Opinion
No. 05-15691.
April 4, 2007.
Bernardo Burstein, Burstein Associates, P.A., North Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jonathan Cohen, Sheila M. Cesarano, Stutts Bowen, LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. D.C. Docket No. 02-21485 CV-CMA.
After oral argument and careful consideration of the record, we conclude that the judgment of the district court is due to be affirmed. With respect to the plaintiffs claim that the promotion which his immediate superior, Lauzat, offered him on October 18, 2000, was denied for discriminatory reasons, we assume arguendo that there were genuine issues of material fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment. However, we also conclude that the jury necessarily rejected plaintiffs arguments in this regard. In other words, in light of the evidence submitted to the jury, the jury instructions, and the plaintiffs arguments to the jury to support plaintiffs position at trial, we conclude that the jury's rejection of plaintiffs termination arguments necessarily meant that the jury rejected plaintiffs argument that defendant discriminated against plaintiff, as well as plaintiffs argument that the worldwide sales coordinator position was a sham offer, merely a pretext to induce plaintiff to resign as defendant allegedly desired for discriminatory reasons.
The jury's verdict finding that plaintiff had not been terminated necessarily entailed the rejection of plaintiff's theory based on Thomas v. Dillard Department Stores, 116 F.3d 1432 (11th Cir. 1997), as well as the rejection of the allegedly discriminatory comments, as these were introduced to establish, inter alia, the defendant's intent to terminate plaintiff under Thomas. Thus, plaintiff would be precluded from arguing that the sham offer or the comments render the defendant's proffered reasons for denying the promotion pretextual. Arguably, the jury's verdict does not foreclose plaintiff from arguing that the reasons themselves are false; however, we agree with the district court and the magistrate judge that proffered nondiscriminatory reasons given by the defendant for the denial, plaintiff has failed to rebut each of the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons given by the defendant for the denial.
With respect to plaintiffs claims of retaliation, we conclude that plaintiffs primary claim is without merit because the defendant's decision to deny the promotion suggested by Lauzat was made before any protected activity on the part of plaintiff. We also find no merit in plaintiffs other claims of retaliation, or in his breach of contract, antitrust, and other employment discrimination claims.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is