” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); see also Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (6th Cir.2011) (“ ‘[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles' that might be buried in the record.”); Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir.2007) (“A district court is not required to ‘search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.’ ”). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, [a court] must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.

Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). And we review the "record in the same fashion as the district court."

Adkins, 105 F.4th at 854; see Bennett v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 86 F.4th 314, 324 (6th Cir. 2023); Scottsdale, 513 F.3d at 551-54; Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007); Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405. That is what happened here.

We generally decline to entertain factual recitations not brought to the district court's attention in the first instance. See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he opposing party 'has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.'" (quoting In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001))); Sumpter v. Wayne Cnty., 868 F.3d 473, 490 (6th Cir. 2017) ("We have said time and again, district courts cannot be expected to dig through the record to find the seeds of a party's cause of action.").

For even where the jury has found an entitlement to punitive damages, the appropriate punitive damages award may still be zero. Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985, 1001 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying the State Farm factors and holding that the district court erred in upholding a jury verdict for any punitive damages following the jury's $32.4 million punitive damages and $10.8 million compensatory damages award). In making that threshold assessment, the "most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct."

The Sixth Circuit has explained that “Rule 56 places an affirmative duty on the nonmovant to cite to ‘particular parts of materials in the record' to establish that a particular fact cannot be supported or is genuinely disputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir.2007).” Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 734 (6th Cir. 2011).

Here, if Plaintiff proved at trial that some ACH employee was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs-he did not-many indicia of reprehensibility exist. Plaintiff's harm was physical, the wrongful conduct-by definition-involved deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's health and safety, and the conduct could be considered as part of ACH's repeated custom of failing to adequately respond to inmate healthcare concerns. See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir.2007) (noting propriety of punitive damages when the defendant engages in “similar reprehensible conduct . . . against various different parties rather than reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.”).

The Sixth Circuit has explained that “Rule 56 places an affirmative duty on the nonmovant to cite to ‘particular parts of materials in the record' to establish that a particular fact cannot be supported or is genuinely disputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir.2007).” Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 734 (6th Cir. 2011).

In addition, the Court has no independent obligation to comb the record in search of evidence supporting Harmon's argument. In response to a motion for summary judgment, Harmon “‘has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.'” Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001)). As the Sixth Circuit has stated:

“District courts need not independently comb through the record and establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact before granting summary judgment.” Id. (citing Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnusun, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007)). Although Plaintiff's complaint alleges a violation of Ohio law regarding the production of documents, on summary judgment Plaintiff may not rest on her pleadings alone.