The repeated conduct factor "'require[s] that the similar reprehensible conduct be committed against various different parties rather than repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.'" Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Bach v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 149 Fed.Appx. 354, 356 (6th Cir.2005)). Here, Westbound argues that defendants' infringement involved repeated actions because defendants authorized the release of the Ready to Die album without confirming that all samples were legal and sampled "Singing in the Morning" on another track on the album.

CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, v. James A. MAGNUSON, et al.Case below, 487 F.3d 985. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F. 3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000). Ohio courts have long held that a preliminary injunction may be issued to enforce a covenant not-to-compete where the agreement to be enforced is valid, the agreement's restrictions are reasonable, and the party seeking the injunctive relief has demonstrated irreparable harm. See, e.g., Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Raimonde v. Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 26 (1975)). IV. LAW AND ANALYSISA. Success on the Merits1.

"A district court is not required to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation and quote marks omitted)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1125 (2008). But ARS has presented circumstantial evidence suggesting that Beard conveyed ARS's confidential pricing information to Boatright before the re-bid (perhaps orally or via an e-mail that is not in the record).

Under Ohio law, "[a] contract of novation is created where a previous valid obligation is extinguished by a new valid contract, accomplished by substitution of parties or of the undertaking, with the consent of all the parties, and based on valid consideration." Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in original); see also Lexford Prop. Mgmt, LLC v. Lexford Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 147 Ohio App.3d 312, 770 N.E.2d 603, 607 (2001). The party invoking a novation (here, the current owner, 216 Jamaica) bears the burden of establishing its existence.

According to Prudential, the agreements containing the clauses constitute valid, enforceable contracts, notwithstanding the district court's conclusion to the contrary. We review questions of contract interpretation de novo. Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 653 (6th Cir. 1996)). The district court focused on the parties' disagreement about whether the agreements locked the interest rates absolutely or merely the spread in finding that there was no meeting of the minds.

This Court would note that JRH appears to use "punitive damages" and "sanctions" interchangeably. This Court does not view those concepts as being equivalent; sanctions include both coercive and punitive sanctions, International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828-830, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (1994); Jove Engineering, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1557-1559 (11th Cir. 1996), and a court must look at the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases when determining whether a punitive damages awards satisfies due process, Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 998-999 (6th Cir. 2007). In this case, neither party discusses at length the nature of the relief sought in JRH's motion, but it seems clear that JRH seeks punitive sanctions pursuant to the inherent power of the court and 11 U.S.C. § 105.

Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 52(a)(6); Chicago Title Ins. Gorp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 2007). Because whether Smiljanich established the elements of equitable estoppel is a determination of law, it is reviewed de novo.

See Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000) (defendant's actions were reprehensible where it violated plaintiffs rights and then attempted to conceal the violation); Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 1994) (punitive damages award was constitutionally permissible where defendant concealed studies relating to product defects); cf. Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 497, 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (1987) (in calculating "a punitive damage award that is reasonable under the circumstances," the trier-of-fact may consider the "duration of the misconduct, the degree of defendant's awareness of the harm or risk of harm, and any concealment"). ¶ 100 Security Title also argues First American has engaged in similar bad acts elsewhere, citing Chicago Title Insurance Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007). In Chicago Title, as here, First American was sued for its conduct in seeking to staff its newly formed Talon division.

The Sixth Circuit has interpreted the repeated conduct factor as requiring "`that the similar reprehensible conduct be committed against various different parties rather than repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.'" Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bach v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 149 F. App'x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2005)). Here, Fastenal argues that this factor is met because, though there was only one sale of goods, the Tri-State Defendants have "continued to reap the benefits of the goods and the information they obtained from Fastenal."