However, the cases Accenture cites—Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990, 998–1001 (6th Cir.2007); Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Med. Sys., Inc., 181 F.3d 446, 463–70 (3d Cir.1999)—are distinguishable. The punitive damages award in Magnuson was three times the amount of the compensatory damages award, see487 F.3d at 990; the punitive damages award in EBI was $2 million more than the compensatory damages award, see181 F.3d at 450.

According to Prudential, the agreements containing the clauses constitute valid, enforceable contracts, notwithstanding the district court's conclusion to the contrary. We review questions of contract interpretation de novo. Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 653 (6th Cir. 1996)). The district court focused on the parties' disagreement about whether the agreements locked the interest rates absolutely or merely the spread in finding that there was no meeting of the minds.

See Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000) (defendant's actions were reprehensible where it violated plaintiffs rights and then attempted to conceal the violation); Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 1994) (punitive damages award was constitutionally permissible where defendant concealed studies relating to product defects); cf. Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 497, 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (1987) (in calculating "a punitive damage award that is reasonable under the circumstances," the trier-of-fact may consider the "duration of the misconduct, the degree of defendant's awareness of the harm or risk of harm, and any concealment"). ¶ 100 Security Title also argues First American has engaged in similar bad acts elsewhere, citing Chicago Title Insurance Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007). In Chicago Title, as here, First American was sued for its conduct in seeking to staff its newly formed Talon division.

The Sixth Circuit has interpreted the repeated conduct factor as requiring "`that the similar reprehensible conduct be committed against various different parties rather than repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.'" Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bach v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 149 F. App'x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2005)). Here, Fastenal argues that this factor is met because, though there was only one sale of goods, the Tri-State Defendants have "continued to reap the benefits of the goods and the information they obtained from Fastenal."

"A district court is not required to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation and quote marks omitted)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1125 (2008). But ARS has presented circumstantial evidence suggesting that Beard conveyed ARS's confidential pricing information to Boatright before the re-bid (perhaps orally or via an e-mail that is not in the record).

With this evidence, FAMC "met its burden of raising sufficient facts to entitle its motion to be granted as a matter of law under Rule 56(c)." Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007). It then fell to UNB "to direct the court’s attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact."

Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F. 3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000). Ohio courts have long held that a preliminary injunction may be issued to enforce a covenant not-to-compete where the agreement to be enforced is valid, the agreement's restrictions are reasonable, and the party seeking the injunctive relief has demonstrated irreparable harm. See, e.g., Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Raimonde v. Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 26 (1975)). IV. LAW AND ANALYSISA. Success on the Merits1.

The per-defendant approach divides the punitive damages assessed against a defendant by the compensatory damages assessed against that defendant, and the per-judgment approach divides the total of punitive damages assessed against the defendants by the total of compensatory damages assessed against the defendants. Compare Planned Parenthood , 422 F.3d 949 (applying per-defendant ratio calculation), Horizon Health , 520 S.W.3d 848 (same), and Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007) (same) with Advocat , Inc. v. Sauer , 353 Ark. 29, 111 S.W.3d 346, 363 (2003) (dividing total of punitive awards against all companies by full amount of compensatory damages award), Bardis v. Oates , 119 Cal. App.4th 1, 21 n.8, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 89 (2004) (same), and Cooley v. Lincoln Elec. Co. , 776 F.Supp.2d 511, 551–53 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (same). The Defendants argue for application of the per-judgment approach; Northwest argues for the per-defendant approach as applied by the trial court and the Superior Court in this case.

The enforceability of Wilson's noncompete agreement turns on whether it is "reasonable." Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 2007). A noncompete agreement is reasonable under Ohio law if it satisfies three factors.

The Court, for the sake of completeness, considers Defendants' argument as if asserted under Ohio law. Under that law, “a non-compete clause's enforceability is a matter of law for the court.” Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir.2007). “[A] noncompete covenant is enforceable to the extent it is reasonable.”