In short, because plaintiff failed to bring the affidavits to the district court's attention in connection with the cellblock claim, it had no occasion to consider them in that context. Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he opposing party ‘has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.’ " (quoting In re Morris , 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001) )). Nor will we fault the district court for failing to do so.

The repeated conduct factor "'require[s] that the similar reprehensible conduct be committed against various different parties rather than repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.'" Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Bach v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 149 Fed.Appx. 354, 356 (6th Cir.2005)). Here, Westbound argues that defendants' infringement involved repeated actions because defendants authorized the release of the Ready to Die album without confirming that all samples were legal and sampled "Singing in the Morning" on another track on the album.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the opposing party "has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact." Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Morris , 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001) ). "This burden to respond is really an opportunity to assist the court in understanding the facts.

Even if the rule applies to district courts and appellate courts—a proposition far from certain, see LidoChem, Inc. v. Stoller Enters., 500 F. App'x 373, 388-91 (6th Cir. 2012) (Thapar, J., dissenting) (collecting cases)—the rule is quite clearly discretionary, and we decline to reverse the district court on this basis. See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989)) ("A district court is not required to 'search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.'"). The first piece of evidence offers little.

We generally decline to entertain factual recitations not brought to the district court's attention in the first instance. See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he opposing party 'has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.'" (quoting In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001))); Sumpter v. Wayne Cnty., 868 F.3d 473, 490 (6th Cir. 2017) ("We have said time and again, district courts cannot be expected to dig through the record to find the seeds of a party's cause of action.").

"A district court is not required to 'search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.'" Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2012). Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the record and finds, at least insofar as the Court understands Plaintiff's retaliation claim, it fails for at least three reasons.

” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); see also Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (6th Cir.2011) (“ ‘[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles' that might be buried in the record.”); Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir.2007) (“A district court is not required to ‘search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.’ ”). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, [a court] must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.

Bormuth has thus waived any argument as to these statements. Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) ; Overstreet v. Lexington–Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't , 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002).

Adkins, 105 F.4th at 854; see Bennett v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 86 F.4th 314, 324 (6th Cir. 2023); Scottsdale, 513 F.3d at 551-54; Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007); Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405. That is what happened here.

" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); see also Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed. Appx. 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2011) ("'[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles that might be buried in the record."); Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) ("A district court is not required to 'search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.'"). (Pls' Resp. at p. 24, ECF No. 255.)