Rule 56 places an affirmative duty on the nonmovant to cite to "particular parts of materials in the record" to establish that a particular fact cannot be supported or is genuinely disputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnunson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007). District courts need not independently comb through the record and establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact before granting summary judgment.

According to Prudential, the agreements containing the clauses constitute valid, enforceable contracts, notwithstanding the district court's conclusion to the contrary. We review questions of contract interpretation de novo. Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 653 (6th Cir. 1996)). The district court focused on the parties' disagreement about whether the agreements locked the interest rates absolutely or merely the spread in finding that there was no meeting of the minds.

See Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000) (defendant's actions were reprehensible where it violated plaintiffs rights and then attempted to conceal the violation); Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 1994) (punitive damages award was constitutionally permissible where defendant concealed studies relating to product defects); cf. Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 497, 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (1987) (in calculating "a punitive damage award that is reasonable under the circumstances," the trier-of-fact may consider the "duration of the misconduct, the degree of defendant's awareness of the harm or risk of harm, and any concealment"). ¶ 100 Security Title also argues First American has engaged in similar bad acts elsewhere, citing Chicago Title Insurance Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007). In Chicago Title, as here, First American was sued for its conduct in seeking to staff its newly formed Talon division.

The Sixth Circuit has interpreted the repeated conduct factor as requiring "`that the similar reprehensible conduct be committed against various different parties rather than repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.'" Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bach v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 149 F. App'x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2005)). Here, Fastenal argues that this factor is met because, though there was only one sale of goods, the Tri-State Defendants have "continued to reap the benefits of the goods and the information they obtained from Fastenal."

"A district court is not required to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation and quote marks omitted)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1125 (2008). But ARS has presented circumstantial evidence suggesting that Beard conveyed ARS's confidential pricing information to Boatright before the re-bid (perhaps orally or via an e-mail that is not in the record).

Accordingly, we do not "'entertain on appeal factual recitations not presented to the district court' when reviewing a district court's decision." Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1992)). The "proper focus is on the factual evidence submitted below."

Next, “[t]he repeated conduct factor ‘require[s] that the similar reprehensible conduct be committed against various different parties rather than repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.’ ” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Pub., 507 F.3d 470, 487 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir.2007)) (additional citation and internal quotation omitted). Burton testified that he was brought before Zwicker's outside counsel three to five times in connection with his former co-worker's lawsuit, but this constitutes “repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.”

The case law cited by Balakrishnan does not support his contention that each factor of the balancing test must be proven by clear and convincing evidence in order for the Court to grant injunctive relief. See Corl v. Citizens Bank, Case No. 2:08-CV-234, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82676, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2008) (explaining that "[u]nlike a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction requires Plaintiff to show actual success on the merits, rather than a mere likelihood of success on the merits, as well as a demonstration that she has already suffered irreparable injury," and that plaintiff must demonstrate his or her right to this permanent injunctive relief by clear and convincing evidence); Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnusson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a plaintiff has a burden of showing that a covenant not to compete is reasonable by clear and convincing evidence in order for there to be a viable claim for breach of the covenant under Ohio law); Am. Sys. Consulting, Inc. v. Devier, Case No. 2:07-cv-818, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66339, at *5-6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2007) (explaining that "[t]he moving party must demonstrate a right to injunctive relief by clear and convincing evidence," but that the four factors are not "prerequisites to be met"); Patio Enclosures, Inc. v. Herbst, 39 F. App'x 964, 969 (6th Cir. 2002) ("To be granted an injunction, the plaintiff must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, actual irreparable harm or the existence of an actual threat of such injury," rather than all four factors) (internal quotations and citations omitted). III.

Moreover, as the Defendants point out, the Supreme Court and other United States Circuit Courts of Appeal other than the Tenth Circuit have found such conduct toward third parties relevant. See Reply at 8 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423–24, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (rejecting the plaintiffs' evidence of State Farm's actions toward third parties, because that evidence was not “of the sort that injured them”)); Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 232 (3rd Cir.2005) (“The ‘repeated conduct’ cited in Gore involved not merely a pattern of contemptible conduct within one extended transaction ( i.e., the sale of one automobile to Dr. Gore), but rather specific instances of similar conduct by defendants in relation to other parties.”); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that, “we interpreted the repeated conduct factor to require that the similar reprehensible conduct be committed against various different parties rather than repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with plaintiff,” (internal quotation omitted) and, “[w]hen assessing whether the defendant's behavior was sufficiently reprehensible to support an award of punitive damages, the Supreme Court has noted that consideration of the defendant's conduct against other parties across the country is instructive to the analysis”).

The Court is cognizant, however, that it "does not serve as a rubber stamp of the requested fees and costs." Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, No. 2:03-CV-368, 2005 WL 2373430, at *30 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2005), rev'd in part on other grounds, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007). Defendants bear the burden of "proving that the requested monies are reasonable."