novo review though has never meant the appellate court starts over. Rather, it means the appellate court takes the facts as presented to the court below and reviews whether summary judgment is justified without giving special deference to the decision below. See, e.g., Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating on summary judgment review that Sixth Circuit looks at factual record as presented by the non-movant to district court); 1 Steven Alan Childress & Martha S. Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 2.14 (3d ed. 1999) ("[W]hat is meant [by de novo review] is merely appellate power, ability, and competency to come to a different conclusion on the record as determined below.") (emphasis added)

Rule 56 places an affirmative duty on the nonmovant to cite to "particular parts of materials in the record" to establish that a particular fact cannot be supported or is genuinely disputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnunson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007). District courts need not independently comb through the record and establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact before granting summary judgment.

The Sixth Circuit has interpreted the repeated conduct factor as requiring "`that the similar reprehensible conduct be committed against various different parties rather than repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.'" Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bach v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 149 F. App'x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2005)). Here, Fastenal argues that this factor is met because, though there was only one sale of goods, the Tri-State Defendants have "continued to reap the benefits of the goods and the information they obtained from Fastenal."

See Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000) (defendant's actions were reprehensible where it violated plaintiffs rights and then attempted to conceal the violation); Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 1994) (punitive damages award was constitutionally permissible where defendant concealed studies relating to product defects); cf. Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 497, 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (1987) (in calculating "a punitive damage award that is reasonable under the circumstances," the trier-of-fact may consider the "duration of the misconduct, the degree of defendant's awareness of the harm or risk of harm, and any concealment"). ¶ 100 Security Title also argues First American has engaged in similar bad acts elsewhere, citing Chicago Title Insurance Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007). In Chicago Title, as here, First American was sued for its conduct in seeking to staff its newly formed Talon division.

Lawyers's chain of causation is too attenuated and speculative to withstand summary judgment. Lawyers argues that we adopted the functional equivalent of its "excluded causation theory" in Chicago Title Insurance Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007), where we affirmed a jury verdict against former Chicago Title executive James Magnuson who breached a non-compete provision by working for a competitor after leaving Chicago Title. Although Magnuson's employment agreement contained a non-compete provision, Lawyers questions the relevance of this distinction because even Bittinger was forbidden from competing with Lawyers during her employment and the solicitation of Frattaroli occurred while Bittinger was employed by Lawyers.

Accordingly, we do not "'entertain on appeal factual recitations not presented to the district court' when reviewing a district court's decision." Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1992)). The "proper focus is on the factual evidence submitted below."

According to Prudential, the agreements containing the clauses constitute valid, enforceable contracts, notwithstanding the district court's conclusion to the contrary. We review questions of contract interpretation de novo. Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 653 (6th Cir. 1996)). The district court focused on the parties' disagreement about whether the agreements locked the interest rates absolutely or merely the spread in finding that there was no meeting of the minds.

The employer bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the restraint. Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007).

Courts within Ohio have held that non-compete agreements with two-year durations are reasonable. Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991-92 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming district court decision that a covenant is reasonable for at least two years); Handel's Enterprises, Inc. v. Schulenburg, No. 4:18CV508, 2018 WL 3077756, at *5 (N.D. Ohio June 22, 2018) (finding two-year non-compete agreement reasonable and enforceable); Life Line Screening of Am., Ltd. v. Calger, 145 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 19, 881 N.E.2d 932, 942 (2006) (observing that “[n]umerous Ohio decisions have upheld contracts calling for two-year periods or longer”).

In addition, the Court has no independent obligation to comb the record in search of evidence supporting Harmon's argument. In response to a motion for summary judgment, Harmon “‘has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.'” Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001)). As the Sixth Circuit has stated: