The Court, for the sake of completeness, considers Defendants' argument as if asserted under Ohio law. Under that law, “a non-compete clause's enforceability is a matter of law for the court.” Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir.2007). “[A] noncompete covenant is enforceable to the extent it is reasonable.”

The parties' competing motions and related briefing address the scope of what discovery this Court should permit upon remand from the Sixth Circuit. That appellate court previously affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded this litigation for a new trial on compensatory damages. Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007). The parties are now arguing over the scope of that remand and what discovery is necessary to meet the court of appeals' directive.

Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). And we review the "record in the same fashion as the district court."

Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere preponderance of the evidence, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations to Ohio state-court decisions omitted, internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1125, 169 L.Ed.2d 950 (2008). Emphasizing the strength of the deference which federal habeas courts accord to state courts' factual findings, our Circuit has stated flatly "`[t]he [federal] appeals court gives complete deference to the . . . state court's findings of fact supported by the evidence.'"

See Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000) (defendant's actions were reprehensible where it violated plaintiffs rights and then attempted to conceal the violation); Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 1994) (punitive damages award was constitutionally permissible where defendant concealed studies relating to product defects); cf. Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 497, 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (1987) (in calculating "a punitive damage award that is reasonable under the circumstances," the trier-of-fact may consider the "duration of the misconduct, the degree of defendant's awareness of the harm or risk of harm, and any concealment"). ¶ 100 Security Title also argues First American has engaged in similar bad acts elsewhere, citing Chicago Title Insurance Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007). In Chicago Title, as here, First American was sued for its conduct in seeking to staff its newly formed Talon division.

Even if the rule applies to district courts and appellate courts—a proposition far from certain, see LidoChem, Inc. v. Stoller Enters., 500 F. App'x 373, 388-91 (6th Cir. 2012) (Thapar, J., dissenting) (collecting cases)—the rule is quite clearly discretionary, and we decline to reverse the district court on this basis. See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989)) ("A district court is not required to 'search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.'"). The first piece of evidence offers little.

Lawyers's chain of causation is too attenuated and speculative to withstand summary judgment. Lawyers argues that we adopted the functional equivalent of its "excluded causation theory" in Chicago Title Insurance Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007), where we affirmed a jury verdict against former Chicago Title executive James Magnuson who breached a non-compete provision by working for a competitor after leaving Chicago Title. Although Magnuson's employment agreement contained a non-compete provision, Lawyers questions the relevance of this distinction because even Bittinger was forbidden from competing with Lawyers during her employment and the solicitation of Frattaroli occurred while Bittinger was employed by Lawyers.

We apply a de novo standard of review when reviewing a district court's determination of the constitutionality of a punitive-damages award. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001); see also Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 999 (6th Cir. 2007). Compensatory damages "are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct."

III. This court reviews de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment to DD, Helms v. Zubaty, 495 F.3d 252, 255 (6th Cir. 2007), as well as the district court's interpretation of the Lease, Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 2007). Where the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the court "must evaluate each motion on its own merit and draw inferences against the party whose motion is being considered."

In assessing the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct in cases such as this where the harm is economic and not physical, we have stated that "the primary considerations to be addressed are [the plaintiffs] financial vulnerability, whether [the defendant's] conduct was repeated, and the culpability of [the defendant's] actions." See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 999 (6th Cir. 2007). New York Life asserts that Morgan is not financially vulnerable, noting that he earned between $500,000 and $1,000,000 during each of his five years in the Cleveland office.