Chica-Iglesia v. Lowe

11 Citing cases

  1. Rad v. Lowe

    No. 1:21-cv-00171 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2021)

    In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which provides for pre-removal mandatory detention of individuals previously convicted of certain criminal offenses. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); see also Orozco Arroyo v. Doll, No. 4:19-cv-490, 2019 WL 6173753, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6130483 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2019) (noting that the Third Circuit's grant of a temporary stay of removal causes an immigration detainee to revert to pre-removal immigration detention status because the order of removal is not administratively final); Carlos A. v. Green, No. 18-741 (SDW), 2018 WL 3492150, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. July 20, 2018); Chica-Iglesia v. Lowe, No. 1:18-cv-35, 2018 WL 1960438, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2018); Gekara v. Lowe, No. 3:17-cv-1693, 2018 WL 837599, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2018); Payano v. Lowe, No. 3:16-cv-2029, 2016 WL 6995433, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016); cf. Leslie v. Att'y Gen., 678 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that "[8 U.S.C.] § 1321 cannot explain nor authorize detention during a stay of removal pending further judicial review"), abrogated in part on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). An individual detained under § 1226(c) may be released only if the Attorney General decides that release is necessary to protect a witness and that the individual is not a flight risk and does not pose a danger to society.

  2. Guerra v. Doll

    1:20-cv-0594 (M.D. Pa. Jul. 27, 2020)   Cited 2 times
    Explaining that any claim challenging petitioner's pre-final order detention was mooted when he became subject to a final order of removal

    Significantly, the grant of a temporary stay of removal in the context of a petition for review causes an immigration detainee to revert to pre-removal immigration detention status because the order of removal is not administratively final. See, e.g., Orozco Arroyo v. Doll, No. 4:19-cv-490, 2019 WL 6173753, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6130483 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2019); Carlos A. v. Green, No. 18-741 (SDW), 2018 WL 3492150, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. July 20, 2018); Chica-Iglesia v. Lowe, No. 1:18-cv-35, 2018 WL 1960438, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2018); Gekara v. Lowe, No. 3:17-cv-1693, 2018 WL 837599, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2018); Payano v. Lowe, No. 3:16-cv-2029, 2016 WL 6995433, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016); see also Leslie v. Atty Gen., 678 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that "§ 1321 cannot explain nor authorize detention during a stay of removal pending further judicial review"), abrogated in part on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). At the time Guerra filed his petition challenging the constitutionality of his prolonged detention without a bond hearing prior to a final order of removal he was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

  3. Alvarez-Prieto v. Doll

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-0544 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2020)

    In the instant case, when Petitioner filed his §2241 petition, his detention was governed by §1226(c), because the Third Circuit's grant of a temporary stay of removal causes an immigration detainee to revert to pre-removal immigration detention status because the order of removal is not administratively final. See, e.g., Orozco Arroyo v. Doll, No. 4:19-cv-490, 2019 WL 6173753, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6130483 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2019); Carlos A. v. Green, No. 18-741 (SDW), 2018 WL 3492150, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. July 20, 2018); Chica-Iglesia v. Lowe, No. 1:18-cv-35, 2018 WL 1960438, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2018); Gekara v. Lowe, No. 3:17-cv-1693, 2018 WL 837599, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2018); Payano v. Lowe, No. 3:16-cv-2029, 2016 WL 6995433, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016); see also Leslie v. Atty Gen., 678 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that "§1321 cannot explain nor authorize detention during a stay of removal pending further judicial review"), abrogated in part on other grounds byJennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). However, as noted above, the Third Circuit denied Petitioner's to stay removal and vacated the temporary stay of removal on February 7, 2020.

