00-cv-00443-JFA, at doc. 6 (D.S.C. May 26, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2))
Chieves v. City of Columbia Police Dep't, et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00445-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2))
Chieves v. U.S. Chief Admin. Solic., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00447-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2))
Chieves v. Haynes, C/A No. 3:00-cv-00449-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2))
Chieves v. City of Columbia Police Dep't, et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00451-JFA, at doc. 4 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2))
Chieves v. Barber, C/A No. 3:00-cv-00453-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2))
Chieves v. City of Columbia Police Dep't, et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00455-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2))
Chieves v. City of Columbia Police Dep't, et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-00457-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 17, 2000) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2))
Chieves v. Crawford, et al., C/A No. 6:00-cv-00459-JFA, at doc. 14 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 2000) (dismissing habeas action for failure to exhaust)
Chieves v. U.S. Pub. Def., et al., C/A No. 3:00-cv-01410-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 2020) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim)
Chieves v. William S. Hall Psychiatric Inst., et al., C/A No. 6:00-cv-01885-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2000) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim)
Chieves v. State of S.C., et al., C/A No. 6:00-cv-03100-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Jan. 11, 2001) (dismissing civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2))
Chieves v. Giese, C/A No. 6:00-cv-03465-JFA, at doc. 4 (D.S.C. Jan. 11,2001) (dismissing mandamus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) and as frivolous)
Chieves v. Richland Cnty. Pub. Def. Off., et al., C/A No. 6:00-cv-03875-JFA, at doc. 4 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2001) (dismissing habeas action)
Chieves v. Richland Cnty. Pub. Def., et al., C/A No. 6:01-cv-00083-JFA, at doc. 4 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2001) (dismissing habeas action)
Chieves v. William S. Hall Psychiatric Inst., et al., C/A No. 6:01-cv-00378-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2001) (dismissing civil action based on three strikes rule)
Chieves v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, et al., C/A No. 6:01-cv-00379-JFA, at doc. 5 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2001) (dismissing civil action based on three strikes rule)
Chieves v. Crawford, et al., C/A No. 6:01-cv-00614-JFA, at doc. 4 (D.S.C. Apr. 6, 2001) (dismissing habeas action for failure to exhaust)
Chieves v. S.C. Solic., C/A No. 6:03-cv-02055-JFA, at doc. 7 (D.S.C. July 31, 2003) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii))
Chieves v. Howell, et al., C/A No. 6:03-cv-02486-JFA, at doc. 4 (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 2003) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim)
Chieves v. Gintonli, C/A No. 3:04-cv-22104-JFA, at doc. 6 (D.S.C. Nov. 5, 2004) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim)
Chieves v. S.C. State House, et al., C/A No. 3:12-cv-00241-JFA, at doc. 17 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2012) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim and frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii))
Chieves v. Police Dep't, C/A No. 3:13-cv-00333-JFA, at doc. 10 (D.S.C. Apr. 9, 2013) (dismissing civil action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
Chieves v. U.S. Dist. Ct., et al., C/A No. 3:13-cv-01152-JFA, at doc. 27 (D.S.C. July 17, 2013) (dismissing civil action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
Chieves v. FBI, et al., C/A No. 3:14-cv-02221-JFA, at doc. 11 (D.S.C. July 14, 2014) (dismissing civil action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
Chieves v. Belton, et al., C/A No. 3:14-cv-03683-JFA, at doc. 10 (D.S.C. Oct. 21, 2014) (dismissing civil action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
Chieves v. Kristion, et al., C/A No. 3:14-cv-03684-JFA, at doc. 10 (D.S.C. Oct. 21, 2014) (dismissing civil action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
Chieves v. State of S.C., et al., C/A No. 6:17-cv-01717-JFA, at doc. 11 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 2017) (dismissing civil action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
Chieves v. State of New York, et al., C/A No. 3:21-cv-02242-JFA, 2021 WL 4754575 (D.S.C. Oct. 12, 2021) (dismissing civil action for failure to state a claim and frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)(1))
Chieves v. Columbia Mun. Ct. Area Mental Health, et al., C/A No. 6:23-cv-04194-JFA-KFM (D.S.C.) (pending)
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
Chieves v. Whitehall, et al., C/A No. 1:14-cv-03735-LAP, at doc. 4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2014) (dismissing civil action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
Chieves v. Greyhound Bus Station, C/A No. 3:08-cv-02294-L, 2009 WL 464237 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2009) (dismissing civil action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).