The covenant must: (1) be "no greater than is required for the protection of the employer"; (2) "not impose undue hardship on the employee"; and (3) not be "injurious to the public." Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Raimonde , 325 N.E.2d at 547 ). Union Home must establish each factor by "clear and convincing evidence."

Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2000). "A covenant restraining an employee from competing with his former employer upon termination of employment is reasonable if it is [1.] no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, [2.] does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and [3.] is not injurious to the public." Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St.2d 21, 26 (1975)). "The party seeking to enforce the covenant 'is required to adduce clear and convincing evidence as to each of these factors' in order to prove that the covenant is reasonable."

"216 Jamaica Avenue, LLC v. S&R Playhouse Realty Co., 540 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). Chicago Title, 487 F.3d at 994 (quoting Am. Vineyards Co. v. Wine Group, 20 Ohio App. 3d 366, 486 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) ("A district court is not required to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));

The per-defendant approach divides the punitive damages assessed against a defendant by the compensatory damages assessed against that defendant, and the per-judgment approach divides the total of punitive damages assessed against the defendants by the total of compensatory damages assessed against the defendants. Compare Planned Parenthood , 422 F.3d 949 (applying per-defendant ratio calculation), Horizon Health , 520 S.W.3d 848 (same), and Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007) (same) with Advocat , Inc. v. Sauer , 353 Ark. 29, 111 S.W.3d 346, 363 (2003) (dividing total of punitive awards against all companies by full amount of compensatory damages award), Bardis v. Oates , 119 Cal. App.4th 1, 21 n.8, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 89 (2004) (same), and Cooley v. Lincoln Elec. Co. , 776 F.Supp.2d 511, 551–53 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (same). The Defendants argue for application of the per-judgment approach; Northwest argues for the per-defendant approach as applied by the trial court and the Superior Court in this case.

The Yungs contend that these factors weigh heavily toward the trial court's finding that Grant Thornton's actions were highly reprehensible. Grant Thornton points to Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007), in which the Sixth Circuit set aside a punitive damages award arising from claims of breach of contract and tortious interference with a contractual relationship. Although the corporate plaintiff established that the defendant acted with malice, the Sixth Circuit noted that the harm caused was only economic and the plaintiff was not financially vulnerable.