” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); see also Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (6th Cir.2011) (“ ‘[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles' that might be buried in the record.”); Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir.2007) (“A district court is not required to ‘search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.’ ”). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, [a court] must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.

The Court, for the sake of completeness, considers Defendants' argument as if asserted under Ohio law. Under that law, “a non-compete clause's enforceability is a matter of law for the court.” Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir.2007). “[A] noncompete covenant is enforceable to the extent it is reasonable.”

The parties' competing motions and related briefing address the scope of what discovery this Court should permit upon remand from the Sixth Circuit. That appellate court previously affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded this litigation for a new trial on compensatory damages. Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2007). The parties are now arguing over the scope of that remand and what discovery is necessary to meet the court of appeals' directive.

Bormuth has thus waived any argument as to these statements. Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) ; Overstreet v. Lexington–Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't , 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002).

The covenant must: (1) be "no greater than is required for the protection of the employer"; (2) "not impose undue hardship on the employee"; and (3) not be "injurious to the public." Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Raimonde , 325 N.E.2d at 547 ). Union Home must establish each factor by "clear and convincing evidence."

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the opposing party "has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact." Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson , 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Morris , 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001) ). "This burden to respond is really an opportunity to assist the court in understanding the facts.

novo review though has never meant the appellate court starts over. Rather, it means the appellate court takes the facts as presented to the court below and reviews whether summary judgment is justified without giving special deference to the decision below. See, e.g., Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating on summary judgment review that Sixth Circuit looks at factual record as presented by the non-movant to district court); 1 Steven Alan Childress & Martha S. Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 2.14 (3d ed. 1999) ("[W]hat is meant [by de novo review] is merely appellate power, ability, and competency to come to a different conclusion on the record as determined below.") (emphasis added)

Rule 56 places an affirmative duty on the nonmovant to cite to "particular parts of materials in the record" to establish that a particular fact cannot be supported or is genuinely disputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnunson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007). District courts need not independently comb through the record and establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact before granting summary judgment.

Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2000). "A covenant restraining an employee from competing with his former employer upon termination of employment is reasonable if it is [1.] no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, [2.] does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and [3.] is not injurious to the public." Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 991 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St.2d 21, 26 (1975)). "The party seeking to enforce the covenant 'is required to adduce clear and convincing evidence as to each of these factors' in order to prove that the covenant is reasonable."

Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). And we review the "record in the same fashion as the district court."