” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); see also Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (6th Cir.2011) (“ ‘[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles' that might be buried in the record.”); Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir.2007) (“A district court is not required to ‘search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.’ ”). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, [a court] must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.

Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). And we review the "record in the same fashion as the district court."

Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere preponderance of the evidence, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations to Ohio state-court decisions omitted, internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1125, 169 L.Ed.2d 950 (2008). Emphasizing the strength of the deference which federal habeas courts accord to state courts' factual findings, our Circuit has stated flatly "`[t]he [federal] appeals court gives complete deference to the . . . state court's findings of fact supported by the evidence.'"

Adkins, 105 F.4th at 854; see Bennett v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 86 F.4th 314, 324 (6th Cir. 2023); Scottsdale, 513 F.3d at 551-54; Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007); Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405. That is what happened here.

We generally decline to entertain factual recitations not brought to the district court's attention in the first instance. See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he opposing party 'has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.'" (quoting In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001))); Sumpter v. Wayne Cnty., 868 F.3d 473, 490 (6th Cir. 2017) ("We have said time and again, district courts cannot be expected to dig through the record to find the seeds of a party's cause of action.").

For even where the jury has found an entitlement to punitive damages, the appropriate punitive damages award may still be zero. Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985, 1001 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying the State Farm factors and holding that the district court erred in upholding a jury verdict for any punitive damages following the jury's $32.4 million punitive damages and $10.8 million compensatory damages award). In making that threshold assessment, the "most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct."

In assessing the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct in cases such as this where the harm is economic and not physical, we have stated that "the primary considerations to be addressed are [the plaintiffs] financial vulnerability, whether [the defendant's] conduct was repeated, and the culpability of [the defendant's] actions." See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 999 (6th Cir. 2007). New York Life asserts that Morgan is not financially vulnerable, noting that he earned between $500,000 and $1,000,000 during each of his five years in the Cleveland office.

The Sixth Circuit has explained that “Rule 56 places an affirmative duty on the nonmovant to cite to ‘particular parts of materials in the record' to establish that a particular fact cannot be supported or is genuinely disputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir.2007).” Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 734 (6th Cir. 2011).

Here, if Plaintiff proved at trial that some ACH employee was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs-he did not-many indicia of reprehensibility exist. Plaintiff's harm was physical, the wrongful conduct-by definition-involved deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's health and safety, and the conduct could be considered as part of ACH's repeated custom of failing to adequately respond to inmate healthcare concerns. See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 1000 (6th Cir.2007) (noting propriety of punitive damages when the defendant engages in “similar reprehensible conduct . . . against various different parties rather than reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff.”).

The Sixth Circuit has explained that “Rule 56 places an affirmative duty on the nonmovant to cite to ‘particular parts of materials in the record' to establish that a particular fact cannot be supported or is genuinely disputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir.2007).” Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 734 (6th Cir. 2011).