  4. Idowu v. Doll

    No. 1:19-cv-2186 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2020)

    Because his petition for review is pending before the Third Circuit, Petitioner's order of removal has not become administratively final and he is still considered to be in pre-removal detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii) (providing that the removal period begins, "[i]f the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, [on] the date of the court's final order"); see also Orozco Arroyo v. Doll, No. 4:19-cv-490, 2019 WL 6173753, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6130483 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2019) (noting that the Third Circuit's grant of a temporary stay of removal causes an immigration detainee to revert to pre-removal immigration detention status because the order of removal is not administratively final); Carlos A. v. Green, No. 18-741 (SDW), 2018 WL 3492150, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. July 20, 2018); Chica-Iglesia v. Lowe, No. 1:18-cv-35, 2018 WL 1960438, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2018); Gekara v. Lowe, No. 3:17-cv-1693, 2018 WL 837599, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2018); Payano v. Lowe, No. 3:16-cv-2029, 2016 WL 6995433, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016); cf. Leslie v. Att'y Gen., 678 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that "[8 U.S.C.] § 1321 cannot explain nor authorize detention during a stay of removal pending further judicial review"), abrogated in part on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). Thus, "decisions concerning [Petitioner's] ongoing detention are at the discretion of the immigration judge."

  5. Davydov v. Doll

    No. 1:19-cv-2110 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2020)   Cited 3 times

    In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which provides for pre-removal mandatory detention of individuals previously convicted of certain criminal offenses. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); see also Orozco Arroyo v. Doll, No. 4:19-cv-490, 2019 WL 6173753, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6130483 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2019) (noting that the Third Circuit's grant of a temporary stay of removal causes an immigration detainee to revert to pre-removal immigration detention status because the order of removal is not administratively final); Carlos A. v. Green, No. 18-741 (SDW), 2018 WL 3492150, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. July 20, 2018); Chica-Iglesia v. Lowe, No. 1:18-cv-35, 2018 WL 1960438, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2018); Gekara v. Lowe, No. 3:17-cv-1693, 2018 WL 837599, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2018); Payano v. Lowe, No. 3:16-cv-2029, 2016 WL 6995433, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016); cf. Leslie v. Att'y Gen., 678 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that "[8 U.S.C.] § 1321 cannot explain nor authorize detention during a stay of removal pending further judicial review"), abrogated in part on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). An individual detained under § 1226(c) may be released only if the Attorney General decides that release is necessary to protect a witness and that the individual is not a flight risk and does not pose a danger to society.

  6. Cobon v. Doll

    No. 1:19-cv-1841 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2020)

    In the instant case, when Petitioner filed his § 2241 petition, his detention was governed by § 1226(c) because the Third Circuit's grant of a temporary stay of removal causes an immigration detainee to revert to pre-removal immigration detention status because the order of removal is not administratively final. See, e.g., Orozco Arroyo v. Doll, No. 4:19-cv-490, 2019 WL 6173753, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6130483 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2019); Carlos A. v. Green, No. 18-741 (SDW), 2018 WL 3492150, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. July 20, 2018); Chica-Iglesia v. Lowe, No. 1:18-cv-35, 2018 WL 1960438, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2018); Gekara v. Lowe, No. 3:17-cv-1693, 2018 WL 837599, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2018); Payano v. Lowe, No. 3:16-cv-2029, 2016 WL 6995433, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016); see also Leslie v.Att'y Gen., 678 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that "§ 1321 cannot explain nor authorize detention during a stay of removal pending further judicial review"), abrogated in part on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). However, as noted above, the Third Circuit denied Petitioner's motion to stay removal and vacated the temporary stay of removal on February 19, 2020.

