Opinion
A22-0345
10-26-2022
CHDC Veterans Limited Partnership, Respondent, v. Cortland Powell, Appellant.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CV-HC-21-1263
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Michelle A. Larkin Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In September 2017, appellant Cortland Powell entered into a written lease agreement with respondent CHDC Veterans Limited Partnership (CHDC) for an apartment in Minneapolis. The initial lease term expired in March 2018, and the lease continued thereafter on a month-to-month basis. Under the lease terms, CHDC could terminate the lease only for enumerated reasons, such as certain criminal conduct, "material noncompliance," violation of Minnesota's landlord/tenant act, or other good cause.Additionally, by statute, Powell agreed not to allow stolen property on the premises. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.171, subd. 1(a)(1)(iv) (2020) (providing that in every lease of a residential premises, the landlord and tenant covenant that "neither will . . . allow stolen property or property obtained by robbery in those premises or in the common area and curtilage of the premises").
CHDC concedes that it must establish "good cause" for termination of the lease at issue. See Cimarron Vill. v. Washington, 659 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Minn.App. 2003) (stating that a recipient of tax credits under 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2020) is "prohibited from terminating a tenancy other than for good cause" (quotation omitted)).
2. On September 29, 2021, CHDC formally notified Powell that it was terminating the lease, effective October 31, 2021, based on "material violation" of the lease. CHDC asserted that Powell stole a package that had been delivered to another resident and that the stolen package had been found in Powell's apartment. The notification specifically stated that possession of stolen material was a violation of Minn. Stat. § 504B.171, subd. 1 (2020). CHDC also asserted that Powell assaulted residents by pouring water on them from his fourth-floor window.
3. On November 8, 2021, CHDC filed an eviction action, seeking to evict Powell for breach of lease and holdover after notice to vacate. CHDC alleged that Powell breached the lease by stealing the package and by "repeatedly" pouring water on residents. CHDC also alleged that Powell failed to vacate after written notice to do so.
4. In March 2022, following a trial before a housing-court referee, the referee recommended granting CHDC a judgment of recovery. Although the referee found that Powell's act of pouring water on residents was not a material breach, the referee found that Powell materially breached the lease by stealing a package containing a computer and bringing it to his unit. The district court adopted the referee's recommended order.
5. An eviction action is a civil matter; the fact-finder must determine whether a preponderance of the evidence supports the stated grounds for eviction. Nationwide Hous. Corp. v. Skoglund, 906 N.W.2d 900, 904, 908 (Minn.App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2018); see Vermillion State Bank v. Tennis Sanitation, LLC, 969 N.W.2d 610, 626 (Minn. 2022) (stating that we generally apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in civil cases). We review findings of fact for clear error. Cimarron Vill., 659 N.W.2d at 817. Findings are clearly erroneous "when they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole." In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). We apply a de novo standard of review to a district court's legal conclusions. Nationwide Hous. Corp., 906 N.W.2d at 907.
6. Powell contends that the eviction action was retaliatory. Powell relies on Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, which concerns holdover after notice to quit. Under section 504B.285, subdivision 2(1) (2020), the defendant must show, as relevant here, that the lease termination was intended as a penalty for the defendant's "good faith attempt to secure or enforce rights under a lease." The lease in this case required tenants to cooperate with the landlord's pest-control efforts. Powell argues that he poured water out of his window because he was trying to remove box-elder bugs, and he characterizes his actions as good faith attempts to secure rights under the lease. Even accepting that Powell was cooperating with CHDC's pest-control efforts, his argument fails. The requirement to cooperate with pest control is not a "right" under the lease, it is an obligation. See Barnes v. Weis Mgmt. Co., 347 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn.App. 1984) ("[A] tenant is allowed to defend . . . by establishing that eviction was in retaliation for good-faith efforts . . . to enforce contractual or statutory provisions designed for his benefit." (emphasis added)). In sum, Powell's retaliation claim is unavailing.
Another source of law for the retaliation defense, Minn. Stat. § 504B.441 (2020), requires a residential tenant to have complained to a government entity or commenced a formal legal proceeding. Cent. Hous. Assocs., LP v. Olson, 929 N.W.2d 398, 408 (Minn. 2019). No such complaint or legal proceeding occurred here. A third source, the common-law, requires a residential tenant to have made a good-faith complaint to the landlord. Id. at 409. No such complaint occurred here.
7. Powell contends that CHDC waived its right to terminate the lease for the theft. Powell argues that CHDC waived the theft claim by not evicting him for many months after the theft, during which time Powell paid rent. Waiver has historically been an affirmative defense to an eviction action. Oak Glen of Edina v. Brewington, 642 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Minn.App. 2002). If a landlord accepts rent while knowing that breaches of the lease have occurred, the landlord generally waives the right to rely on those breaches in an eviction action. Id. However, waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right. Seavey v. Erickson, 69 N.W.2d 889, 895 (Minn. 1955). And acceptance of rent does not necessarily constitute a waiver, particularly if the lease contains a nonwaiver clause. Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Powell, 352 N.W.2d 532, 534 (Minn.App. 1984). Here, Powell breached the lease by stealing a package and bringing it to his apartment. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.171, subd. 1(a)(1)(iv). As noted by the district court, the covenant of the landlord and tenant not to allow unlawful activities cannot be waived. Minn. Stat. § 504B.171, subd. 3 (2020). Further, under the lease, CHDC's rights and remedies, including the right to receive rent, are "cumulative," and "[t]he use of one or more right[s] . . . shall not exclude or waive any other right." In sum, Powell's waiver argument is unavailing.
Although Powell correctly notes that the eviction complaint did not specifically allege a breach of Minn. Stat. § 504B.171 (2020), the complaint alleged that Powell breached the lease by stealing another resident's computer, which was found in his apartment, and the notice to quit specifically referenced section 504B.171.
8. Powell contends that the referee "allowed inadmissible evidence to be heard at trial" and contends that he should have been afforded an "evidentiary hearing." We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Minn. 1997); In re Disciplinary Action Against Dedefo, 752 N.W.2d 523, 528 (Minn. 2008). Powell fails to specify what testimony or exhibit was improperly admitted. We have reviewed the record and see no abuse of discretion in the evidentiary rulings. Powell also contends that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to trial to address "all allegations." Powell fails to cite authority stating that he is entitled to such a hearing. In this case, the housing-court referee conducted a court trial and addressed both issues of law and fact. We fail to see how addressing evidentiary issues prior to the trial, rather than during the trial, would have changed the outcome. Powell therefore fails to show the requisite prejudice. See Palladium Holdings, LLC v. Zuni Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006-OA1, 775 N.W.2d 168, 178 (Minn.App. 2009) (holding that appellant "bears the burden of demonstrating both error and prejudice"), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 2010).
9. Lastly, Powell asserts that he refuted the allegation that he stole a resident's computer. The district court's findings concerning the theft are supported by the record, and we will not reweigh the evidence. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22 (stating that we may not reweigh the evidence as part of clear-error review).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The judgment of recovery is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.