Chicago Title v. Magnuson

4 Citing cases

  1. Union Home Mortg. Corp. v. Cromer

    31 F.4th 356 (6th Cir. 2022)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that the injunction could not "describe the conduct enjoined by referencing the Agreement because that is another document"

    The covenant must: (1) be "no greater than is required for the protection of the employer"; (2) "not impose undue hardship on the employee"; and (3) not be "injurious to the public." Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Raimonde , 325 N.E.2d at 547 ). Union Home must establish each factor by "clear and convincing evidence."

  2. Union Home Mortg. Corp. v. Jenkins

    CASE NO. 1:20-CV-02690 (N.D. Ohio May. 18, 2021)   Cited 3 times

    Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2000). "A covenant restraining an employee from competing with his former employer upon termination of employment is reasonable if it is [1.] no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, [2.] does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and [3.] is not injurious to the public." Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St.2d 21, 26 (1975)). "The party seeking to enforce the covenant 'is required to adduce clear and convincing evidence as to each of these factors' in order to prove that the covenant is reasonable."

  3. McCrief v. Wachovia Bank

    Civil Action No.2:12-cv-72-RMG-WWD (D.S.C. Sep. 11, 2014)

    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) ("A district court is not required to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));

  4. The Bert Co. v. Turk

    298 A.3d 44 (Pa. 2023)   Cited 23 times
    Describing punitive damages as "private fines intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing"

    The per-defendant approach divides the punitive damages assessed against a defendant by the compensatory damages assessed against that defendant, and the per-judgment approach divides the total of punitive damages assessed against the defendants by the total of compensatory damages assessed against the defendants. Compare Planned Parenthood , 422 F.3d 949 (applying per-defendant ratio calculation), Horizon Health , 520 S.W.3d 848 (same), and Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007) (same) with Advocat , Inc. v. Sauer , 353 Ark. 29, 111 S.W.3d 346, 363 (2003) (dividing total of punitive awards against all companies by full amount of compensatory damages award), Bardis v. Oates , 119 Cal. App.4th 1, 21 n.8, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 89 (2004) (same), and Cooley v. Lincoln Elec. Co. , 776 F.Supp.2d 511, 551–53 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (same). The Defendants argue for application of the per-judgment approach; Northwest argues for the per-defendant approach as applied by the trial court and the Superior Court in this case.