Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). And we review the "record in the same fashion as the district court."

Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere preponderance of the evidence, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations to Ohio state-court decisions omitted, internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1125, 169 L.Ed.2d 950 (2008). Emphasizing the strength of the deference which federal habeas courts accord to state courts' factual findings, our Circuit has stated flatly "`[t]he [federal] appeals court gives complete deference to the . . . state court's findings of fact supported by the evidence.'"

In assessing the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct in cases such as this where the harm is economic and not physical, we have stated that "the primary considerations to be addressed are [the plaintiffs] financial vulnerability, whether [the defendant's] conduct was repeated, and the culpability of [the defendant's] actions." See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 999 (6th Cir. 2007). New York Life asserts that Morgan is not financially vulnerable, noting that he earned between $500,000 and $1,000,000 during each of his five years in the Cleveland office.

The Sixth Circuit has explained that “Rule 56 places an affirmative duty on the nonmovant to cite to ‘particular parts of materials in the record' to establish that a particular fact cannot be supported or is genuinely disputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir.2007).” Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 734 (6th Cir. 2011).

In addition, the Court has no independent obligation to comb the record in search of evidence supporting Harmon's argument. In response to a motion for summary judgment, Harmon “‘has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.'” Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001)). As the Sixth Circuit has stated:

Next, “[t]he repeated conduct factor ‘require[s] that the similar reprehensible conduct be committed against various different parties rather than repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.’ ” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Pub., 507 F.3d 470, 487 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir.2007)) (additional citation and internal quotation omitted). Burton testified that he was brought before Zwicker's outside counsel three to five times in connection with his former co-worker's lawsuit, but this constitutes “repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.”