The Sixth Circuit has explained that “Rule 56 places an affirmative duty on the nonmovant to cite to ‘particular parts of materials in the record' to establish that a particular fact cannot be supported or is genuinely disputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir.2007).” Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 734 (6th Cir. 2011).

Here, if Plaintiff proved at trial that some ACH employee was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs-he did not-many indicia of reprehensibility exist. Plaintiff's harm was physical, the wrongful conduct-by definition-involved deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's health and safety, and the conduct could be considered as part of ACH's repeated custom of failing to adequately respond to inmate healthcare concerns. See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir.2007) (noting propriety of punitive damages when the defendant engages in “similar reprehensible conduct . . . against various different parties rather than reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.”).

The Sixth Circuit has explained that “Rule 56 places an affirmative duty on the nonmovant to cite to ‘particular parts of materials in the record' to establish that a particular fact cannot be supported or is genuinely disputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir.2007).” Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 734 (6th Cir. 2011).

The Sixth Circuit has explained that “Rule 56 places an affirmative duty on the nonmovant to cite to ‘particular parts of materials in the record' to establish that a particular fact cannot be supported or is genuinely disputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir.2007).” Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 734 (6th Cir. 2011).

Compare TQL/EDA, 685 F.Supp.3d at 575 (party seeking enforcement "must establish reasonableness under [Ohio law] test by clear and convincing evidence"), with id. at 578-80 (discussion of money damages); see also Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 n.3 (6th Cir. 2007).

Adkins, 105 F.4th at 854; see Bennett v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 86 F.4th 314, 324 (6th Cir. 2023); Scottsdale, 513 F.3d at 551-54; Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007); Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405. That is what happened here.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (“A district court is not required to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 288 F.3d 467, 470 (2nd Cir. 2002)

{¶ 27} Turning to the enforceability of the two-year term of the noncompete and nonsolicitation provisions, we have previously held that "the issue of whether a noncompete contract is enforceable is a question of law for the court to decide." Total Quality Logistics, LLC v. Leonard, 2023-Ohio-2271, ¶ 25 (12th Dist.), citing Facility Servs. & Sys., Inc. v. Vaiden, 2006-Ohio-2895, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.); see also Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 2006), citing UZ Engineered Products Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 147 Ohio App.3d 382, 394 (10th Dist. 2001). Construction of a contract, including a noncompete agreement, "does not become a question of fact simply because a court must consider facts or evidence."

. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Raimonde, 325 N.E.2d at 547).

But rather than consider the "necessary" factors, the court merely concluded that it was reasonable to "restrict an employee from moving to a competitor and taking customers and other employees with them for two years following the employee's departure" under Sixth Circuit precedent. Id. (citing Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 992 (6th Cir. 2007)). The court also relied on the fact that Hylant and Oswald require "nearly identical" non-solicitation agreements in finding the NDNSA reasonable.