Opinion
Case No. C04-987 MJP.
May 21, 2009
ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
This matter comes before the Court on the parties' post-trial motions: Plaintiff Barahimi's motion for entry of judgment, (Dkt. No. 502), Plaintiffs' Chen and Barahimi's motion for entry of judgment, (Dkt. No. 506), Defendants Lindwall, Dougherty, and Osterhoudt's Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, (Dkt. No. 504), and Defendants Lindwall, Dougherty, and Osterhoudt's motion for entry of findings of facts, conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52, (Dkt. No. 507). Having reviewed the motions, responses, replies, and the balance of the record, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motions and DENIES Defendants' motions for the reasons set forth below.
Background
Plaintiffs Ho-Chuan Chen and Hossein Barahimi are King County employees who were employed in a division in the King County Department of Transportation. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in April 2004 alleging that they suffered retaliation and discrimination after raising concerns about the use of flawed methodologies and practices regarding traffic decisions in the Department of Transportation. Mr. Barahimi filed a second lawsuit in August 2007 alleging additional retaliation by Defendants Sue Osterhoudt and King County.
The 2004 and 2007 actions were consolidated and were tried before a jury in March and April, 2009. At the close of Plaintiffs' case, the Court granted Defendant King County's motion for judgment as a matter of law and entered judgment in favor of King County. (Dkt. No. 498.) The Court also granted Defendants Lindwall, Dougherty, and Osterhoudt's motion for judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiffs' claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages. (Dkt. No. 499.)
On April 8, 2009, the jury returned a verdict against each of the remaining defendants and awarded damages to Plaintiffs. (Dkt. No. 495.) On the verdict form, the jury also answered five advisory questions related to the Pickering analysis, and the jury resolved each of the five factual disputes in Plaintiffs' favor. (Id.)
I. Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
On Defendants' motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), the Court must evaluate whether, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence. Fisher v. City of San Jose, 558 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted) (defining "substantial evidence" as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion"). In their motion, Defendants Lindwall, Dougherty, and Osterhoudt argue that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict against them on Plaintiffs' retaliation claims. (Dkt. No. 504 at 3.) In deciding this motion, the Court cannot "substitute [its] view of the evidence for that of the jury." Id.
At trial, Plaintiffs presented evidence regarding the adverse employment actions taken against them and how Plaintiffs' protected speech was a substantial motivating factor in Defendants' decisions to take those adverse employment actions. Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that the evidence presented sufficiently supports the jury's verdict and Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied.
II. Defendants' Motion for Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
The Court will not address Defendants' arguments regarding equitable relief because Plaintiffs have abandoned their request for reinstatement. (See Dkt. No. 506 at 2.)
a. Qualified Immunity
Defendants' arguments regarding qualified immunity fail because the issue of qualified immunity has already been decided in Plaintiffs Chen and Barahimi's 2004 case, and because Defendants waived qualified immunity in Mr. Barahimi's 2007 case by failing to raise it properly in a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). At the parties' pretrial conference on March 18, 2009, Defendants requested that the Court instruct the jury on qualified immunity and the Court responded with the following:
[Q]ualified immunity is a prophylactic issue to be brought up so that . . . the county and governments do not have to go through the process of defending. Here the county decided not to pursue that in one of the lawsuits. They pursued it unsuccessfully in the other lawsuit. It's done.
(Dkt. No. 501 at 53.)
Before trial, Defendants in the 2004 action properly brought a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and the Court rejected the individual Defendants' argument that they were entitled to qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 86 at 9.) Defendants submitted an interlocutory appeal on the qualified immunity ruling and the Ninth Circuit issued a decision on March 21, 2007. (See Dkt. Nos. 111 127.) The Ninth Circuit did not reverse this Court's ruling on the issue of qualified immunity because Defendants' appeal on that issue was "concerned primarily with challenges to evidentiary sufficiency" and fell outside the Ninth Circuit's interlocutory jurisdiction. Ho-Chuan Chen v. Dougherty, 225 Fed. Appx. 665, 666 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants never presented the issue of qualified immunity in a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion in Mr. Barahimi's 2007 action.
Defendants argue that the issue of qualified immunity should now be decided in their favor, thereby eradicating the jury's verdict against them. (Dkt. No. 507 at 5-12.) Defendants rely in part on Ninth Circuit law stating that defendants can present qualified immunity as a defense after trial when "their right to immunity turns on the resolution of disputed facts" to be determined by a jury. Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994). Defendants now contend that the Pickering factors decided by the jury address factual disputes concerning whether Plaintiffs' first amendment rights were "clearly established." (Dkt. No. 507 at 10-11.) The Court rejects this analysis, but even if the Court were to accept Defendants' reasoning, the jury decided all five factual disputes related to the Pickering analysis in Plaintiffs' favor, and Defendants' are not entitled to qualified immunity.
b. Pickering Balancing
The Pickering balancing test is used to determine whether a defendant's interest in maintaining administrative efficiency outweighs a plaintiff's first amendment rights. Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). "Although the Pickering balancing inquiry is ultimately a legal question, . . ., its resolution often entails underlying factual disputes." Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). In this action, the Court submitted the factual disputes underlying the Pickering analysis to the jury.
The Court included five advisory questions related to thePickering analysis in the jury's verdict form, and the jury made the following factual findings: (1) Plaintiffs' speech was truthful; (2) Plaintiffs' speech did not impair discipline or control by supervisors; (3) Plaintiffs' speech did not disrupt co-worker relations; (4) Plaintiffs' speech did not interfere with the performance of their duties; and (5) Plaintiffs' speech did not obstruct the routine operation of the office. (Dkt. No. 495 at 2-6.) Based on these findings and the evidence presented at trial that support them, the Court finds that the Pickering balancing test weighs in favor of Plaintiffs Chen and Barahimi.See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968) (considering factors such as whether the speech was truthful and whether the speech caused disruption in the workplace to determine whether the employer's administrative interests outweighed the plaintiff's first amendment rights). All the factual determinations made by the jury point to the failure of Defendants' Pickering defense, and therefore, the Court finds as a matter of law that Defendants did not meet their burden.
Conclusion
Because Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, have not met their burden under the Pickering analysis, and have not shown that there is insufficient evidence to support Plaintiffs' retaliation claims, their motions are DENIED. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motions for entry of judgment.
The Clerk is directed to send copies of this order to all counsel of record.