Rule 56 places an affirmative duty on the nonmovant to cite to "particular parts of materials in the record" to establish that a particular fact cannot be supported or is genuinely disputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnunson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007). District courts need not independently comb through the record and establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact before granting summary judgment.

The Sixth Circuit has interpreted the repeated conduct factor as requiring "`that the similar reprehensible conduct be committed against various different parties rather than repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.'" Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bach v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 149 F. App'x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2005)). Here, Fastenal argues that this factor is met because, though there was only one sale of goods, the Tri-State Defendants have "continued to reap the benefits of the goods and the information they obtained from Fastenal."

See Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000) (defendant's actions were reprehensible where it violated plaintiffs rights and then attempted to conceal the violation); Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 1994) (punitive damages award was constitutionally permissible where defendant concealed studies relating to product defects); cf. Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 497, 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (1987) (in calculating "a punitive damage award that is reasonable under the circumstances," the trier-of-fact may consider the "duration of the misconduct, the degree of defendant's awareness of the harm or risk of harm, and any concealment"). ¶ 100 Security Title also argues First American has engaged in similar bad acts elsewhere, citing Chicago Title Insurance Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007). In Chicago Title, as here, First American was sued for its conduct in seeking to staff its newly formed Talon division.

Accordingly, we do not "'entertain on appeal factual recitations not presented to the district court' when reviewing a district court's decision." Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1992)). The "proper focus is on the factual evidence submitted below."

According to Prudential, the agreements containing the clauses constitute valid, enforceable contracts, notwithstanding the district court's conclusion to the contrary. We review questions of contract interpretation de novo. Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 653 (6th Cir. 1996)). The district court focused on the parties' disagreement about whether the agreements locked the interest rates absolutely or merely the spread in finding that there was no meeting of the minds.

The employer bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the restraint. Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007).

In addition, the Court has no independent obligation to comb the record in search of evidence supporting Harmon's argument. In response to a motion for summary judgment, Harmon “‘has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.'” Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001)). As the Sixth Circuit has stated:

[See R. 104.] Once a party moves for summary judgment on a claim, it is inappropriate for the non-movant to simply rely on the pleadings. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); see also Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007). As Plaintiffs have explained, Martin Cox testified that the only contract at issue in this case is the RSSA. [See R. 99 at 37.] Thus, the Court is aware of no evidence in the record of a separate oral contract that might give rise to the Cox Defendants' breach of oral contract claim.

The Court is not required to search the record for evidence that supports a moving party's motion. See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (a district court is not required to search the record to determine if it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact) (citing Street, 886 F.2d at 1479-80); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Summary judgment motions that are not properly supported as required by Rule 56 must be denied.

The Court is cognizant, however, that it "does not serve as a rubber stamp of the requested fees and costs." Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, No. 2:03-CV-368, 2005 WL 2373430, at *30 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2005), rev'd in part on other grounds, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007). Defendants bear the burden of "proving that the requested monies are reasonable."