  7. Rades-Suarez v. Doll

    No. 1:19-cv-1946 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2020)   Cited 3 times

    This Court and others have previously determined that arriving aliens who have been subject to detention under § 1225(b) for longer periods of time were not entitled to bond hearings because their detention had not yet reached the point of being arbitrary or unreasonable. See Fatule-Roque v. Lowe, No. 3:17-cv-1981, 2018 WL 3584696, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2018) (detention for a period of fifteen (15) months); Otis V., 2018 WL 3302997, at *8 (detention for a period of just over a year); Chica-Iglesia v. Lowe, No. 1:18-cv-35, 2018 WL 1960438, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2018) (detention for a period of twenty (20) months). But see Pulatov, 2019 WL 2643076, at *3 (concluding that petitioner who had been detained under § 1225(b) for twenty (20) months was entitled to a bond hearing); Gichuhi v. Doll, No. 3:17-cv-1041, 2018 WL 5660744, at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2018) (concluding that petitioner who had been detained under § 1225(b) for twenty-three (23) months was entitled to a bond hearing); Destine v. Doll, No. 3:17-cv-1340, 2018 WL 3584695, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2018) (concluding that petitioner who had been detained under § 1225(b) for twenty-one (21) months was entitled to a bond hearing); see also Lett v. Decker, 346 F. Supp. 3d 379, 387-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (concluding that petitioner who had been detained under § 1225(b) for ten (10) months was entitled to a bond hearing).

  8. Innocent v. Attorney Gen.

    No. 1:19-cv-184 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2019)

    As Magistrate Judge Mehalchick has noted, "[t]his District is split on whether the BIA's decision renders an order of removal 'administratively final' or if the issuance of a stay of removal prevents the order of removal from reaching administrative finality." Lianfu Liang v. Lowe, No. 1:17-CV-01735, 2018 WL 4692467, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2018) (citing Patel v. Doll, No. 1:17-CV-01594, 2018 WL 2307017, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018); Chica-Iglesia v. Lowe, No. 1:18-CV-0035, 2018 WL 1960438 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2018)), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 4680054 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2018). Regardless of whether Petitioner's order of removal was final at the time of the Third Circuit's stay of removal, the stay ensured that Petitioner remained detained pursuant to the pre-removal provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1226.

  9. Bah v. Doll

    CIVIL NO. 3:18-CV-1409 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2018)   Cited 3 times

    In contrast, if Chavez Alvarez relied upon constitutional due process principles to define the presumptively reasonable duration of immigration detention without a hearing, then Jennings' holding, which eschewed any due process analysis, would not have completely abrogated the rule announced in Chavez Alvarez. Presented with this shifting legal landscape, and these ambiguities, judges of this court initially reached competing conclusions. Some have suggested that Jennings abrogated Chavez Alvarez. See, e.g., Chica-Iglesia v. Lowe, No. 1:18-CV-0035, 2018 WL 1960438, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2018); Coello-Udiel v. Doll, No. 3:17-CV-1414, 2018 WL 2198720, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 14, 2018); Destine v. Doll, No. 3:17-CV-1340, 2018 WL 3584695, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2018); Fatule-Roque v. Lowe, No. 3:17-CV-1981, 2018 WL 3584696, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2018); Fernandez v. Lowe, No. 3:17-CV-2301, 2018 WL 3584697, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2018) ; Okyere v. Doll, No. 1:18-CV-178, 2018 WL 3585080, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2018). Others have considered Chavez Alvarez a rule of constitutional dimension and suggested that this ruling may remain unaffected by the narrow Jennings holding which was limited to the canon of constitutional avoidance, a rule of statutory interpretation.

  10. Liang v. Lowe

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-01735 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2018)   Cited 2 times

    See Patel v. Doll, No. 1:17-CV-01594, 2018 WL 2307017, at *3(M.D.Pa. Apr. 11, 2018). Compare Chica-Iglesia v. Lowe, No. 1:18-CV-0035, 2018 WL 1960438 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2018). Regardless which stage of finality the removal order existed in at the time of the Third Circuit's stay of removal, the stay entered ensured that Liang remained in the detention provisions of § 1226. "[E]very circuit to consider the issue has held that § 1226, not § 1231, governs detention during a stay of removal. . . . Furthermore, insofar as the purpose of § 1231 detention is to secure an alien pending the alien's certain removal, § 1231 cannot explain nor authorize detention during a stay of removal pending further judicial review."