During each of the years in question, respondent Assessor for the Town of Corinth consistently treated petitioner as the owner of the property by notifying petitioner that it was required to make tax payments and, indeed, collecting taxes from petitioner. Under these circumstances, respondents are estopped from now claiming that petitioner was not the owner entitled to file a grievance complaint and therefore lacks standing to sue (see Chicago Tit. Ins. Co. v Mazula, 38 A.D.3d 1114, 1116 [2007]). The inconsistency in respondents' current position is further highlighted by the fact that, if the property had still been owned by the IDA as respondents claim, then it would have been tax exempt (see RPTL § 412-a; General Municipal Law § 874 [1]).
During each of the years in question, respondent Assessor for the Town of Corinth consistently treated petitioner as the owner of the property by notifying petitioner that it was required to make tax payments and, indeed, collecting taxes from petitioner. Under these circumstances, respondents are estopped from now claiming that petitioner was not the owner entitled to file a grievance complaint and therefore lacks standing to sue (seeChicago Tit. Ins. Co. v. Mazula, 38 A.D.3d 1114, 1116, 832 N.Y.S.2d 685 [2007] ). The inconsistency in respondents’ current position is further highlighted by the fact that, if the property had still been owned by the IDA as respondents claim, then it would have been tax exempt (see RPTL § 412–a ; General Municipal Law § 874[1] ).
Plaintiff alleges that she was injured when she fell to the floor because a chair she was attempting to sit in, in defendant's office, slid out from under her. As limited by its brief, defendant appeals only from Supreme Court's denial of its summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of the complaint. To successfully shift the burden of demonstrating a triable issue of fact to the nonmovant, a party seeking summary judgment must establish a prima facie entitlement to judgment, as a matter of law, by submitting competent evidence which eliminates any material issue of fact ( see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562; Manculich v Dependable Auto Sales Serv., Inc., 39 AD3d 1070, 1071; Chicago Tit. Ins. Co. v Mazula, 38 AD3d 1114, 1115). In this premises liability case, defendant was obligated to submit competent evidence to establish, as a matter of law, that it did not create the dangerous condition ( see Dong v Cazenovia Coll., 263 AD2d 606, 607), or that it did not have notice of such a condition ( see Grant v Radamar Meat, 294 AD2d 398, 398-399; McCombs v Related Mgt. Co., 290 AD2d 681, 681).
At most, East 77 cited the Third Department's decision in Chicago Title Ins. Co. v Mazula (38 A.D.3d 1114 [3d Dept 2007]). But Mazula was inapposite.
During each of the years in question, respondent Assessor for the Town of Corinth consistently treated petitioner as the owner of the property by notifying petitioner that it was required to make tax payments and, indeed, collecting taxes from petitioner. Under these circumstances, respondents are estopped from now claiming that petitioner was not the owner entitled to file a grievance complaint and therefore lacks standing to sue (see Chicago Tit. Ins. Co. v Mazula, 38 A.D.3d 1114, 1116 [2007]). The inconsistency in respondents' current position is further highlighted by the fact that, if the property had still been owned by the IDA as respondents claim, then it would have been tax exempt (see RPTL § 412-a; General Municipal Law § 874 [1]).
This court may take judicial notice of the documents in the file on the divorce action. ( See Rossbach v Rosenblum, 260 App Div 206, 210 [1st Dept 1940], affd 284 NY 745; Chicago Tit. Ins. Co. v Mazula, 38 AD3d 1114, 1115 [3d Dept 2007]; Matter of Department of Social Servs. v Cronin, 37 AD3d 463 [2d Dept 2007]; Matter of Khatibi v Weill, 8 AD3d 485, 485-486 [2d Dept 2004]; Schmidt v Magnetic Head Corp., 97 AD2d 151, 158 n 3 [2d Dept 1983].) Indeed, because the divorce action and this action are related, Justice Sunshine's findings might be deemed "law of the case."
This court may take judicial notice of the documents in the file on the divorce action. (See Rossbach v Rosenblum, 260 App Div 206, 210 [1st Dept 1940], affd 284 NY 745 [1940]; Chicago Tit. Ins. Co. v Mazula, 38 AD3d 1114, 1115 [3d Dept 2007]; Matter of Department of Social Servs. v Cronin, 37 AD3d 463 [2d Dept 2007]; Matter of Khatibi v Weill, 8 AD3d 485, 485-486 [2d Dept 2004]; Schmidt v Magnetic Head Corp., 97 AD2d 151, 158 n 3 [2d Dept 1983].) Indeed, because the divorce action and this action are related, Justice Sunshine's findings might be deemed "law of the case."